Trunk v. MED. CENTER OF LA. AT NEW ORLEANS, 2003-CA-0275.

• Decision Date: 17 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-0275.,2003-CA-0275.
• Citation: 863 So.2d 675
• Parties: Laura E. TRUNK v. MEDICAL CENTER OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS, State of Louisiana, Louisiana Health Care Authority, John Doe and ABC Insurance Company.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

863 So.2d 675

Laura E. TRUNK v. MEDICAL CENTER OF LOUISIANA AT NEW ORLEANS, State of Louisiana, Louisiana Health Care Authority, John Doe and ABC Insurance Company.

No. 2003-CA-0275.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

December 17, 2003.

Patrick G. Kehoe, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Rodney A. Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General, LA Dept. of Justice, Litigation Division, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.

(Court composed of Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD).

EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is a slip-and-fall personal injury case. The accident occurred on January 31, 1996. As Laura Trunk ("Plaintiff") exited a conference room located on the third floor of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans ("Defendant"), she slipped on a foreign substance and injured her wrist. As a result of the fall the plaintiff suffered tendon and ligament injuries that required arthroscopic surgery.

At the time of the accident the plaintiff was completing her residency in Internal Medicine. Upon completion of her residency, the plaintiff had planned to specialize in Gastroenterology. This position would require extensive use of the hands and wrist in performing examinations and surgical procedures.

Plaintiff filed suit on January 30, 1997 and named the Medical Center of Louisiana as a defendant. Prior to trial both the defendant and the plaintiff filed motions for directed verdict on the issue of liability. The trial judge granted plaintiff's motion, but denied defendant's motion.

Subsequently, on April 3,4 and 8-12, 2002, a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $35,000 in general damages and $17,901.79 for past medicals. The total amount awarded was $52,901.79. The jury made no award for mental pain and anguish, permanent disability, future medical and future lost of earning capacity.

Plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). The trial judge granted plaintiff's JNOV and increased the jury award to $250,000 general damages (including pain and suffering), $40,000 past and future medical expenses and $500,000 for future loss of earning capacity. Thus, the net judgment rendered for the plaintiff pursuant to the JNOV was in the amount of $790,000.

From that judgment defendant appeals, assigning the following as error:

(1) The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability.

(2) The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for JNOV on the issue of damages.

(3) The trial erred in denying its motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability because the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was workers' compensation.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

By way of this assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability. The defendant argues that the plaintiff must prove under Civil Code article 2315 that the floor created an unreasonable risk of harm. The defendant further submits that the plaintiff failed to prove that it owed a duty under the theory of negligence. Additionally, the defendant argues that there was no evidence introduced to establish actual or constructive notice.

The standard of review for directed verdicts is whether, viewing the evidence submitted, the appellate court concludes that reasonable people could not reach a contrary verdict. Lott v. Lebon, 96-1328 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/15/97), 687 So.2d 612, 616. The record supports the conclusion of the trial judge compelling the granting of a motion for a directed verdict, based not on a credibility determination (a factual issue), but on a sufficiency of evidence determination (a question of law). Id. A directed verdict should be sustained on appeal where the reviewing court would find a jury verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion to be manifestly erroneous had the trial judge allowed the case to go to the jury. Wichser v. Trosclair, 99-1929 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/28/01), 789 So.2d 24.

A motion for directed verdict under La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 1810 is properly granted if in viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party, the trial court concludes that the evidence is such that reasonable, fair-minded jurors cannot arrive at a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Lozano v. Touro Infirmary, 99-2587 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/13/00), 778 So.2d 604, 607, writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.5/11/01), 792 So.2d 733. If there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied, and the case should be submitted to the jury. Lott v. Lebon, 96-1328 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/15/97), 687 So.2d 612, 616, writ denied, 97-0359 (La.3/21/97), 691 So.2d 92, and writ denied 97-0414 (La.3/21/97), 691 So.2d 95; Walker v. Louisiana Health Management Co., 94-1396, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95), 666 So.2d 415, 421, writ denied, 96-0571 (La.4/19/96), 671 So.2d 922.

A directed verdict is appropriate only when the evidence overwhelmingly points to one conclusion. Hebert v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 01-00223 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/6/01), 787 So.2d 614. A motion for a directed verdict is a procedural device available in jury trials with an eye toward judicial economy. Reed v. Columbia/HCA Information Systems, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/11/01), 786 So.2d 142, writ denied XXXX-XXXX (La.6/22/01), 794 So.2d 796.

The trial court has much discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for directed verdict. Brockman v. Salt Lake Farm Partnership, 33,938 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/4/00), 768 So.2d 836, writ denied XXXX-XXXX (La.12/15/00), 777 So.2d 1234; Delaney v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 96-2144 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/12/97), 703 So.2d 709, writ denied 98-0123 (La.3/20/98), 715 So.2d 1211. A motion for directed verdict may be granted when, after considering all evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the mover's opponent, it is clear that the facts and inferences are so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Burris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 94-0921 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 558.

After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion with regard to the granting of the motion for directed verdict. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for JNOV on the issue of damages. It argues that the jury award of $35,000 for pain and suffering was adequate and not unreasonable or abusively low to require an increase in the award. Additionally, the defendant contends that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient credible testimony to support any award for future medical expenses or future loss of earning capacity. Thus, the defendant argues, the plaintiff is not entitled to such damages.

The plaintiff answers the appeal and contends that the "jury's verdict was so abusively low as to shock the conscience of any objective arbiter." She argues that the jury failed to appreciate the severity of her injury and failed to properly apply the facts and law in arriving at its decisions. We agree.

In ruling on a motion for JNOV under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1811, the trial court is required to employ the following legal standard: A JNOV should only be granted if the trial court, after considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion, finds it points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict on the issue. However, if there is substantial evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable persons might reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied. Boeing Company v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969); Cosie v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co., 527 So.2d 1105, 1107 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988); Robertson v. Penn, 472 So.2d 927, 929 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 353 (La.1985). On appeal, the findings of the jury are reviewed under this standard. Woods v. Sammisa Company, Ltd., 873 F.2d 842, 846 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853, 107 L.Ed.2d 847 (1990). The trial judge's action in granting a JNOV, thereby altering the factual finding of the jury, is governed by the manifest error or abuse of discretion standards. See Cosie v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co., 527 So.2d at 1107

(employing a manifest error test); Robinson v. Bump, 894 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.1990) (employing an abuse of discretion test).

A JNOV is proper only where the trial judge concludes the verdict is one reasonable people could not have reached. Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So.2d 829 at 832 (La.1991); Lilly v. Allstate Insurance Company, 577 So.2d 80, 83 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990),writ denied,578 So.2d 914 (La.1991). In applying this standard, the court cannot weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury. Barnes v. Thames, 578 So.2d at 1169.

In reviewing the trial judge's decision to grant plaintiff's motion for JNOV on the issue of damages, we conclude that the motion was properly granted.

Having found the motion for JNOV was correctly granted, we must determine whether the trial court abused its vast discretion in its de novo award of damages.

A JNOV is a procedurally correct device for raising an unreasonable damage award. Orgeron v. Prescott, 93-926 (La.App. 5th Cir.4/14/94), 636 So.2d 1033, 1040, writ...