Trustees of Il Wu-Pma Pension Plan v. Peters

Decision Date21 September 2009
Docket NumberNo. C 08-03136 JSW.,C 08-03136 JSW.
Citation660 F.Supp.2d 1118
PartiesTRUSTEES OF the IL WU-PMA PENSION PLAN, Plaintiff, v. Emelda PETERS, et al., Defendants. Emelda Peters, Cross-Complainant, v. Dorothy Eldridge, Cross-Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Christine Hwang, Leonard Carder, LLP, Donald Patrick Sullivan, D. Ward Kallstrom, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, CA, Peter Warren Saltzman, Leonard Carder, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.

Murlene L. Randle, Law Offices of Murlene J. Randle, Gener D. Benitez, Ibarra Professional Law Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

Murlene L. Randle, Law Offices of Murlene J. Randle, San Francisco, CA, for Cross-Complainant.

Gener D. Benitez, Ibarra Professional Law Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Cross-Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JEFFREY S. WHITE, District Judge.

The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero's Report and Recommendation ("Report") regarding Dorothy Eldridge's motion for summary judgment, the Trustees of the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan's ("Trustees") applications for default judgment against Rose Peters and Joyce Chapman. The time for filing objections has passed, and there have been no objections filed thereto.1 The Court finds the Report correct, well-reasoned and thorough, and adopts it in every respect. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Dorothy Eldridge's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the Trustee's applications for default judgment against Rose Peters and Joyce Chapman.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNTIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDCATION OF CLAIMS (PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT) BY DFENDANT AND CROSS-DEFEDANT DOROTHY ETHERIDGE [Docket No. 30];

2) APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY COURT AGAINST DEFENDANTS ROSE PETERS [Docket No. 65];

3) APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY COURT AGAINST DEFENDANT JOYCE CHAPMAN [Docket No. 67]

JOSEPH C. SPERO, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, the trustees of the ILWPMA Pension Plan ("Trustees"), brought this interpleader action under Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), seeking a determination as to whom the survivor pension benefits payable on the account of William J. Peters are to be paid. Plaintiffs named Dorothy Etheridge ("Dorothy"), Emelda Peters ("Emelda"), Joyce Peters ("Joyce"), and Rose Peters ("Rose") as defendants. Dorothy and Emelda have appeared in this action, and Emelda has asserted crossclaims against Dorothy. Joyce and Rose have not appeared and the Clerk has entered their defaults pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Presently before the Court are three motions. First, Dorothy brings a summary judgment motion ("the Summary Judgment Motion") asking for a determination that she is, as a matter of law, entitled to receive the survivor pension benefits in the interpleader action. She further requests that the Court enter judgment in her favor on all of Emelda's claims against her. Second, the Trustees have filed an Application for Default Judgment by Court Against Defendant Rose Peters. Third, the Trustees have filed an Application for Default Judgment Against Defendant Joyce Chapman. All of the parties except Rose Peters have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Court concludes that any relief afforded in the interpleader action will affect the legal rights not only of those who have consented but also of the nonconsenting defendant and therefore, that it does not have jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues of the interpleader action. See American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Florida, Inc. v. Petty, 2008 WL 3112066 (D.Virgin Islands, 2008) (finding that magistrate judge did not have authority to issue order to disburse funds in interpleader action where all named defendants had not consented to magistrate jurisdiction and noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) does not authorize magistrate judges to decide interpleader claims). Accordingly, the Court refers all three motions, along with recommendations on the motions, to a district court judge for determination.

For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that all three motions be GRANTED.1

II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
1. Decedent's Work History and Plan Participation

Decedent William J. Peters ("William") was a longshore worker from 1967 until his retirement, on October 1, 2002. Complaint, 111111-13; Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, No. 7. He participated in the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan ("the Plan"), a multi-employer benefit pension plan under ERISA sponsored by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union ("ILWU") and the Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA") for the benefit of longshore workers jointly registered by the ILWU and the PMA as part of the workforce in the longshore industry on the Pacific Coast of the United States. Id., ¶ 11. William died on July 23, 2007. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, No. 11.

Under the terms of the Plan, William's surviving spouse is entitled to survivor pension benefits. For the purpose of determining who should receive these benefits the Plan defines "surviving spouse" as follows:

1.35. "Surviving Spouse"—Subject to the provisions of any Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the extent it requires any other person to be treated as a Surviving Spouse, (a) any person who survives a Participant who was alive and whose Pension Commencement Date had not occurred as of June 30, 1987 if (i) such person was legally married to the Participant for a continuous period of not less than 1 year as of the Participant's Pension Commencement Date, (ii) such person legally married the Participant within 1 year before his Pension Commencement Date and was legally married to him for a continuous period of at least 1 year ending on or before the date of his death, or (iii) such person was legally married to the Participant for a continuous period of not less than 1 year as of his death, and his death occurred before his Pension Commencement Date; provided, if no other person satisfies the requirements of subparagraphs (a)(I) or (a)(ii), then any such person who was legally married to the Participant for a continuous period of not less than 1 year as of his death, where such Participant's Pension Commencement Date was on or before June 30, 1989, shall be treated as his Surviving Spouse; (b) any person (i) who survives a Participant who was alive and had not retired on July 1, 1976, and whose death (in the case of a Participant who has not retired) or Pension Commencement Date was prior to July 1, 1987, and (ii) who was legally married to such Participant for a period of not less than 1 year that ended with the day of his death which is on or subsequent to July 1, 1976; c) any spouse who, as of July 1, 1976, is eligible to receive a Survivor Pension and who, subject to the provisions of subparagraph (e) here-inbelow, does not at any time remarry; (d) a person (I) who survives a Participant who retired under the Pension Plan prior to July 1, 1976, (ii) who was dependent upon such Participant and was sharing such Participant's domicile as of his death, (iii) who shared a common domicile with, and was dependent upon, such Participant for the 3 years immediately preceding his death as though he and she were husband and wife, irrespective of the legal relationship existing between them, and (iv) who, subject to the provisions of subparagraph (e) hereinbelow, does not at any time remarry; (e) provided, for purposes of subparagraphs (c) and (d), a person whose status as a Surviving Spouse was terminated as the consequence of a remarriage may not requalify as a Surviving Spouse upon termination of such remarriage unless the Trustees, in their sole, absolute, and unreviewable discretion, are satisfied that the remarriage was annulled following the initiation of proceedings that were commenced for reasons other than reestablishing such person's status as a Surviving Spouse; and (f) any person who survives Participant who was alive on July 1, 1976, and had not retired and who dies prior to July 1, 1980, if such person satisfies on the date of such Participant's death the requirements of subparagraph (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) hereinabove, and if no other person satisfies all the requirements of subparagraph (b) hereinabove.

Declaration of Kate McClure in Support of the Statement of the Trustees of the ILWU-PMA Pension Plan Regarding Whether Defendant Emelda Peters Qualifies as a Surviving Spouse Under Paragraph 1.35(c) of the Pension Plan ("McClure Decl."), Ex. A (Seventeenth Amendment to ILWU-PMA Pension Agreement as Amended through the

Twenty-Ninth Amendment, dated March 27, 2003) ("the Plan"); Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, No. 14. Emelda and Dorothy both contend that they are entitled to the Plan's survivor benefits.

The Summary Plan Description explains that the "definition of a Surviving Spouse was changed effective July 1, 1976 to comply with the requirements of [ERISA], and changed again effective July 1, 1987 to comply with the requirements of the Retirement Equity Act (REA)." McClure Decl., Ex. B (Summary Plan Description) at 66. Thus, it explains, the applicable definition depends on the date the participant retired and/or died, as follows:

The Pre-July 1, 1976 Definition applies in the case of Pensioners who retired and active Participants who died before July 1, 1976. The July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1987 Definition applies in the case of Pensioners who retired and active Participants who died on and after July 1, 1976 and before July 1, 1987. The July 1, 1987 and After Definition applies in the case of Pensioners who retire and active Participants who die on and after July 1, 1987.

Id. at 66-67.

2. William's...

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