Truman Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2020
• Docket Number: WD 82762
• Citation: 597 S.W.3d 362
• Parties: TRUMAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Truman Medical Centers, Appellant, v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

597 S.W.3d 362

TRUMAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Truman Medical Centers, Appellant,

v.PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

WD 82762

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Filed: February 25, 2020

Brian J. Gordon and Connor J. Pace, Gower, for appellant.

Brette S. Hart, Matthew W. Greenberg, Overland Park, KS, for respondent.

Before Division Three: Lisa White Hardwick, P.J., and Alok Ahuja and Mark D. Pfeiffer, JJ.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

Truman Medical Center, Inc., provided treatment to Ozell Lincoln after he was injured in an automobile accident caused by an unidentified motorist. Truman sent notice of a hospital lien to Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, Lincoln’s insurer. After receiving Truman’s lien notice, Progressive paid Lincoln $300,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to compensate him for his injuries. Progressive made no payment to Truman on its claimed lien.

Truman filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County against Progressive, claiming that its hospital lien attached to the uninsured motorist benefits that Progressive had paid to Lincoln. The circuit court granted Progressive’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Truman’s lien did not reach the uninsured motorist benefits. Truman appeals. We affirm.

Factual Background

Lincoln was injured and sought medical treatment at Truman as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred shortly after noon on September 1, 2017. The accident occurred when a vehicle driven by an unidentified motorist crossed the center line on 23rd Street Trafficway near Interstate 435 in Kansas City, and struck head-on the truck which Lincoln was driving. A witness reported to police that the driver and a passenger in the vehicle which struck Lincoln’s truck ran away from the accident scene on foot. The driver was never identified.

Progressive had issued a Commercial Auto insurance policy to Say Yes, Inc., which was in force at the time of the accident. Lincoln was identified as the sole "rated driver" on the policy. The policy listed the 2005 Chevrolet Silverado which Lincoln was driving as the only covered automobile. The policy provided a "combined single limit" of $300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage.

On October 30, 2017, Truman sent Progressive notice of a hospital lien. In the notice, Truman asserted that its lien attached to all of Lincoln’s claims for damages from a tortfeasor, or for benefits from an insurance carrier, on account of his injuries.

Following the accident, Lincoln made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage under Progressive’s policy. Lincoln settled his claim with Progressive for $300,000, the liability limit for the uninsured motorist coverage. No portion of the settlement was paid to Truman for the medical services it had rendered to Lincoln, despite the notice of lien which Truman had served on Progressive.

Truman filed suit against Progressive in the Circuit Court of Jackson County on April 23, 2018. In its First Amended Petition, Truman alleged that it had provided health care services to Lincoln relating to the accident, for which the reasonable and customary charges totaled $176,549.87. The petition alleged that none of the charges for Lincoln’s medical treatment had been paid, and that Truman was entitled to a hospital lien in the amount of the unpaid charges pursuant to § 430.235.¹ Because Progressive had disbursed insurance benefits to Lincoln after receiving notice of Truman’s lien, the petition alleged that Progressive was liable to Truman for the entirety of Lincoln’s unpaid medical bills.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Progressive’s motion, and denied Truman’s. The court found that Truman’s hospital lien did not extend to the uninsured motorist benefits under the Progressive policy because "Progressive [was] neither the person or persons who caused [Lincoln]’s injury nor has either party alleged facts that Defendant Progressive insured the person or persons causing [Lincoln]’s injury."

Truman appeals.

Standard of Review

"This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. " Messina v. Shelter Ins. Co. , 585 S.W.3d 839, 842 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Summary judgment shall be entered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Folsom v. Mo. State Hwy. Patrol , 580 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and gives the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record." Messina , 585 S.W.3d at 842 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Analysis

I.

In its first Point on appeal, Truman argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because the material facts were disputed. In its second Point, Truman contends that the circuit court’s summary judgment ruling erroneously resolved disputed factual issues, and relied on facts not alleged in Progressive’s summary judgment motion. We reject these procedural arguments.

Progressive’s motion for summary judgment alleged the following uncontroverted facts: that Lincoln was "allegedly injured" and "allegedly sought medical treatment" at Truman as a result of an accident with an unidentified motorist; that Lincoln was insured under a Progressive insurance policy which provided $300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident; that Lincoln made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the Progressive policy, and ultimately settled that claim with Progressive; and that Truman was asserting a hospital lien claim "due to Progressive’s failure to pay [Truman] pursuant to its lien when it settled Ozell Lincoln’s [uninsured motorist] claim made under his insurance policy."

Although Truman purported to dispute each of Progressive’s uncontroverted facts, its response expressly acknowledged the following facts:

On September 1, 2017, Ozell Lincoln was actually injured and actually sought medical treatment at Plaintiff Truman Medical Centers as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified/uninsured motorist. ...

... At the time of the September 1, 2017 motor vehicle accident, Ozell Lincoln was a rated driver under an automobile insurance policy with Defendant Progressive Casualty Insurance Company with uninsured motorist coverage limits ("UM") of $300,000 combined single limit. ... [¶] ... The insurance policy at issue was not Ozell Lincoln’s insurance policy. The policy was issued to Say Yes, Inc.; Ozell Lincoln was only a "rater driver" under that policy.

Besides affirmatively alleging these facts, Truman’s response did not dispute: that Lincoln had made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the Progressive policy; that he had settled that claim with Progressive; or that Truman’s hospital lien claim was based on Progressive’s failure to pay Truman when it settled Lincoln’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

Thus, Truman either expressly admitted, or failed to controvert, each of the material facts on which the circuit court’s summary judgment ruling depends. On appeal, Truman contends that the circuit court relied on two additional facts which were not put in issue by Progressive’s summary judgment motion: (1) that Progressive did not itself cause Lincoln’s injuries; and (2) that Progressive did not insure the person who caused Lincoln’s injuries. Truman contends that the summary judgment ruling relies on a further, controverted fact: that Progressive was Lincoln’s "own insurance company."

Truman’s factual arguments are frivolous, and mischaracterize the record. Truman’s response to Progressive’s summary judgment motion affirmatively alleged that Lincoln was injured "as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified/uninsured motorist ." (Emphasis added.) If the motorist who injured Lincoln was "unidentified," there is no evidence that driver was affiliated with Progressive. Indeed, in its Reply Brief Truman acknowledges that it "has never asserted that [Progressive] caused Ozell Lincoln’s injuries." Moreover, if the motorist who caused Lincoln’s injuries was "uninsured," the motorist was – by definition – not insured by Progressive. Finally, whether the Progressive policy was issued to Lincoln, or whether he was instead merely a "rated driver" under that policy (as Truman alleged), the relevant fact remains: the policy provided uninsured motorist coverage to Lincoln; and that policy was not issued to, and did not insure, the "unidentified/uninsured motorist" who caused Lincoln’s injuries.

Points I and II are denied.

II.

In its third and fourth Points, Truman argues that the circuit court misapplied the law because Truman’s hospital lien attached to the uninsured motorist benefits that Progressive paid Lincoln. We disagree.

Resolution of Truman’s third and fourth Points requires that we interpret and apply Missouri’s hospital lien statutes.

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Our primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue. We will look beyond the plain meaning of the statute only when the language is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd or illogical result.

A statute is ambiguous when its plain language does not answer the current dispute as to its meaning. Ambiguities in statutes are resolved by determining the intent of the legislature and by giving effect to its intent if possible. When determining the legislative intent of a statute, no portion of the statute is read in isolation, but rather the portions are read in context to harmonize all of the statute’s provisions. Rules of statutory construction are used to resolve any ambiguities if the legislative intent is undeterminable from the plain meaning of the statutory language.

Truman...