Trueblood v. State, 93-396

Decision Date22 April 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-396,93-396
Citation635 So.2d 1024
Parties19 Fla. L. Weekly D945 Steven Lopez TRUEBLOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Amelia L. Beisner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

DAVIS, Judge.

Appellant, Steven Lopez Trueblood, appeals from a sentence imposed after appellant pled nolo contendere to a charge of escape from a juvenile detention facility. Appellant raises three issues as involving error: (1) the trial court's sentencing appellant as an adult without making specific written findings of fact on each of the factors set forth in section 39.059(7)(c)1.-6; (2) the trial court's ordering that appellant be given credit for prison time served prior to resentencing, to be determined by the Department of Corrections; and (3) the trial court's entering of a written order which fails to comport with the court's oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing concerning the imposition of restitution and costs. The state has conceded error as to Issues I and III. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with escape from a juvenile detention facility. On April 14, 1992, after a plea of nolo contendere, appellant was sentenced as an adult to 12 years incarceration. On appeal, this court reversed the 12-year sentence and remanded for resentencing. Trueblood v. State, 610 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). On remand, this court directed the trial court to make specific written findings of fact on each of the factors set forth in section 39.059(7)(c)1.-6, if the trial court determined to impose adult sanctions. Such findings were to be made with reference only to the escape conviction. Trueblood, 610 So.2d at 14. On December 17, 1992, appellant appeared for resentencing. The trial court sentenced appellant as an adult to five years incarceration.

As to the first issue, appellant argues that the trial court failed to comply with this court's directive in Trueblood v. State, 610 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) by failing to address each of the factors set forth in section 39.059(7)(c) and by commingling the findings with regard to the escape conviction with findings on appellant's burglary conviction. Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to address whether the escape offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner, a required finding under section 39.059(7)(c)2. Appellant also argues that the trial court failed to address whether the escape offense was against persons or property, a required finding under section 39.059(7)(c)3. The state concedes that the trial court failed to address each of the statutory factors set forth in section 39.059(7)(c). We reverse and remand for resentencing. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to make specific written findings on each of the factors set forth in section 39.059(7)(c)1.-6, with reference only to the escape conviction.

As to the second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to specify the exact amount of previously served prison time for which appellant was to be given credit. The judgment entered by the court indicates that appellant is to be given "credit for all time previously served on this count in the Department of Corrections prior to resentencing," without specifying the amount of prison time appellant had served. The state asserts that pursuant to this court's opinion in DeSue v. State, 605 So.2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the trial court was not required to specify the amount of previously served prison time for which appellant was to be given credit. In DeSue, this court found that although it is preferable for the trial court to require the Department of Corrections' calculation of time served to be included in the presentence investigation report, so that such amount can be stated in the...

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7 cases
  • Whitehead v. State, 94-1955
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 1995
    ...v. State, 650 So.2d 696, 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); see also Verble v. State, 636 So.2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Trueblood v. State, 635 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); White v. State, 624 So.2d 811, 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Armstead v. State, 612 So.2d 623, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); ......
  • C.A. v. State, 96-215
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 1997
    ...court's oral pronouncement reserving restitution, the oral pronouncement prevails over the written form. See, e.g., Trueblood v. State, 635 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Rada v. State, 656 So.2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 660 So.2d 715 Affirmed. ...
  • Luke v. State, 95-1191
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 1, 1996
    ...that when a written order does not conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment and sentence, the latter controls. Trueblood v. State, 635 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Howard v. State, 591 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Kelly v. State, 414 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In this case, ......
  • Saulsberry v. State, 4D05-1950.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 17, 2006
    ...imposing sixty days as a condition of ten years probation. See Arroyo v. State, 651 So.2d 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Trueblood v. State, 635 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Kelly v. State, 414 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Additionally, the sentence order improperly included a general sente......
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