Trujillo v. Serrano

• Decision Date: 08 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 20900,20900
• Citation: 871 P.2d 369,1994 NMSC 24,117 N.M. 273
• Parties: Loyola TRUJILLO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose E. SERRANO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 369

871 P.2d 369

117 N.M. 273

Loyola TRUJILLO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Jose E. SERRANO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20900.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 8, 1994.

[117 N.M. 274] Jose E. Serrano, pro se.

Loyola Trujillo, pro se.

OPINION

FROST, Justice.

Defendant-AppellantJose E. Serrano appeals the dismissal by the district court of his appeal of a magistrate court decision.The basis of the district court action was that Serrano had not timely filed his appeal.We conclude that there is no jurisdictional bar to hear the appeal if the notice was late because of court error.This case is remanded for further proceedings.

I.Facts

This matter arises from a breach-of-contract claim concerning the construction of a swimming pool.On March 4, 1992, Trujillo and Serrano presented the merits of their contract dispute in the Rio Arriba County Magistrate Court.After the evidence had been presented, the magistrate stated in open courthe would take the case under advisement.He further indicated, according to Serrano's affidavit in district court, he would recall the parties to the court on an unspecified later date and announce his decision.On March 30, 1992, without further notice to the parties, the magistrate filed a written judgment favoring Trujillo.New Mexico law requires those aggrieved of a magistrate's decision to file a notice of appeal to district court within fifteen days after the judgment or final order.NMSA 1978, Sec. 35-13-1(Repl.Pamp.1988);SCRA 1986, 2-705(A)(Repl.Pamp.1990).Trujillo claims the fifteen-day period began to run upon the entry of the judgment by the clerk on March 30.

Serrano claims, however, that he was not informed of the magistrate's decision until the first week of May 1992 when he received a copy of the decision at his post office box, more than one month after the judgment was filed.Serrano claims he relied on the magistrate's statement that no decision would be rendered until the parties were recalled to the court.He asserts the fifteen-day period started when he received the opinion in the mail, giving him at least until May 15 to file.On May 7, 1992, Serrano filed a notice of appeal in Rio Arriba County District Court.

On June 30, 1992, Trujillo moved to dismiss on the ground that the notice of appeal was late.A hearing was held on November 2, 1992, in district court.On November 4, 1992, the district court entered an Order of Dismissal with prejudice because Serrano's appeal was untimely and the court was thus deprived of jurisdiction.

II.

Law governing appeals from magistrate court

The time limit on appeals from magistrate court is codified by Section 35-13-1 of the statutes relating to magistrate court which permits an "appeal to the district court within fifteen days after judgment is rendered or the final order is issued...."(emphasis added).The time limit is reiterated in the Rules of Civil Procedure for Magistrate Courts.At the time of this dispute the wording of the rule allowed "fifteen (15) days after entry of the judgment or final order."SCRA 2-705(A)(emphasis added).(The language of this rule was changed effective January 1, 1994.As discussed below, the changes resolve any confusion about the beginning of the fifteen-day period.)The magistrate rules further stress that the fifteen days is not a discretionary guideline but an inflexible deadline:

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion:

....

(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be done, but it may not extend the time for ... taking an appeal under Rule 2-705.

SCRA 1986, 2-104(B)(Repl.Pamp.1990)(emphasis added).

The fact that Serrano's notice of appeal was filed late cannot be seriously disputed.Though there seems to be a disparity of terminology between the statute and rule in describing the moment from which a magistrate's order can be appealed, we feel any confusion is largely academic.The term "entry" as used in SCRA 2-705(A) and the terms "rendered" and "issued" in Section 35-13-1 are synonymous with the time a judgment or decision is "filed" with the court clerk's office.In fact, the amendments to SCRA 2-705(A), which became effective January 1, 1994, have discarded the above terminology: the right to appeal now begins fifteen days "after the judgment or final order appealed from is filed in the magistrate court clerk's office."SCRA 2-705(A), as amended byIn re the Amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Magistrate Courts, Supreme Court Order8000 Misc., (Aug. 27, 1993), Judicial Pamphlet 2 (emphasis added).The new rules for metropolitan courts also adopt this "filing" terminology.SeeSCRA 1986, 3-706(A)(Repl.Pamp.1993), as amended byIn re the Amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts, Supreme Court Order8000 Misc., (Aug. 27, 1993), Judicial Pamphlet 2.In the same way, the time to appeal from a district court begins to run from when "the judgment or order ... is filed in the district court clerk's office."SCRA 1986, 12-201(A)(Repl.Pamp.1992)(emphasis added).

There is no question that, under this "filing" standard, Serrano's notice of appeal was not timely.The issue presented in this appeal is whether there are unusual circumstances under which a trial court should entertain an untimely notice of appeal.

III.Background

The New Mexico Constitution mandates that "an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal."N.M. Const. art. VI, Sec. 2.The courts must ensure that the procedural rules expedite rather than hinder this right.Govich v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226, 230, 814 P.2d 94, 98(1991).Behind every evaluation of judicial procedure is the recollection that our modern system evolved in response to the involuted procedures of the courts of England in which the substantive issues of a case could be lost in a labyrinth of procedural rules.See Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System 240-43 (1955); Charles S. Christopher & Baron Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1 Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 516, 519-22 (Committee of the Ass'n ofAm.Law Schs. ed., 1907).Modern rules promote expedience and uniformity and attempt to balance constitutional rights with the need for the efficient administration of justice.As we have previously stated, "[i]t is the policy of this court to construe its rules liberally to the end that causes on appeal may be determined on the merits, where it can be done without impeding or confusing administration or perpetrating injustice."Jaritas Live Stock Co. v. Spriggs, 42 N.M. 14, 16, 74 P.2d 722, 722-23(1937);see alsoGovich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98;Lowe v. Bloom, 110 N.M. 555, 798 P.2d 156, (1990);James v. Brumlop, 94 N.M. 291, 293, 609 P.2d 1247, 1249(Ct.App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991(1980).Procedural formalities should not outweigh basic rights where the facts present a marginal case which does not lend itself to a bright-line interpretation.SeeTrujillo v. Hilton of Santa Fe, 115 N.M. 397, 398, 851 P.2d 1064, 1065(1993)."Where ... there are two possible interpretations relating to the right to an appeal, that interpretation which permits a review on the merits rather than rigidly restricting appellate review should be favored."Maples v. State, 110 N.M. 34, 42, 791 P.2d 788, 796(1990)(Montgomery J., dissenting)(quotingIn re ApplicationNo. 0436-A (Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n), 101 N.M. 579, 581, 686 P.2d 269, 271(1984)).A court's decision not to excuse a party's failure to file a timely appeal will be reviewed by an appellate court applying an abuse of discretion standard.SeeState ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 123, 128, 812 P.2d 777, 782(1991).Serrano's explanation of his late filing was--if supported by the evidence--sufficient to give the district court reason to exercise its discretion in allowing the appeal.

IV.

Are there unusual circumstances under which a trial court

should entertain an untimely notice of appeal?

1.Absolute jurisdictional matter vs. mandatory precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction.

Trujillo urges the proposition"that timely notice of appeal presents an absolute jurisdictional matter; the absence of a timely appeal removes any ability or power of the court to act on the matter."Earlier New Mexico decisions would support this interpretation.See, e.g.Lopez v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 82 N.M. 338, 339, 481 P.2d 700, 701(1971);Scott v. Newsom, 74 N.M. 399, 402, 394 P.2d 253, 255(1964);Chavez v. Village of Cimarron, 65 N.M. 141, 144-45, 333 P.2d 882, 884-85(1958);State ex rel. Heron v. District Court, 46 N.M. 290, 292, 128 P.2d 451, 452(1942).This proposition was also urged by the majority in Lowe v. Bloom, 110 N.M. 555, 556, 798 P.2d 156, 157(1990).However, more recent decisions by this Court have intimated and even proclaimed that the word "jurisdiction" connotes shades of meaning in addition to its common usage in most federal and state courts.SeeGovich, 112 N.M. at 230, 814 P.2d at 98(1991);State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 780, 788-89, 833 P.2d 1146, 1154-55(1992)(Ransom, C.J., specially concurring);Lowe, 110 N.M. at 556-59, 798 P.2d at 157-60(Montgomery, J., dissenting).

For example, lack of subject matter jurisdiction means--as Trujillo urges--"an entire lack of power to hear or determine the case and the absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties."Grace v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 87 N.M. 205, 208, 531 P.2d 939, 942(1975)(citing20 Am.Jur.2dCourtsSec. 87(1965));see alsoLasley v. Baca, 95 N.M. 791, 794, 626 P.2d 1288, 1291(1981)("A lack of subject matter jurisdiction means a lack of authority to decide the matters presented.").However, an...