Troy v. Hanifin, 2-73
| Decision Date | 04 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-73,2-73 |
| Citation | 132 Vt. 76,315 A.2d 875 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Daniel M. TROY v. John W. HANIFIN. |
Manfred W. Ehrich, Jr., Bennington, for plaintiff.
Franklin P. Jones, and W. Averell Brown, Bennington, for defendant.
Before BARNEY, SMITH, KEYSER and DALEY, JJ., and LARROW, Superior judge. DALEY, Justice.
The defendant, in the year 1968, owned a summer camp sitated upon approximately twelve (12) acres of land in Searsburg, Vermont. The plaintiff, a young fireman from New York City, had through a long friendship existing between the defendant and his father, occupied the premises on a few weekends prior to October, 1968. He became desirous of purchasing the property and, in November of 1968, entered into an oral agreement with the defendant for the purchase of the premises. The purchase price agreed upon was fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000). A deed of conveyance was to be given by the defendant when payment had been made in full. The plaintiff made a down payment of one thousand dollars ($1,000) in December, 1968; possession of the property was given to the plaintiff, who thereafter made a principal payment of five hundred dollars ($500) in June of 1969, reducing the stated purchase price to twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500); a further payment of three hundred dollars ($300) was made on September 2, 1969.
Six days later, at the suggestion and instance of the defendant, the parties entered into the following written agreements: (a) A purchase agreement with a stated consideration of twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500); (b) A promissory note signed by the plaintiff in the same face amount; (c) A real estate mortgage upon the premises described in the purchase and sell agreement signed by the parties. The promissory note provided for the payment of twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500), with interest payable quarterly on the then outstanding balance with the first installment payable three months from September 8, 1969, the entire amount to be paid within ten years. The note also contained a clause for the acceleration of payment at the option of the holder upon installment default. Subsequent to these agreements, the plaintiff made no payment until the month of June, 1970, when he paid five hundred and fifty dollars ($550). In December, 1970, by letter addressed to the plaintiff, the defendant sought to terminate the written agreements; he informed the plaintiff that he was exercising his option contained in the note to declare the balance of principal and interest due and payable. The plaintiff offered certain sums to the defendant which he claimed represented the amount then due; these offers were never accepted by the defendant.
In May, 1971, the defendant's attorney informed the plaintiff that his client considered the contract for the Searsburg property ended, and his client was taking possession. The plaintiff has not occupied the lands and buildings in question since May, 1971. During the time in which the plaintiff was in possession, no improvements were made by him. The defendant has not returned any of the monies paid by the plaintiff.
By a civil action in the Bennington County Court, the plaintiff requested specific performance of the oral agreement, claiming that by its terms after the initial down payment of one thousand dollars ($1,000), he was to pay only such same as he could on principal without interest for a period of three years and the balance as he was able with interest at five per cent (5%) until the total purchase price was paid. The defendant, by answer, claimed that the oral agreement a stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be substantially correct, but alleged that it had been superseded by the written agreements. He further requested the court to terminate the written contract and by order deliver the possession of the premises to him free and clear of all claims by the plaintiff.
The court, exercising its equity powers, found the oral contract to be as claimed by the plaintiff and decreed specific performance. It also, in its judgment order, declared the written agreements to be null and void as an attempted novation. The defendant appeals.
The evidence upon which the court was required to make a decision consisted of the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant and the written instruments. The written purchase and sell agreement, the promissory note, and the real estate mortgage, given by the plaintiff upon lands to which he held no deed of conveyance, came into being some ten to eleven months after the defendant had given possession to the plaintiff of lands to which he held record title. The evidence surrounding the execution and exchange of the written agreement shows beyond dispute that the defendant requested his attorney to prepare the documents. They were executed by the plaintiff in the state of New York at the defendant's request; the defendant testified that he had the documents prepared for the protection of himself and the protection of the plaintiff. The only question raised by the plaintiff at the time the written agreements were executed related to the rate of interest, which he thought was to be at the rate of five per cent (5%). This was discussed, and the defendant gave his reason for requiring six per cent (6%); namely, to assure himself of an interest return equal to that paid on savings accounts. The plaintiff makes no claim of being fraudulently induced into signing the agreements.
The note required no set monthly or yearly payments of principal, nor did the written purchase and...
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...a "rule of evidence" and as such "does not make oral contracts illegal or void per se," even when relating to land. Troy v. Hanifin, 132 Vt. 76, 80, 315 A.2d 875, 878 (1974). But this means simply that it is possible for later signed writings to "make mutually enforceable [oral agreements] ......
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Willey v. Willey
...unpersuasive as well. The Statute of Frauds is a rule of evidence, and does not make oral agreements per se void. Troy v. Hanifin, 132 Vt. 76, 80, 315 A.2d 875, 878 (1974). Because it is a rule of evidence, the Statute of Frauds may be waived by the party who would benefit from its applicat......
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Chomicky v. Buttolph, 84-434
...complaint. Plaintiffs' contention that this Court specifically enforced an oral agreement to convey real property in Troy v. Hanifin, 132 Vt. 76, 315 A.2d 875 (1974), is without merit. In fact, the Court in Troy reversed the lower court's ruling to that effect, and held that the written agr......
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...title in trust for the vendee until conveyance, particularly where the sales contract is specifically enforceable. See Troy v. Hanifin, 132 Vt. 76, 315 A.2d 875 (1974), and cases therein cited. Such language is, however, generally descriptive rather than definitive. A contract to convey pro......