Trusky v. Ford Motor Co., Lincoln-Mercury Division

• Decision Date: 30 April 1952
• Docket Number: LINCOLN--MERCURY,No. A--83,A--83
• Citation: 19 N.J.Super. 100,88 A.2d 235
• Parties: TRUSKY v. FORD MOTOR CO.,DIVISION.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 100

19 N.J.Super. 100

88 A.2d 235

TRUSKY v. FORD MOTOR CO., LINCOLN--MERCURY DIVISION.

No. A--83.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued April 21, 1952.

Decided April 30, 1952.

Verling C. Enteman, Newark, argued the cause for appellant (McCarter, English & Studer, Newark, attorneys).

Aaron Gordon, Jersey City, argued the cause for respondent (Weiner & Weiner, Elizabeth, attorneys).

Before Judges McGEEHAN, JAYNE and GOLDMANN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JAYNE, J.A.D.

One James Trusky died on January 14, 1949. His widow and sole dependent in- augurated the present proceeding by the presentation of a petition in which she alleged that on January 7, 1949, the decedent suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Ford Motor Company which produced an intracerebral hemorrhage causing the decedent's death. She has recovered an award of compensation under R.S. 34:15--7 et seq., N.J.S.A. The employer prosecutes this appeal.

There is no doubt that the burden descended upon the claimant to prove those essential and indispensable elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Parker v. John A. Roebling's Sons Co., 135 N.J.L. 440, 52 A.2d 681 (Sup.Ct.1947), affirmed 136 N.J.L. 635, 57 A.2d 387 (E. & A.1948). It is equally indubitable that an injury, even though fatal, suffered in the course of employment but arising solely from natural causes wholly unrelated to an industrial mishap, is not compensable. Becker v. City of Union City, 17 N.J.Super. 217, 85 A.2d 539 (App.Div.1952).

The burden of proof necessarily embraces the obligation to disclose that the injury sustained by the employee was the consequential result of an Accident within the import of the statute. The proof is not required to eliminate all doubt. Ames v. Sheffield Farms Company, 1 N.J. 11, 61 A.2d 502 (1948); Russo v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 1 N.J. 417, 64 A.2d 71 (1949). The burden may be fulfilled by the submission of proof which preponderates in favor of the tendered hypothesis by the erection of a rational inference founded upon a comparative superiority of probabilities according to the common experience of mankind. Gilbert v. Gilbert Machine Works, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 533, 6 A.2d 213 (Sup.Ct.1939); Sunkimat v. Senger Coal & Ice Corp., 137 N.J.L. 103, 58 A.2d 226 (Sup.Ct.1948).

The transcript of the evidence in the present case has been zealously examined and considered within the legitimate orbit of our inquiry. Both the deputy director and the judge of the Middlesex County Court concluded that the evidence adequately established that the decedent's death was proximately caused by an accident which occurred on January 7, 1949, and arose in the course of and out of the decedent's employment.

In our review of the evidence we do not ignore those inferences of fact which the deputy director and judge of the County Court could have logically and rationally drawn from it. It is not inexpedient to state that considerable weight is accorded in this court to the findings of fact of the County Court where such findings parallel those of the deputy director. Donofrio v. Haag Brothers, Inc., 10 N.J.Super. 258, 77 A.2d 42 (App.Div.1950).

Notwithstanding the existence of concordant conclusions by the deputy director and the County Court, Rule 3:81--13 seems often to have induced the supposition that this court studies the evidence with a view toward making findings of fact of its own wholly insensible and inattentive to the previous factual findings. Cf. Rules 1:2--20 and 4:2--6. It must be realized that this court exercises in such proceedings an appellate or supervisory function which operates to ascertain whether the findings of the County Court are supported by sufficient evidence. The permissive power conferred by the rules is exercised in the sound discretion of this court only where from an examination of the record it is manifest that the findings of fact under review are so plainly unjustified by the evidence that the interests of justice necessitate their nullification. Vide, Vandenberg v. John De Kuyper & Son, 5 N.J.Super. 440, 447, 69 A.2d 581 (App.Div.1949); Morgan v. Letwenske, 6 N.J.Super. 67, 69 A.2d 889 (App.Div.1949); Galloway v. Ford Motor Co., 7 N.J.Super. 18, 22, 71 A.2d 657 (App.Div.1950), affirmed 5 N.J. 396, 75 A.2d 855 (1950); Kuperstein v. Gude & Cole Corp., 7 N.J.Super. 200, 72 A.2d 531 (App.Div.1950); Donofrio v. Haag Brothers, Inc., supra; Giacchi v. Richmond Brothers Co., 11 N.J.Super. 76, 78 A.2d 109 (App.Div.1951); Folsom v. Magna Manufacturing Co., 14 N.J.Super. 363, 82 A.2d 434 (App.Div.1951); Lilly v. Todd, 15 N.J.Super. 1, 83 A.2d 21 (App.Div.1951); Becker v. City of Union City, 17 N.J.Super. 217, 227, 85 A.2d 539 (App.Div.1952).

There is no scientific measure on appeal for definitely ascertaining to what extent the conclusions of the triers of the facts correspond to the actualities where the witnesses have disagreed, the permissible inferences derivable from the evidence were divergent and contradictory, and where some of the evidence, deemed by the triers of the facts to have been true, rationally supports the conclusions. It has been remarked that an appellate court in reviewing the trial court's determination of the facts 'has to...