Troy Hills Village, Inc. v. Fischler

• Decision Date: 12 July 1971
• Citation: 301 A.2d 177,122 N.J.Super. 572
• Parties: TROY HILLS VILLAGE, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Bruce FISCHLER et al., Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 572

122 N.J.Super. 572

301 A.2d 177

TROY HILLS VILLAGE, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Bruce FISCHLER et al., Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division.

July 12, 1971.

Hillard Chapnick, Parsippany, for plaintiff (Krugman, Chapnick, Grimshaw & Dubow, Parsippany, attorneys).

Arthur W. Vespignani, Parsippany, for defendants (Arthur W. Vespignani, Parsippany, attorney).

COLLINS, J.C.C., Temporarily Assigned.

This is an action for declaratory relief to determine the rights of the parties under their lease agreement, and also under Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1970 entitled 'Landlord and Tenant--Reprisals Against Tenant.' N.J.S.A. 2A:42--10.10 et seq.

Plaintiff owns a 752-unit, multi-family garden apartment in the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, Morris County, New Jersey.

On June 20, 1968, plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement with defendants Bruce and Beth Fischler, wherein plaintiff leased defendants apartment 307--A for a term of two years commencing July 1, 1968 until June 30, 1970. By memorandum dated March 6, 1970, executed between plaintiff and defendants, the aforesaid lease was extended until June 30, 1971.

Plaintiff admitted that defendant Beth Fischler,

1. Is president of the Troy Hills Village Tenants Association, Inc.

2. Has been active in making complaints to municipal authorities regarding the condition of the plaintiff's property.

3. She and her husband have been active in picketing plaintiff's rental office.

On February 22, 1971 plaintiff mailed a written notice to defendants stating that it intended to terminate their lease effective June 30, 1971.

On September 30, 1970 Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1970 became effective and was enacted into law. N.J.S.A. 2A:42--10.10 et seq. Said statute is entitled 'Landlord and Tenant--Reprisals Against Tenant,' and contains the following sections:

1. No landlord of premises or units to which this act is applicable shall serve a notice to quit upon any tenant or institute any action against a tenant to recover possession of premises, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise:

a. As a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States; or

b. As a reprisal for tenant's good faith complaint to a governmental authority of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, regulation, code or ordinance, or State law or regulation which has as its objective the regulation of premises used for dwelling purposes; or

c. As a reprisal for the tenant's being an organizer of, a member of, or involved in an activities of, any lawful organization; or

d. On account of the tenant's failure or refusal to comply with the terms of the tenancy as altered by the landlord, if the landlord shall have altered substantially the terms of the tenancy as a reprisal for any actions of the tenant set forth in subsection a, b, and c of section 1 of this act. Substantial alteration shall include the refusal to renew a lease or to continue a tenancy of the tenant without cause.

Under subsection b of this section the tenant shall originally bring his good faith complaint to the attention of the landlord or his agent and give the landlord a reasonable time to correct the violation before complaining to a governmental authority.

A landlord shall be subject to a civil action by the tenant for damages and other appropriate relief, including injunctive and other equitable remedies, as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in every case in which the landlord has violated the provisions of this section.

2. In any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover possession of premises or units to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, judgment shall be entered for the tenant if the tenant shall establish that the notice to quit, if any, or the action to recover possession was intended for any of the reasons set forth in subsections a, b, c, or d of section 1 of this act.

3. In any action or proceeding instituted by or against a tenant, the receipt by the tenant of a notice to quit or any substantial alteration of the terms of the tenancy without cause after:

a. The tenant attempts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey, or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States; or

b. The tenant, having brought a good faith complaint to the attention of the landlord and having given him a reasonable time to correct the alleged violation, complains to a governmental authority with a report of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, regulation, code or ordinance; or

c. The tenant organizes, becomes a member of, or becomes involved in any activities of, any lawful organization; or d. Judgment under section 2 of this act is entered for the tenant in a previous action for recovery of premises between the parties; shall create a rebuttable presumption that such notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant for making such attempt, report, complaint, or for being an organizer of, a member of, or involved in any activities of, any lawful organization. No reprisal shall be presumed under this section based upon the failure of a landlord to renew a lease or tenancy when so requested by a tenant if such request is made sooner than 90 days before the expiration date of the lease or tenancy, or the renewal date set forth in the lease agreement, whichever later occurs.

4. This act shall apply to all rental premises or units used for dwelling purposes except owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units. * * *.

The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the court construe the lease to declare that plaintiff is not obligated to either extend or renew the lease and further to declare Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1970 unconstitutional and ineffective and without force of law.

The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey was joined in this action as a party defendant; however, he has notified the court that he has accepted the complaint in accordance with R. 4:28--4, and at this point will not appear but is reserving his right to intervene at a later date if such a course becomes appropriate and necessary.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to declare the 'Landlord and Tenant Reprisal Law' unconstitutional.

Both parties agree that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the constitutionality of the statute in question. The sole issue at this juncture is one of law.

Plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of the Statute on four grounds. They are:

(a) The law divests a person of 'vested rights' and denies due process in the substantive sense;

(b) The statute is void because it is vague and ambiguous;

(c) The statute is an illegal interference with a lawful business; and (d) The statute would create two types of tenants in violation of the equal protection clause.

At the outset it should be pointed out that there is a presumption of the constitutional sufficiency of a legislative enactment, and the burden of proof and persuasion is heavy on the party contesting the statute. David v . Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965); Fried v. Kervick, 34 N.J. 68, 167 A.2d 380 (1961); Levitt and Sons, Inc. v. Div. Against Discrimination, etc., 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960); Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 109 A.2d 640 (1954).

The first point raised by plaintiff is that the statute divests a person of 'vested rights' and is therefore void.

Plaintiff brings to the attention of this court the recent case of Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J.Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615 (Ch.Div.1970). In that case tenants brought suit for an injunction to restrain landlords from refusing to renew leases at the expiration of their respective terms, and the landlords counterclaimed for eviction. Since Chapter 210 of the Laws of 1970 became effective during the pendency of that litigation, the court did not pass on its constitutionality. However, the court in Engler held that under the doctrine of unclean hands equity barred the landlords from refusing to renew tenants' leases solely because of the tenants' activities with a tenants' association. Plaintiff points out the dictum in that case which stated (at 447, 271 A.2d at 616) that 'a landlord's right of possession upon the expiration of a lease and the right of action to dispossess a tenant holding over without a lease are vested rights which cannot be annulled by subsequent legislation.' However, in this case the statute became effective long before the complaint was filed. Thus, the effect of the act is prospective and applies to tenancies which terminate after the effective date of the act.

Our Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 102 A.2d 587 (1954), stated that the term 'vested right' is not defined but, generally, the concept it expresses is that of a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary state action.

The word 'vested,' when used as descriptive of recognized legal rights, does not exlcude divestible rights or interests which can be divested by legislative action. It is used to denote the quality of a present right or interest, even though divestible. Jersey City v. Kelly, 134 N.J.L. 239, 47 A.2d 354 (E. & A.1946).

In Brookchester v. Ligham, 17 N.J. 460, 111 A.2d 737 (1955), the Supreme Court held that a contract between a landlord and a tenant would be governed by the police power of the State, and that the police power is superior to the contractual rights of the landlords and tenants.

A traditional and recognized function...