Trueblood v. Inch
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:21cv19/MW/EMT |
| Parties | WILMARIO DEVONDRIC TRUEBLOOD, Petitioner, v. MARK S. INCH, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Petitioner Wilmario Devondric Trueblood (Trueblood) filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with an incorporated appendix and memorandum of law (ECF No. 1). Respondent (the State) filed an answer (ECF No. 13) and relevant portions of the state court record (ECF Nos 13-1 through 13-29). Trueblood filed a reply (ECF No. 18).
The case was referred to the undersigned for issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). After careful consideration of the issues presented by the parties, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. It is also the opinion of the undersigned that Trueblood is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are established by the state court record (see ECF No. 13).[1] Trueblood challenges his convictions and sentences entered in the Circuit Court for Leon County, Florida, in 2014. He was charged in case number 2013CF915 with Count 1, burglary of a dwelling, and Count 2, grand theft, at the Bilal residence (ECF No. 13-1 at 16). Trueblood proceeded to a jury trial on these charges on March 11, 2014, and the jury found him guilty as charged on Count 1 and not guilty on Count 2 (ECF No. 13-1 at 191-92).
Trueblood was charged in case number 2013CF916 with Count 1, burglary of a dwelling, and Count 2, grand theft at the Verfaillie/Pereira residence (ECF No. 133 at 23). After a jury trial on May 13, 2014, the jury found him guilty as charged on both counts (ECF No. 13-3 at 194-95). Trueblood was sentenced in both cases on June 3, 2014 (ECF No. 13-2 at 68-77). In case number 2013CF915, he received a sentence of 446.4 months (ECF No. 13-1 at 202-08). In case number 2013CF916, he received a sentence of 457.8 months, both counts to run concurrently (ECF No. 13-3 at 201-07).
Trueblood appealed his judgments and sentences to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) in two separate appeals. Before the appeals proceeded, however, he filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) to correct sentencing error in case number 2013CF915 (ECF No. 13-7 at 4). The motion was heard by the circuit court, which struck a fine and surcharge and a corrected a scrivener's error on the scoresheet (ECF No. 13-7 at 24-25). Trueblood was resentenced with a corrected scoresheet to 446.4 months (ECF No. 13-7 at 29).
Trueblood's two separate appeals were consolidated in the First DCA, and he filed a counseled amended brief arguing trial court error (1) in failing to hold a hearing and determine his competency to proceed after ordering a competency evaluation; and (2) in admitting evidence of his multiple burglaries in both trials (ECF No. 13-9 at 2-64). The state filed an answer brief (ECF No. 13-10) and Trueblood filed a reply (ECF No. 13-11 at 2).
The First DCA issued a written opinion on June 15, 2016, affirming in part and reversing in part with instructions (ECF No. 13-12 at 4-8). The court reversed on the issue of failure to hold a competency hearing, and remanded for a nunc pro tunc competency hearing based on the competency evaluation Trueblood was provided prior to trial (ECF No. 13-12 at 4-8). See Trueblood v. State, 193 So.3d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Table). The mandate issued on July 1, 2016 (ECF No. 13-12 at 3).
On remand, the circuit court conducted a nunc pro tunc evidentiary hearing on March 7, 2017, as to Trueblood's competence to stand trial in the two cases (ECF No. 13-13 at 122-43). After hearing testimony from Dr. Michael D'Errico, the doctor who examined Trueblood in April 2013, and after considering other record evidence, the state court subsequently issued an order on October 5, 2017, finding Trueblood was competent to proceed as of the date of the doctor's report and thereafter to the time of his trials (ECF No. 13-13 at 96-98). The state circuit court concluded that (ECF No. 13-13 at 98).
Trueblood appealed his judgments and sentences again to the First DCA in two separate appeals, which were consolidated for briefing and consideration. Trueblood filed a counseled consolidated initial brief arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion on remand by finding he was competent at the time of his trials (ECF No. 13-15 at 2). The State filed an answer brief (ECF No. 13-16 at 2) and Trueblood filed a reply brief (ECF No. 13-17 at 2). On June 20, 2019, the First DCA issued a per curiam affirmance (ECF No. 13-18 at 3). See Trueblood v. State, 273 So.3d 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (Table). The mandate issued on July 11, 2019 (ECF No. 13-18 at 2).
On September 25, 2019, Trueblood filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in both cases (ECF No. 13-20 at 2). He alleged that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in regard to denial of his motion to suppress. The State filed a response with an appendix (ECF No. 13-21 at 2), and Trueblood filed a reply with an appendix (ECF No. 13-22 at 2). The First DCA denied the petition on the merits on June 12, 2020 (ECF No. 13-23 at 2) and denied the motion for rehearing on August 3, 2020 (ECF No. 13-24 at 6). See Trueblood v. State, 299 So.3d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
During the pendency of his petition in the First DCA, Trueblood filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court on January 15, 2020 (mailbox rule) alleging manifest injustice because the trial judge who presided over his trials was subsequently removed from office (ECF No. 13-25 at 4). He also alleged manifest injustice in the trial court's denial of a second competency evaluation (id. at 14). The Florida Supreme Court treated the petition as a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and transferred it to the state circuit court to be treated as if it had originally been filed in the circuit court on January 15, 2020 (ECF No. 13-26 at 2). In that order, the court stated that the transfer should not be considered as an adjudication of the merits, a determination that the circuit court had jurisdiction, that the petition should be considered as a motion for postconviction relief, or that it should be ruled upon on the merits (id.). The postconviction court denied the motion as untimely under Rule 3.850(b) (ECF No. 13-25 at 91). The court also concluded that even if not untimely, the claims were meritless and should be summarily denied because the claim about the trial judge was entirely speculative and the competency issue was previously raised and addressed on remand from the First DCA (id.).
Trueblood, pro se, appealed the denial of postconviction relief (ECF No. 1327 at 2), and the State elected not to file an answer brief pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2)(c) (ECF No. 13-28 at 2). The First DCA affirmed per curiam on October 15, 2020 (ECF No. 13-29 at 3), and the mandate issued on November 12, 2020 (id. at 2). See Trueblood v. State, 304 So.3d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (Table).
Trueblood filed the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 11, 2021 (ECF No. 1).
A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).[2] Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Under the Williams framework, the federal court must first determine the “clearly established Federal law, ” namely, “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). After identifying the governing legal principle, the federal court determines whether the state court's adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is “contrary” only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (...
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