Truck Trailer Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency

• Decision Date: 12 November 2021
• Docket Number: No. 16-1430,16-1430
• Citation: 17 F.4th 1198
• Parties: TRUCK TRAILER MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., Respondents California Air Resources Board, et al., Intervenors
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

17 F.4th 1198

TRUCK TRAILER MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner

v.ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al., Respondents

California Air Resources Board, et al., Intervenors

No. 16-1430

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued September 15, 2020

Decided November 12, 2021

Elisabeth S. Theodore argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were S. Zachary Fayne, Jonathan S. Martel, and Samuel F. Callahan.

H. Thomas Byron, III, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan Brightbill, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Eric G. Hostetler and Jennifer L. Utrecht, Attorneys. Sue S. Chen, Attorney, and Douglas N. Letter, General Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, entered appearances.

Alice Henderson argued the cause for respondents-intervenors Public Health and Environmental Organizations. With her on the brief were Jim Dennison, Vickie Patton, Peter Zalzal, Benjamin Longstreth, Peter Huffman, Vera Pardee, Joanne Spalding, Andres Restrepo, Susannah Landes Weaver, Sean H. Donahue, Clare Lakewood, Katherine Hoff, and Kevin Bundy.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Robert W. Byrne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Myung J. Park, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, M. Elaine Meckenstock, Caitlan McLoon, and Ryan R. Hoffman, Deputy Attorneys General, William Tong, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Matthew I. Levine and Scott N. Koschwitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Maura Healey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Tom Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, Jacob J. Larson, Assistant Attorney General, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Garrahan, Attorney-in-Charge, Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney Genera l, Bob Ferguson , Attorney Gene ral, Office of t he Attorney Gene ral for the Stat e of Washington, Thomas J. Young, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont, and Nicholas F. Persampieri, Assistant Attorney General, were on t he brief for respon dents-intervenors C alifornia Air Resou rces Board, et al. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, entered an appearance.

Before: Millett, Katsas^* , and Walker, Circuit Judges.

Opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge Millett.

Walker, Circuit Judge:

In 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a rule for trailers pulled by tractors based on a statute enabling the EPA to regulate "motor vehicles." In that same rule, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued fuel efficiency standards for trailers based on a statute enabling NHTSA to regulate "commercial medium-duty or heavy-duty on-highway vehicles."

Trailers, however, have no motor. They are therefore not "motor vehicles." Nor are they "vehicles" when that term is used in the context of a vehicle's fuel economy, since motorless vehicles use no fuel.

We therefore grant the petition and vacate all portions of the rule that apply to trailers.

I.

The most widely recognized "tractor-trailer" combination is what a layperson calls a semitruck. A trailer is the back portion attached to a motorized tractor in the front. Trailers include tanks, car carriers, logging trailers, and platforms. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2 , 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,640 (Oct. 25, 2016).

In 2016, the EPA and NHTSA jointly created a rule called " Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2." Id. at 73,478. Under that rule, for the first time, those agencies set greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency standards for heavy-duty trailers. The rule requires trailer manufacturers to adopt some combination of fuel-saving technologies, such as side skirts and automatic tire pressure systems.

Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc. objected to the rule and timely petitioned for review. In 2017, this court granted the Association's motion to stay the EPA's portion of the rule to the extent it applies to trailers. In 2020, we stayed the compliance dates in NHTSA's portion.

II.

An agency's rule may not exceed the agency's statutory authority. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(C) ; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). To understand that authority, we consider the statute's text, structure, and context. We ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If Congress has, and the agency acted in accordance with the statute, our inquiry ends. Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").¹

A. The EPA's Authority

According to the EPA, it can regulate (1) trailers as motor vehicles, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), and (2) trailer manufacturers as motor-vehicle manufacturers, id. § 7550(1). We discuss each in turn.

1. Motor Vehicles

The EPA primarily relied on § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act for its authority to regulate trailers’ effects on greenhouse gas emissions. Id. § 7521(a)(1). That section requires the EPA to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles and their engines if they emit harmful air pollutants. It provides:

The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines , which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful life (as determined under subsection (d), relating to useful life of vehicles for purposes of certification), whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution.

Id. (emphases added).

The Act defines "motor vehicle" to exclude anything that does not propel itself. Id. § 7550(2). For the purposes of § 202, a "motor vehicle " is "any self-propelled vehicle designed for transporting persons or property on a street or highway ." Id. (emphases added).

Because trailers are not "self-propelled," they are not motor vehicles under § 202. Therefore, the EPA cannot rely on § 202 to regulate trailers’ effects on greenhouse gas emissions.

The EPA and Respondent-Intervenors ask us to focus on the second half of motor vehicle's definition, requiring a motor vehicle to be "designed for transporting persons or property." Id. They say "the tractor-trailer as a whole should be considered the pertinent vehicle" because a tractor "cannot accomplish its intended purpose" unless the tractor is pulling the trailer. Respondents’ Br. 29.

But tractors can carry people and things without trailers attached. As anyone who has spent any time on a highway knows, they often do. So a tractor without a trailer can still accomplish what it is "designed for." 42 U.S.C. § 7550(2). That makes a self-propelled tractor a "motor vehicle" long before a trailer is ever attached.

The EPA also invites us to focus on the second sentence of § 202(a)(1): "Such standards shall be applicable to such vehicles ... whether such vehicles ... are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution." Id. § 7521(a)(1). The EPA says that sentence allows it to regulate significant components of the complete vehicle because Congress suggested that the EPA could create standards for vehicles or portions of vehicles not "designed as complete systems." Id.

But that's not what Congress did. Rather, it created two categories of complete motor vehicles. Category one: motor vehicles with built-in pollution control. Category two: motor vehicles with add-in devices for pollution control. Either way, for both categories, the phrase "such vehicles," in that sentence, refers to "motor vehicles," not components. That takes us back to where we started. Because trailers are not "motor vehicles," no reference to "motor vehicles" — like "such vehicles" — covers trailers.

The EPA's theories, taken to their logical conclusion, mean that the EPA could regulate other non-propelled items attached to a motorized vehicle. For example: rooftop cargo carriers. They are "designed for transporting ... property." Id. § 7550(2). And when they are on a car, they are attached to a motor vehicle. But they are not themselves motor vehicles.²

Perhaps sensing that it needs to offer a limiting principle, the EPA claims that it can regulate only "significant" vehicle components. Respondents’ Br. 34. But that limit is atextual. Even if a trailer is a motor-vehicle component — which we doubt³ — we cannot endorse a hazy line mentioned nowhere in a statutory provision that allows the EPA to regulate "motor vehicles," not motor-vehicle components.

In addition, the EPA is incorrect that § 202(a)(5), (a)(6), and (k) of the Clean Air Act provide contextual support for its alleged authority under § 202(a)(1) to regulate any component of an entire vehicle — even assuming again that a trailer is a motor-vehicle component. These provisions address fill pipes,...