Trybulski v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corporation
| Decision Date | 13 May 1941 |
| Citation | 20 A.2d 117,112 Vt. 1 |
| Parties | JOHN J. TRYBULSKI ET AL. v. BELLOWS FALLS HYDRO-ELECTRIC CORPORATION |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
February Term, 1941.
Public Service Commission.---1. Separation of Governmental Powers.---2. Incidental Exercise of Another Department's Powers.---3. Public Service Commission Administrative and Quasi-Judicial.---4. Nothing Presumed in Favor of Commission's Jurisdiction.---5. Commission's Powers only Express and Necessary.---6. Commission Agency and Not A Court.---7. Commission's Powers Under P. L. 6060 Limited to its Jurisdiction.---8. Commission's Jurisdiction under P. L. 6091 for Supervision under P. L. 6085.---9. Quality of Act not Classification Determines Function.---10. Commission has Quasi-Judicial Power.---11. Reparation for Past Injuries a Judicial Function.---12. Commission's Jurisdiction Does Not Deprive Courts of Their General Jurisdiction.---13. Jurisdiction to Construe Charter in Relation to Alleged Damages a Judicial Function.---14. Construction of Commission's Jurisdiction Presumed Constitutional.---15. Statute Construed to be Constitutional.---16. Statute Presumed Valid.
1. The provisions of the Vermont Constitution (Chapter II, Sec. 5) that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary departments shall be distinct and separate so that neither exercise the powers belonging to the others does not mean an absolute separation of functions as there must be a certain amount of overlapping or blending of the powers exercised by the different departments.
2. Although one department of government may be authorized to exercise certain powers which may in some manner pertain to another, these powers must be incidental to the department whose powers are exercised and beyond this the powers of one department may not be constitutionally conferred upon another.
3. The public service commission is an administrative body with some quasi-judicial functions authorized to make certain rules and regulations and to determine facts with those auxiliary or subordinate legislative powers delegated to it by the Legislature.
4. The public service commission exercising special and statutory powers, not according to the course of the common law nothing will be presumed in favor of its jurisdiction.
5. The public service commission has only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the Legislature together with such incidental powers expressly granted or necessarily implied as are necessary to the full exercise of those granted.
6. The public service commission is an agency of the Legislature and not a court in the strict sense.
7. The powers of a court of record given the public service commission by P. L. 6060 relate only to those matters within its jurisdiction, Public Laws Chapter 250.
8. The jurisdiction of the public service commission conferred by P L. 6091 is given for the purpose of enabling the commission to carry out the requirements of general supervision provided for in P. L. 6085.
9. It is the quality of the act and not the official classification of the actor which determines whether a function requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment be administrative or judicial.
10. The quasi-judicial power with which the public service commission is clothed may be defined as "the power to perform acts administrative in character, but requiring incidentally the trial and determination of questions of law and fact."
11. Where the function of a commission seems primarily to be to decide a question of private right, based on a claim for reparation for injuries suffered in the past, involving facts and law, the function may be said to be judicial and constitutionally to be performed by the courts.
12. The jurisdiction conferred upon the public service commission over public service corporations does not deprive the courts of actions in contract, actions in general nor the validity of the companies' franchises.
13. A petition seeking to have the public service commission assess damages for injuries to the petitioners' properties claimed to be caused by operation of a power corporation's dam which caused erosion and washing away of petitioners' land involves not only the finding of damages past and future but a construction of charter provisions alleged to make the power corporation liable as an insurer, questions of negligence and other questions which constitute a purely judicial function not incidental to the supervisory power of the public service commission.
14. In the construction of a statute (P. L. 6091) conferring general supervisory powers over power corporations upon the public service commission, it will be assumed that the Legislature did not overlook the constitutional provisions providing for the separation of governmental powers so as to transfer improperly jurisdiction of general questions of fact and law from the courts to the commission.
15. A statute must be construed so that it will not be rendered unconstitutional if it is fairly and reasonably possible so to do.
16. The court must indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the validity of a statute.
PETITION by John T. Trybulski individually and with Mary Trybulski and by William S. Powers and Winifred J. Powers brought to the public service commission seeking the assessment of damages resulting from the operation of petitionee's dam across the Connecticut River. Heard by the commission, E. B. Cornwall, Milo C. Reynolds, Wm. H Darrow, in November, 1940. Petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Exceptions to petitioners. Other facts appear in the opinion.
The order of the public service commission dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction was without error and it is affirmed.
Barber & Barber for petitioners.
Fenton, Wing & Morse (Leonard F. Wing and John D. Carbine) for the petitionee.
Present: MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order of the public service commission dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a petition brought to assess damages for injuries to the properties of the petitioners claimed to have been caused by maintenance and operation of the petitionee's dam across the Connecticut River between Bellows Falls, Vermont, and North Walpole, New Hampshire. The petitionee is engaged in the manufacture and sale of electric current. The premises of the petitioners lie in this State, abutting on the river, at some distance downstream from the dam. It is alleged that, in a manner and for reasons not necessary to recount in detail, the petitionee has operated its dam so as to cause certain fluctuations in the flow of water which have resulted in the erosion of the lands owned by the petitioners, and that in March, 1936, after the formation of an ice jam above the dam, and a period of warm weather, rain and fog, the flashboards and gates of the dam were removed so that a large volume of water and ice came down the river, overflowing and washing away the petitioners' lands, depositing thereon a great amount of sand and debris, and damaging their farming tools and machinery.
The petitionee was incorporated by an Act of the Legislature passed October 25, 1792, under the name of "The Company for Rendering the Connecticut river navigable by Bellows Falls," and was granted "the exclusive privilege of erecting and continuing locks on or by Bellows Falls, on Connecticut river, within the State of Vermont," and the charter provided "That if it should be found necessary to fully effect the intention of this act, to erect a dam on Connecticut River, and thereby flow, or otherways injure the property of any of the good citizens of this State, such person or persons so injured shall, upon application to the county court for the county of Windham, be entitled to receive from the company aforesaid, such compensation as the county court shall adjudge just and equitable, for the injury which such person or persons has sustained, or probably may in future sustain, by flowing the said land or in any other way whatsoever, and a record being made thereof by the clerk of said court shall be a complete bar to any future application for any compensation for any injury done to the same property, whether real or personal; and any action for damage sustained by the dam aforesaid, shall be commenced in the mode prescribed by this act, and in no other, unless the company shall have failed to pay the sum or sums assessed by the court aforesaid, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding." Laws of Vermont, 1797, Appendix, P. 81-84. The charter was amended by No. 135 of the Acts of 1859, by changing the corporate name to the Bellows Falls Canals Company, and providing that "All the rights and privileges heretofore granted such company are hereby extended to them for the purpose of manufacturing, selling or renting of water power, and the transacting of such other business as may be incident thereto." A further amendment was effected by No. 365 of the Acts of 1912, which after reciting (Sec. 1) that the company had ceased to furnish navigation service, provided (Sec. 9) that "Said Bellows Falls Canal Company shall at all times be subject to the general laws of this state from time to time in effect and applicable to water power corporations, and shall be subject to all duties, limitations and restrictions imposed thereby; and if at any time said Bellows Falls Canal Company shall engage in the business of manufacturing, distributing and selling to the public electricity for light, heat or power purposes, it shall be under and subject to all general laws of this state then and from time to time in effect applicable thereto, and shall be subject to the supervision and authority of the public service...
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