Truscott v. Chaplin
| Decision Date | 18 November 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 17237.,17237. |
| Parties | Susan TRUSCOTT, a minor, by her Guardian, Cynthia Margaret Truscott and Cynthia Margaret Truscott, in her own right, Appellants, v. Jewel Pierce CHAPLIN. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Arnold M. Kessler, Bernstein, Bernstein, Harrison & Kessler, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
John J. Walsh, Jr., LaBrum & Doak, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before HASTIE, Chief Judge, and SEITZ and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
The jury in this civil action retired to consider its verdict immediately following lunch. After they had been deliberating one and one half hours, the trial judge sent a message through the marshal asking if they were close to a decision. This inquiry was made without prior consultation with and in the absence of counsel. Shortly thereafter, the jury reached a verdict; but before it returned to the courtroom to announce it, counsel were advised of the court's previous inquiry to the jury. Neither counsel raised any objection prior to the reception of the verdict.
We are to determine whether the circumstances of this communication from the trial court to the jury amounted to reversible error.
We perceive no meaningful purpose to have been served by this particular inquiry. It was made in the middle of the afternoon when the jury had not been occupied in deliberations so lengthy that arrangements were necessary for feeding or lodging them. In this context, a bare inquiry soliciting information whether they were near a verdict could be an intrusion on their deliberative process. It could suggest, for example, that they should accelerate the making of their decision. Under certain circumstances this could raise problems of serious dimensions. Accordingly, the practice of making such inquiries in the absence of counsel is not approved.
We recognize that there may be times when administrative communications between judge and jury may properly transpire in the absence of counsel, so long as these communications do not contain supplemental instructions relating to the case and are clearly incapable of prejudicing the rights of the parties. In this general category would be communications relating to the jurors' welfare, comforts and physical needs. Such communications must not directly or indirectly refer to the specifics of the case, must be collateral to the issues under consideration, and must not be capable of affecting the deliberative process in any manner.1
We do not find it necessary, however, to examine in depth the circumstances of the case below for the reason that counsel, knowing that the...
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Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau
...States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933); United States v. Pittman, 449 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1971); Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1968). As normal jury pressures and intra-jury influences may not be impeached by juror evidence, so also they constitute no grounds ......
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Key v. People
...the ex parte communication amounted to harmless error and no prejudice arose. The present case is similar to Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1968), where, after the jury had been deliberating for only an hour and a half, the trial judge sent a message to the jury asking if th......
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Ross v. Dist. Attorney of the Cnty. of Allegheny
...to the issues under consideration, and [was] not capable of affecting the deliberative process in any manner.” Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1968). The trial court thus did not err by conferencing with the single juror in the absence of the rest of the jury.B. Ross argues t......
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Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd.
...606(b). "Extraneous influences" may include communications between the judge and jury outside the presence of counsel. Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644 (3d Cir.1968). Here, however, plaintiffs do not suggest that the court influenced the jury in any way. Indeed, there is no allegation that......