Trueblood v. Tinsley, No. 19915
| Docket Nº | No. 19915 |
| Citation | 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 |
| Case Date | December 04, 1961 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Page 655
v.
Harry C. TINSLEY, Warden of the Colorado State Penitentiary,
Defendant in Error.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1961.
[148 Colo. 504]
Page 656
Samuel D. Menin, Denver, for plaintiff in error.Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
FRANTZ, Justice.
Five reasons are urged for the reversal of the 'order and judgment' of the trial court entered against the petitioner Trueblood in habeas corpus proceedings. We shall consider these reasons seriatim.
1. 'The judgment and sentence was not within statutory limitations in that petitioner was not subject to the so-called sex offenders act.' To support this contention Trueblood theorizes that the evidence fails to bring him within the purview of C.R.S. '53, 39-19-1 et seq., 1960 [148 Colo. 505] Perm.Cum.Supp., providing for sentencing sex offenders, and therefore any sentence which the trial court might have imposed ought to have been laid upon him pursuant to C.R.S. '53, 40-2-32.
Sex offenders within the meaning of C.R.S. '53, 39-19-1 et seq., 1960 Perm.Cum.Supp., may be sentenced 'to a state institution for an indeterminate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life.' Those who offend against C.R.S. '53, 40-2-32, providing for punishment of persons who take indecent and improper liberties with the person of a child, may, if over eighteen years of age, be confined 'in the penitentiary for a term of not more than ten years.'
Page 657
On June 9, 1958, Trueblood was sentenced to the Colorado State Penitentiary for a 'period not exceeding life and not less than one day (1 day).' Prior to the imposition of sentence, the trial court had had Trueblood examined psychiatrically and had before it the psychiatric report.
Out of this report Trueblood draws encouragement for his position that C.R.S. '53, 39-19-1 et seq., 1960 Perm.Cum.Supp., is inapplicable to his misdeed. From statements by the doctor that he showed 'no evidence of thinking disorder' and that he 'is not mentally deficient,' and the absence of statements that he constituted a threat of bodily harm to the public or that he is an habitual offender, Trueblood claims that he falls without the pale of the provisions for sentencing sex offenders.
The applicable section in part reads:
'For the better administration of justice and the more efficient control, treatment and rehabilitation of persons convicted of * * * indecent liberties * * * if the district court is of the opinion that any such person, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill, the district court in lieu of the sentence now provided by law, for each such crime, may sentence such person to a state institution for an indeterminate term * * *.'
[148 Colo. 506] Assuming that the psychiatric report could be interpreted in the favorable manner proposed by Trueblood, it would not necessarily be binding upon the trial court. To hold otherwise would empower the psychiatrist to impose the sentence through his report. It was not intended that the psychiatrist thus become vicariously the judge under the statute, or otherwise limit or restrict the court in the exercise of its judgment. The words, 'if the district court is of the opinion that any * * * person, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public,' and so forth, contained in the statute, leave Trueblood's argument in this respect bereft of substance.
Indeed, the psychiatric report is not the sole gauge by which to determine the character of the sentence....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Marcy, No. 80SA303
...566 P.2d 364 (1977); People v. Czajkowski, supra; People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302, 557 P.2d 1205 (1976); see also Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961). Similarly, separate statutes proscribing with different penalties what ostensibly might be different acts, but offering ......
-
R. McG. v. J. W., No. 80SA167
...Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado constitution. See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 8 Gender as the basis of statutory differential in treatment is also apparent......
-
People v. White, No. 80SA348
...People v. Breazeale, 190 Colo. 17, 544 P.2d 970 (1976); Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); see also People v. Medina, 193 Colo. 190, 564 P.2d Page 693 119 (1977); People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112, 521 P.2d 1265 (......
-
People v. Leisen
...report, and that the statute was not intended to limit or restrict the court in the exercise of its judgment (Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961), cert. den. 370 U.S. 929, 82 S.Ct. 1570, 8 L.Ed.2d 507 (1962); Vanderhoof v. People of Colorado, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903......
-
People v. Marcy, No. 80SA303
...566 P.2d 364 (1977); People v. Czajkowski, supra; People v. Hulse, 192 Colo. 302, 557 P.2d 1205 (1976); see also Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961). Similarly, separate statutes proscribing with different penalties what ostensibly might be different acts, but offering ......
-
R. McG. v. J. W., No. 80SA167
...Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado constitution. See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 8 Gender as the basis of statutory differential in treatment is also apparent......
-
People v. White, No. 80SA348
...People v. Breazeale, 190 Colo. 17, 544 P.2d 970 (1976); Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); see also People v. Medina, 193 Colo. 190, 564 P.2d Page 693 119 (1977); People v. Lyons, 185 Colo. 112, 521 P.2d 1265 (......
-
People v. Leisen
...report, and that the statute was not intended to limit or restrict the court in the exercise of its judgment (Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961), cert. den. 370 U.S. 929, 82 S.Ct. 1570, 8 L.Ed.2d 507 (1962); Vanderhoof v. People of Colorado, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903......