Trust v. Babel

• Decision Date: 29 December 2010
• Docket Number: Calendar No. 3.,Docket No. 139617.
• Citation: 793 N.W.2d 633,488 Mich. 136
• Parties: 2000 BAUM FAMILY TRUST, Baum Family Trust, Joseph Beaudoin, Sandra Beaudoin, Adele Megdall Revocable Trust, Paul Nowak & Joan Nowak Trust, Marilyn Ormsbee, Mark Schwartz, Wendy Schwartz, and Thomas Thomason, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants, v. William BABEL, Judy Babel, James Cahill, Gloria Cahill, Daniel Engstrom, Penny Engstrom, Arthur A. Ranger Trust, Patricia L. Ranger Trust, and Charlevoix County Road Commission, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees, and Al Gooch, Elizabeth Gooch, Jesse Halstead, and Linda Halstead, Intervening Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees, and Charlevoix Township, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

488 Mich. 136

793 N.W.2d 633

2000 BAUM FAMILY TRUST, Baum Family Trust, Joseph Beaudoin, Sandra Beaudoin, Adele Megdall Revocable Trust, Paul Nowak & Joan Nowak Trust, Marilyn Ormsbee, Mark Schwartz, Wendy Schwartz, and Thomas Thomason, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants,

v. William BABEL, Judy Babel, James Cahill, Gloria Cahill, Daniel Engstrom, Penny Engstrom, Arthur A. Ranger Trust, Patricia L. Ranger Trust, and Charlevoix County Road Commission, Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees,andAl Gooch, Elizabeth Gooch, Jesse Halstead, and Linda Halstead, Intervening Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees,andCharlevoix Township, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 139617.

Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 5, 2010.

Decided Dec. 29, 2010.

Carey & Jaskowski, P.L.L.C. (by William L. Carey), Grayling, for the 2000 Baum Family Trust and others.

Joel D. Wurster, PLC (by Joel D. Wurster), Petoskey, for the Charlevoix County Road Commission.

Law Weathers (by Clifford H. Bloom), Grand Rapids, for amici curiae the Michigan Waterfront Alliance and Higgins Lake Property Owners Association.

Levine Law Group, PLLC (by Michael C. Levine), for amici curiae the County Road Association of Michigan.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

This case involves riparian rights.¹ Specifically, the parties ask us to decide an issue that was treated as unsettled by the lower courts: who possesses riparian rights to a portion of a lake, persons who are owners of property fronting the lake but separated from the water by a public road or a county road commission that has accepted a statutory dedication of the road and maintains it as such? The trial court ruled that the property owners (plaintiffs) did not possess riparian rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, further holding that the road commission (defendant) was in "no way" limited in the type of use it could make of the public road. 2000 Baum Family Trust v. Babel, 284 Mich.App. 544, 561, 773 N.W.2d 44 (2009). We reverse.

The road at issue, along Lake Charlevoix, was dedicated under the 1887 plat act. Many lots alongsideMichigan's some 11,000 inland lakes were platted during this period and are separated from the water by a public road running parallel to the shoreline. The term of art that Michigan courts have long used to describe the property interest in dispute is a statutory "base fee." Patrick v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Kalamazoo, 120 Mich. 185, 191, 79 N.W. 208 (1899). Decisions of this Court dating back well over a century illuminate the nature of this property interest and the corresponding rights the county receives through a statutory dedication. Bay Co. v. Bradley, 39 Mich. 163, 166 (1878) (stating that the county "acquire[d] no beneficial ownership of the land"); Wayne Co. v. Miller, 31 Mich. 447, 448-449 (1875) (stating that the county did not receive "title in the nature of a private ownership"); Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110, 115, 13 N.W. 380 (1882) (stating that the county did not receive "the usual rights of a proprietor," but took title to the extent that it could "preclude questions which might arise respecting the public uses, other than those of mere passage"). Consistent with these holdings, the Court of Appeals has held that a statutory base fee does not divest front-lot ² property owners of their riparian rights. Mich. Central Park Ass'n v. Roscommon Co. Rd. Comm., 2 Mich.App. 192, 139 N.W.2d 333 (1966); Sheridan Drive Ass'n v. Woodlawn Backproperty Owners Ass'n, 29 Mich.App. 64, 185 N.W.2d 107 (1970);Kempf v. Ellixson, 69 Mich.App. 339, 244 N.W.2d 476 (1976); McCardel v. Smolen, 71 Mich.App. 560, 250 N.W.2d 496 (1976), vacated in part on other grounds in 404 Mich. 89, 273 N.W.2d 3 (1978).

On the authority of this caselaw, and mindful that the imperatives of stare decisis are particularly strongin the area of property law, we hold that plaintiffs in this case have riparian rights, as similarly situated persons have always had in Michigan.

I. FACTS AND HISTORY

Plaintiffs own front lots in a platted subdivision on the northern shore of Lake Charlevoix. Their lots do not touch the shoreline. Rather, Beach Drive, which runs east to west and parallel to the lake, abuts the shoreline and separates plaintiffs' lots from the lake. In other words, plaintiffs' lots extend to the edge of the road, not to the water's edge. In addition to the Charlevoix County Road Commission (CCRC), defendants include back-lot owners and Charlevoix Township.

The plat includes six named streets, including Beach Drive. All these streets run parallel to the lake, except for Central Avenue, which cuts through the center of the plat and runs perpendicular to, and terminates at, the lake. The plat depicts a single dock extending into the lake at the end of Central Avenue, but there is no indication in the record whether this dock was ever built, or, if it did exist, how it was used.

The Charlevoix County Board of Supervisors accepted the plat and the dedication of the streets on August 7, 1911.³ Concerning the roadways in the plat,the dedication includes the following language: "[T]he streets and alleys as shown on said plat are hereby dedicated to the use of the public." It is undisputed that the public has continued since that time to accept the dedication of the roadways, including Beach Drive. Today, the CCRC maintains Beach Drive, which is now paved.⁴

From the time it accepted the dedication in 1911 until the instant lawsuit, the CCRC had never asserted a claim to riparian rights as a necessary incident to its interest in Beach Drive. The CCRC has never installed a dock along the lakeshore or otherwise engaged in riparian activities. Over the years, however, plaintiffs have used the lake in front of their lots and have built seasonal docks extending into the lake in order to moor boats and other water-related equipment. Furthermore, it is undisputed that there is neither a reservation nor a grant of riparian rights inplaintiffs' deeds and that their lots are taxed as "water view" properties rather than "waterfront" properties.

Allegedly, various back-lot owners began using the waterfront in front of plaintiffs' homes to maintain docks and store boats. In response, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging claims of trespass and nuisance and seeking injunctive and equitable relief. The CCRC counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiffshad trespassed on Beach Drive by maintaining encroachments on the drive, including docks. The individually named back-lot defendants also counterclaimed, asserting claims of adverse possession or, alternatively, seeking a declaration that they possess easements, either by acquiescence or by prescription.

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary disposition against the CCRC alone, claiming that there is no issue of material fact regarding which party is entitled to riparian rights. Plaintiffs argued that because their lots were separated from the water by a roadway parallel to the water, their lots were riparian. In plaintiffs' view, the CCRC has a right to the use of Beach Drive as a roadway only. In response, the CCRC argued that plaintiffs did not possess riparian rights because the public holds Beach Drive in fee pursuant to the statutory dedication under the plat act, which means that plaintiffs' lots are not riparian. The back-lot defendants also filed a motion in response, arguing that plaintiffs did not possess riparian rights because, as shown on the plat, none of their properties abuts the lake.

The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, ruling that they did not possess riparian rights. The court framed the issue as "whether Beach Drive is an easement with the fee title residing in the front lot owners or whether the public holds fee title." It ruled that the effect of a dedication is to "vest fee title in the local unit of government...." It followed, in the court's view, that because plaintiffs "do not hold fee title to the waterfront land in front of their respective lots, they do not possess riparian rights."

The Court of Appeals granted plaintiffs' interlocutory application for leave to appeal and affirmed. Baum, 284 Mich.App. at 546, 549, 773 N.W.2d 44. That Court applied a "two-tier analysis: First, whether a valid statutory dedicationwas created under the 1887 plat act and, second, if so, what type of fee interest has been vested in the public." Id. at 562, 773 N.W.2d 44. On the first question, the Court concluded that the act was "unambiguous" and that it clearly vested in the public a fee for public uses of the road. Id. at 557-559, 773 N.W.2d 44. The second question, the Court reasoned, required discerning the intent of the plat proprietor by examining the dedication.⁵ The Court concluded that the "language of the dedication in no way limits what type of use may occur on the depicted streets or alleys or who may use them." Id. at 561, 773 N.W.2d 44.

We granted leave to appeal, including among the issues to be argued (1) whether the fee title resulting from the dedication of land for public uses in a plat under the 1887 plat act in land that runs along the shore of a lake conveys the riparian rights to the lake to the county or whether the conveyance is limited to public uses of the road as a road and (2) whether caselaw stating that front-tier lots adjacent to a road running along a waterway have riparian rights, unless such rights are expressly excluded, remains valid.2000 Baum Family Trust v. Babel, 485 Mich. 1051, 777 N.W.2d 137 (2010).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question presented on appeal is a question of law: Whether plaintiffs have riparian rights in this context in which their lots abut a roadway that runs parallel to the lakeshore and was dedicated under the 1887 plat act. We review issues of statutory interpretation and other questions of law de novo. Eggleston v. Bio-Med. Applications of Detroit, Inc., 468 Mich. 29, 32, 658 N.W.2d 139 (2003).

III. LAW OF DEDICATION

The lower courts held that the nature of the...