Trustees v. Greenough
Decision Date | 01 October 1881 |
Citation | 26 L.Ed. 1157,105 U.S. 527 |
Parties | TRUSTEES v. GREENOUGH |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
The case was argued by Mr. Charles W. Jones for the appellants, and by Mr. Jefferson Chandler, with whom was Mr. C. D. Willard, for the appellee.
The question is this case is one of costs, expenses, and allowances awarded to the complainant below out of a trust fund under the control of the court. Ordinarily a decree will not be reviewed by this court on a question of costs merely in a suit in equity, although the court has entire control of the matter of costs, as wl l as the merits, when it has possession of the cause on appeal from the final decree. But it was held by Lord Cottenham, in Angell v. Davis (4 Myl. & Craig, 360), that when the case is not one of personal costs, in which the court has ordered one party to pay them, but a case in which the court has directed them to be paid out of a particular fund, an appeal lies on the part of those interested in the fund. Lord Cottenham, indeed, suggested other cases in which an appeal might lie from a decree for costs, as where the costs are part of the specific relief prayed; and where the whole of the facts distinctly appear upon the face of the proceedings themselves, so that it is not necessary, in determining the question, to enter into any investigation of the merits. But these suggestions have not met with subsequent approval; and in the case of Taylor v. Dowlen (Law Rep. 4 Ch. App. 697), the court declared that they were not disposed to extend the case of Angell v. Davis; and dismissed an appeal brought by parties ordered to pay costs, which they claimed should be payable out of a fund.
But these discussions in the English courts arose under a system in which appeals from interlocutory orders are allowed. We can only entertain an appeal from a final decree; and supposing the objection to the appeal on the ground of its being from a decree for costs only is untenable, as we think it is, then arises another question, whether the orders appealed from amount to a final decree.
The principal suit was commenced in 1870, by a bill filed by Francis Vose, a large holder of bonds of the Florida Railroad Company, on behalf of himself and the other bondholders, against Harrison Reed and others, trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida, and against the former members of the same board, and against the board itself as a corporation, and sundry other corporations alleged to be in complicity with them. That fund consisted of ten or eleven million acres of lands belonging to the State, including certain proceeds of the sale of some of them, and was pledged for the payment of the interest accruing on the bonds and instalments of the sinking fund for meeting the principal, which were largely in arrear. The charge of the bill is to the effect that the trustees were wasting and destroying the fund by selling at nominal prices the lands by the hundred thousand and even million acres, and failed and refused to provide for the payment of interest or sinking fund on the bonds. The bill prayed that the fraudulent conveyances be set aside, and the trustees enjoined from selling more lands, and that a receiver be appointed to take care of the fund.
The litigation was carried on with great vigor and at much expense, and in fact a large amount of the trust fund was secured and saved; the management of the fund was taken out of the hands of the trustees; agents were appointed by the court to make sales of the land, and made a large number the court to make sales of the land, and made a large number of sales; a considerable amount of money was realized, and dividends have been made amongst the bondholders, most of whom came in and took the benefit of the litigation. Vose, the complainant, bore the whole burden of this litigation, and advanced most of the expenses which were necessary for the purpose of rendering it effective and successful. In 1875 he filed a petition, setting forth these advances and the efforts made by him, and prayed an allowance out of the fund for his expenses and services. In December, 1876, an order was made by the court referring it to a master to ascertain: 1. What and by whom the necessary expenditures have been incurred in bringing the moneys already received into court. 2. What necessary expenditures have been made, and by whom, in protecting the landed and sinking fund from which this money has been and will be realized. 3. What personal services have been rendered, and by whom, in said work, and the value thereof. 4. What amount of same have been charged toF rancis Vose by the receiver, instead of being paid out of the common fund in his hands.
Vose presented his account and vouchers before the master, and testimony was taken on the subject. In 1877 the master made a report, in which, amongst other things, he stated as follows:——
'First, After consideration of the proofs as submitted to me, I find and report that the moneys which have already been received, whether upon account of the internal improvement fund or of the sinking fund, have been brought into court at the instance and the suit and by the sole efforts of Francis Vose, the petitioner, through himself, his solicitors and his agents, and by the instrumentality more directly and especially of his proceeding in equity against the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund et al., as they appear in the records which are made evidence in this case.'
The master further reported a statement of expenditures made by Vose in the cause, and declared that they were necessary expenditures, being for fees of solicitors and counsel, costs of court, and sundry small incidental items for copying records and the like, the whole amounting to $34,192.62. He also stated and allowed sundry fees paid in maintaining other suits in New York, and on appeal to this court, attorneys' fees for resisting fraudulent coupons, and expenses paid to attorneys and agents to investigate fraudulent grants of the trust lands, amounting in all to $19,745.68. He also reported in favor of an allowance to Vose for his personal services and expenditures, as follows:——
'I consider and report that the charge embraced in his itemized account, and numbered forty-two (42), for $25,000 principal, and $9,625 interest, is reasonable and just.
The first of these items consisted of an allowance of $2,500 a year for ten years of personal services; the second was for railroad fares and hotel bills paid by the complainant.
The proceedings before the master were opposed; but, on a hearing upon the report and the evidence submitted therewith the court confirmed it to the extent of $27,835.34, allowing generally the fees of the officers of the court, and those of the attorneys and solicitors employed in the cause, including charges as between attorney and client; at the same time disallowing certain fees paid to advisory counsel and other items not directly connected with the suit, and referring the remainder of the report for further evidence and hearing. In December, 1879, after additional evidence had been taken, a final order was made, allowing sundry expenses for looking after and reclaiming the trust lands, and also allowing for the personal expenses and services of Vose embraced in the two items before referred to; the total amount allowed being $60,131.96.
The appeal to this court is taken from these orders of the court below; and it is contended that they were illegal, because Vose was not before the court in the character of a trustee, and therefore not entitled to reimbursement of his expenses beyond taxable costs; and because the allowances were not lawful if he had been such trustee. The objections to the orders are not expressed in this precise form; but this is the substance of them.
The first question, however, is whether these orders do or do not amount to a final decree, upon which an appeal lies to this court. They are certainly a final determination of the particular matter arising upon the complainant's petition for allowances, and direct the payment of money out of the fund in the hands of the receiver. Though incidental to the cause, the inquiry was a collateral one, having a distinct and independent character, and received a final decision. The administration of the fund for the benefit of the bondholders may continue in the court for a long time to come, dividends being made from time to time in payment of coupons still unsatisfied. The case is a peculiar one, it is true; but under all the circumstances, we think that the proceeding may be regarded as so far independent as to make the decision substantially a final decree for the purposes of an appeal.
As to the point made by the appellants, that the complainant is only a creditor, seeking satisfaction of his debt, and cannot be regarded in the light of a trustee, and therefore is not entitled to an allowance for any expenses or counsel...
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