Trustees of Sch. v. Hoyt, 16382.

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: DUNN
• Citation: 148 N.E. 867,318 Ill. 60
• Parties: TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS et al. v. HOYT.
• Docket Number: No. 16382.,16382.
• Decision Date: 08 October 1925

318 Ill. 60
148 N.E. 867

TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS et al.
v.
HOYT.

No. 16382.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1925.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1925.

Petition by the Trustees of Schools and others to condemn land of Norman C. Hoyt for schoolhouse site. Judgment for defendant, and petitioners appeal.

Affirmed.

See, also, 311 Ill. 532, 143 N. E. 59.

[318 Ill. 60]Appeal from Champaign County Court; Roy C. Freeman, Judge.
Williamson & Winkelman, of Urbana, and Jones, McIntire & Jones and Hall & Holaday, all of Danville (O. M. Jones, of Danville, and A. R. Hall, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

318 Ill. 61]Green & Palmer, of Urbana (Henry I. Green, Oris Barth, and Charles G. Howard, all of Urbana, of counsel), for appellee.
DUNN, C. J.

This cause was before the court at the December term, 1923. The proceeding was a petition to condemn land for a schoolhouse site. The owner of the land objected to the condemnation, because of the lack of the statutory conditions authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain; but his motion was denied, and after a trial a judgment of condemnation was rendered, from which he appealed. While other objections were raised on the record, the judgment of reversal was based solely on the lack of power of the board of education to call the election to vote on the proposition to locate and purchase a schoolhouse site, and the judgment of the county court was reversed, and the cause was remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition. On the reinstatement of the cause in the county court, the petitioners made a motion for leave to amend the petition and for another hearing, with leave to introduce further evidence. The defendant made a cross-motion for a judgment dismissing the petition. The court overruled the motion of the petitioners, and entered a judgment for the defendant, dismissing the petition.

[1] It has been held in numerous cases in this court that, where a judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, with specific directions as to the action to be taken by the trial court, it is the duty of that court to follow those directions, and that it cannot err in doing so. Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315, 22 Am. Rep. 77;Windett v. Ruggles, 151 Ill. 184, 37 N. E. 1021;Roby v. Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock Co., 154 Ill. 190, 40 N. E. 293. Where a cause is remanded by the Supreme Court, the trail court cannot err if it follows the opinion of the Supreme Court in the further proceedings of the case, and no attention will be given to arguments that it erred in so doing. [318 Ill. 62]Manternach v. Studt, 240 Ill. 464, 88 N. E. 1000,130 Am. St. Rep. 282. ‘A decree entered in accordance with the directions of this...