Truitt v. Department of State, 88-5086
| Citation | 897 F.2d 540,283 U.S.App. D.C. 86 |
| Decision Date | 10 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-5086,88-5086 |
| Parties | Marc TRUITT, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 83-3592).
Sonya D. Winner, with whom Michael S. Horne, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
John D. Bates, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and R. Craig Lawrence and A. Patricia Frohman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before MIKVA, Circuit Judge, ROBINSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and HAROLD H. GREENE, * United States District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
This appeal solicits rulings on a variety of issues arising under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 1 but the record presently before us permits sound resolution of relatively few. Principally among the emerging questions appropriate for present consideration, however, is whether a federal executive department may refuse to search a file likely containing sought-after but undisclosed documents solely on a claim that FOIA's provision that requests for records "reasonably describe[ ] such records" 2 had not been complied with. We answer that question in the negative.
Marc Truitt is an historian probing Anglo-American policies and activities toward Albania during World War II and thereafter. In the early 1980's, he invoked the Freedom of Information Act in efforts to obtain pertinent materials from eight federal agencies. 3 Numerous documents were located; many were released without expurgation, others were redacted before release, and still others were withheld in their entirety. Dissatisfied with the agencies' searches, their revelations and the tempo of administrative appeals, Truitt instituted this litigation in the District Court. 4
Pursuant to the court's order, 5 the agencies completed their searches, filed and supplemented their Vaughn indices, 6 and released additional documents. 7 Ultimately, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the court, concluding that the searches were adequate and that the materials withheld were exempt from disclosure, granted summary judgment in favor of the agencies. 8 This appeal followed, and we now make such dispositions as the record enables.
Truitt attacks the thoroughness of the file search made by the Department of State. It is elementary that an agency responding to a FOIA request must "conduct[ ] a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents," 9 and, if challenged, must demonstrate "beyond material doubt" that the search was reasonable. 10 11 If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper. 12
Truitt's call upon the State Department originally was for information on Albania falling within several subject categories. 13 The Department conducted a search, but did not extend it to "File 767," in which materials on Albanian "internal, political and national affairs" were kept. Later, on a visit to the National Archives, Truitt found in that file 14 a large number of pertinent documents which had not been released to him. 15 Other records had been removed from the file, apparently because they remained classified, but markers placed in the file indicated the probability that they too were responsive to Truitt's request. 16 Truitt insisted upon an agency examination of the file's removed components, a release of those nonexempt, and inclusion in the Department's Vaughn index of those claimed to be exempt. 17
The Department has not honored Truitt's demand. In defense, it says no more than that Truitt asked for searches of only two files, neither of which was File 767; that those two files were examined; and that there was nothing to suggest the importance of looking into any other file. 18 The record, however, challenges the Department's factual predicate. Truitt's initial FOIA request made clear that he wanted all records related to the topics he particularized; it made no mention of files in which they might be contained. 19 True it is that, in a follow-up letter, Truitt stated that he was "specifically seeking documents for the period 1950-54" in two files he identified, 20 but that did not suggest that he had lost interest in other files because, in the same letter, he also asked for documents in four categories without designating files. 21 Indeed, the Department, in response to a subsequent entreaty by Truitt for 1955-56 materials on topics identical to those enumerated in his original request, released to him records bearing marks denoting File 767 as the repository. 22 So, at the very least, there were genuine issues as to the import of Truitt's demand for information and the sufficiency of the Department's ensuing search; and that, standing alone, establishes the impropriety of summary judgment. 23
This is but one obstacle to approval of the Department's stance in regard to File 767; there is another, even more formidable. Even if Truitt's first request did not summon a search of the file, his later request--for examination of the documents removed therefrom--was specific. Instead of observing that entreaty, the Department chose not only to shield the removed items from disclosure but also, by refusing to list them in its Vaughn index, to insulate them from any contest over nondisclosure. We perceive no basis upon which the Department could vindicate that action even if it were true that Truitt's earlier calls for information were too vague to implicate File 767. To be sure, a request which fails to "reasonably describe[ ]" the documents sought does not trigger a search of agency records. 24 When, however, an agency becomes reasonably clear as to the materials desired, FOIA's text and legislative history make plain the agency's obligation to bring them forth.
With exceptions inapposite here, Section 3(a)(3) of FOIA specifies that
each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. 25
The language "request for records which ... reasonably describes such records" was inserted in 1974 26 in replacement of the words "request for identifiable records," the terminology of Section 3 as originally enacted in 1967. 27 Although the committee reports in both houses of Congress had declared that a "request for identifiable records" involved no more than a reasonable description enabling agency personnel to locate the records sought, 28 and had warned that the 1967 statutory formulation was "not to be used as a method for withholding," 29 the 1974 Senate Report 30 noted that "cases nonetheless have continued to arise where courts have felt called upon to chide the government for attempting to use the identification requirements as an excuse for withholding documents." 31 The Report cited as examples two decisions in this circuit, 32 and another in which "the government had the temerity to argue that the request being resisted was not for 'identifiable' records, even though the court specifically found that the agency in question had known all along precisely what records were being requested." 33 The Report emphasized that "[w]hile the committee does not intend by this change to authorize broad categorical requests where it is impossible for the agency reasonably to determine what is sought, 34 ... it nonetheless believes that the identification standard in the FOIA should not be used to obstruct public access to agency records." 35 The 1974 substitution of language, the Report explained, "makes explicit the liberal standard for identification that Congress intended and that courts have adopted, and should thus create no new problems of interpretation." 36
When the Department completed the file search occasioned by Truitt's request, it reported that all records pertinent thereto had been uncovered. We have no cause to doubt the Department's sincerity in that regard. But the fact of the matter was that the Department was mistaken, for there were responsive documents in File 767, and likely others equally responsive which then had been or later were taken out. In that situation, as hitherto we have announced, "what is expected of a law-abiding agency is that it admit and correct error when error is revealed." 37 Having learned of Truitt's interest in the documents removed from File 767, it could not justify its inertia simply on the claim that Truitt had not manifested it earlier. Rather, the Department came under a duty to conduct a reasonable search for the removed items, and to either disclose them to Truitt if they were nonexempt 38 or, if deemed exempt, to treat them in its Vaughn index to afford Truitt an opportunity to contest the exemption claim, and to provide a reviewing court with an informed basis upon which to rule thereon. Here the Department did neither, and the District Court erred in upholding its action.
Truitt asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to release records in the same topical categories listed in the request he submitted to the State Department. 39 One such topic was an alleged attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to overthrow the Tirane Regime in Albania during the period 1949-54. 40 The CIA declined to acknowledge...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. U.S. Dept. of Justice
...all relevant documents.'" Valencia-Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C.Cir.1990)); Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 27 (D.C.Cir.1998) (requiring agency to conduct its search u......
-
Houser v. Church, Civil Action No. 16-1142 (RBW)
...search is measured by a standard of reasonableness, and is dependent upon the circumstances of the case." Truitt v. U.S. Dep't of State , 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy its burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to ......
-
Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp.
...relevant documents.’ " Valencia–Lucena v. United States Coast Guard , 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep't of State , 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ). "In order to obtain summary judgment the agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search f......
-
West v. Jackson
...of a search is measured by a standard of reasonableness and depends on the individual circumstances of each case. Truitt v. Dep't of State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C.Cir. 1990). The question is not whether other responsive documents may exist, but whether the search itself was adequate. Steinb......