Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation Com'r

• Decision Date: 04 November 1941
• Docket Number: 9248-9253.
• Citation: Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation Com'r, 17 S.E.2d 330, 123 W.Va. 621 (W. Va. 1941)
• Parties: TRUAX-TRAER COAL CO. v. COMPENSATION COM'R et al., and five other cases.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

17 S.E.2d 330

123 W.Va. 621

TRUAX-TRAER COAL CO. v. COMPENSATION COM'R et al., and five other cases.

Nos. 9248-9253.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

November 4, 1941

Syllabus by the Court.

The constitutional provision that, in no case shall a special act be passed where a general law would be proper and can be made applicable, makes the judgment of the Legislature on the propriety and applicability of general law conclusive and not subject to judicial review. Const.W.Va. art. 6, § 39.

If while a general law is in force, a special law is passed affecting the same subject and modifying the general law, the question of the validity of the special law is judicial, and the special law will be held invalid under constitutional provision that in no case shall a special act be passed where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable. Const.W.Va. art. 6,§ 39.

Acts purporting to authorize Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen and rehear a single specific claim against the workmen's compensation fund, though the claim has been regularly heard under the general law, and has been decided adversely to the claimant, and though the decision of the commissioner has become final and is beyond modification under the general law, are unconstitutional as violating the constitutional provision that in no case shall a "special act" be passed, where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable. Code 1931, 23-6-1 et seq., as amended by Laws 1935, c. 78; Laws 1941, cc. 101 102, 104, 107, 109, 110; Const.W.Va. art. 6, § 39.

A final order of the State Compensation Commissioner in a compensation proceeding is not a "judgment" in the full sense of the term, but it is a judgment in that it is a final determination of a controversy relating to property rights by a public official expressly authorized to make such a decision.

A "judgment" is "property" and as such is the proper subject of constitutional protection.

Acts purporting to authorize the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen and rehear a single specific claim against the workmen's compensation fund, though the claim has been regularly heard under the general law, and has been decided adversely to the claimant, and though the decision of the commissioner has become final and is beyond modification under the general law, are unconstitutional as violating the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Code 1931, 23-6-1 et seq., as amended by Laws 1935, c. 78; Laws 1941, cc. 101, 102, 104, 107, 109, 110; U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const.W.Va. art. 3, §§ 1, 10.

Acts purporting to authorize the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen and rehear a single specific claim against the workmen's compensation fund, though it has been regularly heard under the general law, and has been decided adversely to the claimant, and though the decision of the commissioner has become final and is beyond modification under the general law, are unconstitutional on ground that they nullify decisions of legally established judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals. Code 1931, 23-6-1 et seq., as amended by Laws 1935, c. 78; Laws 1941, cc. 101, 102, 104 107, 109, 110.

The constitutional separation of the departments of government inhibits the Legislature from nullifying or modifying by a special act a decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal where the decision has been regularly made and has become final under the general law relating thereto.

1. An act of the legislature which purports to authorize the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen and rehear a single specific claim against the workmen's compensation fund, which has been regularly heard under the general law, and decided adversely to the claimant, which decision of the commissioner has become final and is beyond modification under the general law, violates the provision of the state constitution against the enactment of special laws where a general law would be proper and can be made applicable.

2. The "due process" and "equal protection" provisions of the state and federal constitutions interdict an act of the legislature, which attempts to authorize a rehearing in a case before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, in which a decision by the commissioner has been made under the general law, and become final and beyond modification under the procedure prescribed by the workmen's compensation law.

3. The constitutional separation of the departments of government inhibits the legislature from nullifying or modifying by a special act a final decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal which has been regularly made and become final under the general law relating thereto.

In No. 9248:

Brown, Jackson & Knight and John A. Field, Jr., all of Charleston, for petitioner.

H. D. Rollins, of Charleston, for respondent E. R. Robinson.

In No. 9249:

Charles E. Mahan, of Fayetteville, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

In No. 9250:

C. E. Mahan and S. C. Higgins, Jr., all of Fayetteville, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

In No. 9251:

File, Scherer & File, of Beckley, for petitioner.

M. O. Litz, of Charleston, for respondent Bennie Bell.

In No. 9252:

File, Scherer & File, of Beckley, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

In No. 9253:

H. G. Shaffer, of Madison, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

ROSE Judge.

Separate rules in prohibition have been awarded by this Court against the State Compensation Commissioner, C. L. Heaberlin, and the claimants hereinafter named, upon the relation of the employers on the ground that the separate acts of the legislature, under which hearings on said claims are proceeding before said commissioner, are unconstitutional. The compensation commissioner has not answered nor made return to any of these writs, and has not otherwise made an appearance in any of the cases; none of the claimants, except Bennie Bell and E. R. Robinson, has answered. These two respondents not only made answer and return, but have appeared by counsel in this Court. Consolidated briefs have been filed on behalf of the six several relators, with special supplemental briefs for the individual relators in each separate case. By agreement of all those appearing here the cases were argued and submitted and to be decided together, although there has been no actual consolidation.

Briefly the six several cases are as follows:

Case No. 9248--Truax-Traer Coal Company v. Heaberlin, Commissioner, and E. R. Robinson: The claimant was injured on May 24,

1935, and was given an award of thirty-three per cent permanent partial disability, the last payment on which was made December 17, 1937. In January, 1938, he had certain correspondence with the commissioner, and on August 30, 1939, he employed counsel who formally requested the reopening of the case. This was refused August 31, 1939, on the ground that more than one year had elapsed since the last payment on the former award, which action of the commissioner was affirme d by the compensation appeal board October 21, 1939, and by this Court October 8, 1940, Robinson v. State Compensation Com'r, 11 S.E.2d 111.

Case No. 9249--The New River Company v. Heaberlin, Commissioner, and Leo Daciek: The New River Company, at the request of the compensation commissioner, on July 5, 1939, filed a report that Leo Daciek was claiming benefits under the provisions of article 6, chapter 23 of the Code, 23-6-1 et seq., as amended by Laws 1935, c. 78, known as the "Silicosis Act", on which a hearing was had August 30, 1939, and on September 22, 1939. At this hearing the employer resisted the claim of Daciek, and on December 14, 1939, the commissioner found on the non-medical question arising, as a fact, that "the claimant had not been exposed to the inhalation of silicon dioxide dust in harmful quantities for a period of two years, in the same employment, as provided by Section 5, Article 6, Chapter 23 of the Code." The appeal board affirmed this finding April 20, 1940. Nothing further was done by the claimant.

Case No. 9250--Koppers Company v. Heaberlin, Commissioner, and Alfred F. Dean: The claimant was injured May 14, 1932, and was regularly given a permanent partial disability award of fifty-five per cent, on which the last payment was made June 7, 1936. Nothing further was done toward appealing or reopening the case.

Case No. 9251--Koppers Coal Company v. Heaberlin and Bennie Bell. This claimant was injured June 3, 1926, and was allowed in due course a permanent partial disability award of twenty-five per cent December 17, 1927, which was increased to fifty per cent May 16, 1928, and to seventy per cent September 11, 1930, and finally to seventy-five per cent February 3, 1932. On March 9, 1932, the commissioner refused further compensation and upon hearing duly had this action was affirmed by the commissioner October 21, 1932. Bell appealed to this Court, which, in turn, affirmed the commissioner April 18, 1933. Bell v. State Compensation Commissioner, 113 W.Va. 571, 169 S.E. 162. Again the claimant petitioned for a reopening of his claim, which request was refused December 31, 1935, which ruling was reaffirmed by the commissioner after formal hearing January 30, 1936, and later by the appeal board. Finally, in 1937, the commissioner again refused to reopen the case, and this last action was affirmed by the appeal board April 24, 1937.

Case. No. 9252--Lillybrook Coal Company v. Heaberlin, Commissioner and Herbert Morris: The claimant was injured September 18, 1929, and on February 27, 1931, was awarded a rating of twenty per cent permanent partial disability, the last payment on which was made March 31, 1931. A request...