Trujillo v. Williams
Decision Date | 17 October 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 04-2257.,04-2257. |
Citation | 465 F.3d 1210 |
Parties | Jesse TRUJILLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe WILLIAMS, Secretary; Elmer Bustos, Director, New Mexico Department of Corrections; Gene Johnson, Director; L.W. Huffman, Regional Director; S.K. Young, Warden, Institutional Classification Authority, Virginia Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Jesse Trujillo, filed a brief pro se.
Before HENRY, McKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jesse Trujillo, a pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against various New Mexico and Virginia corrections officials1 alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by: 1) improperly classifying and segregating him; 2) denying him access to legal materials and the courts; 3) providing him with a nutritionally inadequate diet; and 4) treating him differently than other inmates. The district court sua sponte ordered that "Plaintiff's claims against the New Mexico Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice; Plaintiff's claims against the Virginia Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Reviewing the district court's dismissal de novo, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Mr. Trujillo is a New Mexico state prisoner who was transferred by the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDC) to Wallens Ridge State Prison (WRSP) in Virginia on April 12, 2002. Immediately upon his arrival, WRSP held a classification hearing at which Mr. Trujillo was not permitted to present evidence, allegedly in violation of Virginia Departmental Operating Procedure 821.2 After the hearing, WRSP placed Mr. Trujillo in segregation claiming that he was a threat to the prison. Mr. Trujillo's initial appeal to the warden was denied, but the regional director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) determined Mr. Trujillo's subsequent grievance was founded and informed Mr. Trujillo that "appropriate administrative action ha[d] been taken." Mr. Trujillo's classification, however, remained the same and no new hearing was conducted.
On July 9, 2002, at a second classification hearing during which Mr. Trujillo was again not allowed to present witnesses or evidence, he was placed in segregation under the explanation that he "need[ed] a longer period of adjustment;" "New Mexico inmate." Mr. Trujillo appealed this decision on the grounds that he had been in segregation for over 100 days when the average stay for new arrivals in segregation was days or weeks; his appeal was denied by the warden and the regional director. As a result, Mr. Trujillo spent nearly a year in segregation.
On March 9, 2003, Mr. Trujillo wrote a letter to another regional director explaining that he had been classified in a prejudicial and discriminatory manner because no Virginia or other out-of-state prisoner housed at WRSP was classified in the same manner as he had been classified, nor housed in segregation for this length of time, and requested that the director intervene. According to Mr. Trujillo, the average stay in segregation for other prisoners at WRSP is less than a month, and prisoners rarely remain in segregation even for the most serious offenses for more than 180 days and usually only for sixty to ninety days. Mr. Trujillo explained to the director that he had been in segregation for more than 750 days. The letter was returned stating that his appeal to the director did not meet the criteria for a Level III response.
On March 26, 2003, WRSP changed the rationale for Mr. Trujillo's segregation to "inmate viewed as a threat to WRSP." Mr. Trujillo alleges that no further indication was given as to why he might now be viewed as a threat. And he claims that there was no marked change in his behavior to warrant such an abrupt change in the rationale for keeping him in segregation.3
In early May 2003, pursuant to Departmental Operating Procedure 821-7.1A, Mr. Trujillo requested an annual review of his classification to assess whether a change in his security level and treatment plan was warranted. That request was denied. In late May 2003, Mr. Trujillo filed another grievance with the VDOC, claiming that he was entitled to a classification review and should not be excluded because he was an out-of-state prisoner. In response, the WRSP warden stated: The regional director provided nearly the same response, stating: "Investigation reveals that you are an inmate from NMDC, therefore, the reviews are done in accordance with policies and procedures from NMCD."
In February 2004, in response to another grievance, VDOC informed Mr. Trujillo that Following the warden's instructions, Mr. Trujillo then wrote to the secretary and the director of the NMDC requesting reclassification of his status. He never received a response.
Mr. Trujillo claims that the conditions of his confinement violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, his constitutional right of access to the courts, and his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Based on these allegations, Mr. Trujillo filed this § 1983 action in federal district court for the District of New Mexico against various Virginia and New Mexico prison officials.
After granting Mr. Trujillo in forma pauperis status, the district court, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), dismissed without prejudice Mr. Trujillo's claims against the Virginia defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. It also dismissed with prejudice Mr. Trujillo's claims against the New Mexico defendants under § 1915(e)(2) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We review both dismissals de novo. See Perkins v Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.1999) ( ); Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1259 ().
The district court concluded that 1) it had no jurisdiction over the Virginia defendants because nothing in the complaint indicated any connection between the Virginia defendants and the State of New Mexico such that in personam jurisdiction could be properly exercised, and 2) "venue [was] improper in this district." The court then correctly noted that, "[u]nder these circumstances, claims against the Virginia Defendants could be severed and transferred to Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) & (3) ... or dismissed." See Doering ex rel. Barrett v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 3 (10th Cir.2001) (). The district court ordered the latter, dismissing without prejudice all of Mr. Trujillo's claims against the Virginia defendants. We affirm the district court's jurisdictional decision but vacate and remand its decision to dismiss rather than transfer.
Section 1915 contains no express authorization for a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction or venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.4 However, we have previously held that a district court may, in certain limited circumstances, properly dismiss under § 1915 based on an affirmative defense. See Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258; Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir.1995). As the Supreme Court has described:
Section 1915(d) [the precursor to § 1915(e)] is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).5 In
light of these policy considerations, and despite the fact that lack of personal jurisdiction and venue represent defenses that, similar to affirmative defenses, can be waived if not properly raised, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1), we conclude that a district court may, in certain limited circumstances described below, dismiss under § 1915 for lack of personal jurisdiction and for improper venue, as well as for affirmative defenses.
In the context of affirmative defenses, we have cautioned that sua sponte dismissal on such grounds should be "reserved for those extraordinary instances when the claim's factual backdrop clearly beckons the defense." Fratus, 49 F.3d at 676. The same caution applies to sua sponte dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. Accordingly, under § 1915, the district court may consider personal jurisdiction and venue sua sponte "only when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed." Fratus, 49 F.3d at 674-75 (quotations, alterations omitted). And the district court may dismiss under § 1915 only if "it is clear that [the plaintiff] can allege no set of facts," Sanders, 760 F.2d at 871, to...
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