Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.
| Decision Date | 06 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–35462.,15–35462. |
| Citation | 822 F.3d 1037 |
| Parties | Cassie Cordell TRUEBLOOD, next friend of Ara Badayos, an incapacitated person; A.B., by and through her next friend Cassie Cordell Trueblood; K.R., by and through his next friend Marilyn Roberts ; D.D., by and through his next friend Andrea Crumpler; Disability Rights Washington, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES; Western State Hospital; Eastern State Hospital; Kevin W. Quigley, Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services, in his official capacity; Ron Adler, CEO of Western State Hospital; Dorothy Sawyer, Chief Executive Officer of Eastern State Hospital in her Official Capacity, Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Noah G. Purcell (argued), Robert W. Ferguson, Anne E. Egeler, Amber L. Leaders, and Nicholas Williamson, Washington State Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Defendants–Appellants.
Anita Khandelwal (argued), Public Defender Association, Seattle, WA; La Rond Baker and Margaret Chen, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Seattle, WA; David R. Carlson and Emily Cooper, Disability Rights Washington, Seattle, WA; Christopher Carney, Sean Gillespie, and Kenan Isitt, Carney Gillespie Isitt PLLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.
Harry Williams IV, Law Office of Harry Williams, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae Disability Rights Network.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Marsha J. Pechman, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:14–cv–01178–MJP.
Before: MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS and M. MARGARET McKEOWN, Circuit Judges and SHARON L. GLEASON,* District Judge.
Washington State, through its Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”),1 has faced considerable challenges—both legal and practical—in administering timely competency evaluation and restoration services to pretrial detainees in city and county facilities. It is well recognized that detention in a jail is no substitute for mentally ill detainees who need therapeutic evaluation and treatment. Long-standing Supreme Court precedent requires that “a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). To honor its constitutional obligations, Washington law provides that when “there is reason to doubt [the] competency” of a person facing criminal charges, the defense counsel or prosecutor may request an evaluation or a court may sua sponte order an evaluation to ensure that only those persons competent to stand trial are prosecuted. Wash. Rev.Code § 10.77.060.
Following a bench trial, the district court detailed Washington's shortcomings in providing competency evaluation and restoration services, the insufficient number of beds and personnel as a result of inadequate funding and planning, and the deleterious effects of prolonged incarceration without evaluation and treatment for mentally ill detainees. The court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. Thus, the question we address is a narrow one, focused on the timeliness of the evaluation—does the Due Process Clause compel the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation?
We agree with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court's order. The district court's seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, we vacate the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remand to the district court to amend the injunction in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Consistent with its constitutional obligation, Washington law provides that “[n]o incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues.” Wash. Rev.Code § 10.77.050. Once a judge, defense counsel, or prosecutor raises doubt about a criminal defendant's legal competency, the court must order an evaluation. Id. § 10.77.060(1)(a).
DSHS is responsible for overseeing both competency evaluations and any following restorative services. See id. §§ 10.77.010(5); 10.77.088. The evaluation must be conducted by a trained evaluator and includes a face-to-face interview with the individual whose competency is in doubt, which can occur in one of three settings: a jail, a state hospital, or in the community. Id. § 10.77.060(1). Individuals who are in jail (because they have been denied bail or have not posted bail) generally remain in jail awaiting performance of the competency evaluation. The court may order evaluations to take place at a state hospital if “necessary for the health, safety, or welfare of the defendant.” Id. § 10.77.060(1)(d). Nearly ninety percent of the evaluations occur in a jail or community setting. Detainees retain the right against self-incrimination during competency evaluations, have a right to counsel during the interview process, and may be permitted to have a defense expert for questions of competency. Id. § 10.77.020(4).
Once the requisite information has been gathered, the evaluator's report and recommendations are presented to the court. Id. § 10.77.065. If an individual is found competent, the criminal prosecution may continue, but if a person is found incompetent to stand trial, criminal prosecution is stayed. Id. § 10.77.084(1)(a). At that point, the court may order restorative services or, if the defendant is charged with a nonfelony crime that is not a serious offense as defined in § 10.77.092, the court may dismiss the case or refer the defendant for civil commitment. Id. § 10.77.088.
Washington law, effective July 24, 2015, sets a performance target of seven days or less for competency evaluations, but imposes a fourteen-day maximum time limit, with the possibility of a seven-day extension for clinical reasons. Id. § 10.77.068(1)(a).2 The target and time limit were to be phased in over a one-year period beginning July 1, 2015. Id. The law provides a number of defenses for failing to meet the deadline, including the inability to obtain necessary information regarding the defendant's history, insufficient private space in the detention facility to conduct the evaluation, and “lack of availability or participation by counsel, jail or court personnel, interpreters, or the defendant,” any of which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, relieve the state of its duty to perform the evaluation within the time allotted. Id. § 10.77.068(1)(c). This provision explicitly “does not create any new entitlement or cause of action” to enforce these deadlines. Id. § 10.77.068(5).
This appeal arises out of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed in federal district court against DSHS by Cassie Trueblood, on behalf of a single plaintiff, Ara Badayos. Badayos had been found legally incompetent to stand trial and was detained in solitary confinement in the Snohomish County Jail awaiting transfer to a hospital for restorative treatment. The complaint was then amended to include a class of individuals who were either awaiting a competency evaluation or had been found incompetent and were awaiting restorative services. The district court certified the class as:
All persons who are now, or will be in the future, charged with a crime in the State of Washington and: (a) who are ordered by a court to receive competency evaluation or restoration services through DSHS; (b) who are waiting in jail for those services; and (c) for whom DSHS receives the court order.
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the question of “whether current in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluation and restoration services violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” finding that “current in-jail wait time[s] experienced by Plaintiffs and class members [are] far beyond any constitutional boundary ....” Relying substantially on this court's reasoning in Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.2003), the district court found that substantive due process analysis applied to the plaintiffs' liberty interest in freedom from incarceration, and concluded that “wait times of less than seven days comport with due process, and that anything beyond seven days is suspect.”
The court held a bench trial to determine the “precise outer boundary permitted by the Constitution” based on the specific conditions present in Washington State. During the trial, the district court heard testimony on three main issues: the current state of competency evaluations and restorative services in Washington; the effects of prolonged detention in jail, rather than a hospital, for mentally ill individuals; and the feasibility of providing competency evaluation and restorative services within seven days.
Between 2001 and 2011, demand for competency evaluations in Washington increased by eighty-two percent. The district court found that evaluation services were delayed due to staffing shortages, high evaluator turnover, lack of accurate data and timely...
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