Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility

• Decision Date: 03 April 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 100085,No. 12,12
• Citation: 451 Mich. 129,545 N.W.2d 642
• Parties: Catherine TRYC, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Richard Tryc, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The MICHIGAN VETERANS' FACILITY and the Michigan Department of Public Health, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 642

545 N.W.2d 642

451 Mich. 129

Catherine TRYC, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Richard Tryc, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The MICHIGAN VETERANS' FACILITY and the Michigan Department of Public Health, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 100085.

Calendar No. 12.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 9, 1995.

Decided April 3, 1996.

Schenk, Boncher & Prasher by Gregory G. Prasher, Gary Schenk, and Curtis D. Rypma, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Thomas R. Wheeker, Assistant Attorney General, Tort Defense Division, Lansing, for defendants.

OPINION

MALLETT, Justice.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the Michigan Veterans' Facility meets the hospital exception of the governmental immunity statute, thus preventing the facility from claiming immunity from the negligent acts of its employees. Because the facility meets the four-part definition of "hospital" according to the plain language of the statute, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I

On November 8, 1989, Richard Tryc was admitted to the Michigan Veterans' Facility in Grand Rapids, a residential facility designed to provide care for veterans. Tryc was a veteran of the Second World War who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. At the time of his admission, the facility was under the administration of the Department of Public Health. ¹

After his admission to the facility, a long-term care assessment was prepared for Tryc. This assessment indicated that the facility staff could place Tryc in a geriatric chair to keep him in place during meals and when he became "agitated." On March 10, 1990, Tryc was fed his breakfast in the geriatric chair while wearing a "protective vest," which was a restraint that wrapped around him and secured him to the chair. After breakfast, at approximately 8:40 a.m., he was left unattended while the workers assigned to care for him were hearing morning reports and taking a coffee break. During this time Tryc slipped down in the chair and was strangled to death by the vest. ²

A tort action was filed by Catherine Tryc, Richard's wife, individually and as personal representative of his estate, against the facility and the Department of Public Health, seeking recovery on the basis of the alleged negligence of the facility's employees. Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), ³ claiming that they were immune from suit on the basis of governmental immunity. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition for defendants, concluding that the facility was not a "hospital" for purposes of the public hospital exception, M.C.L. § 691.1407(4); M.S.A. § 3.996(107)(4). It noted that the facility was "not a licensed hospital," did not have an organized medical staff, was not accredited by the "Joint Committee on Hospital Accreditations," and did not have a peer-review committee. It stated that "the nature of the facility much more closely [ap]proximates that of a nursing home" even though it was not a nursing home because it was "exempted from the nursing home statute."

Plaintiff appealed the Court of Claims decision in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion, issued June 10, 1994 (Docket No. 145189). Plaintiff sought leave to appeal to this Court, which was granted, limited to the issue "whether the Michigan Veterans' Facility is a 'hospital' within the statutory definition found in M.C.L. § 691.1407(4)(b); M.S.A. § 3.996(107)(4)(b). ⁴ We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals that the facility was not a "hospital" under the public hospital exception.

II

Defendants asked the Court of Claims for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), ⁵ claiming that they were protected by governmental immunity. In determining whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by immunity granted by law under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must consider all documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 162, 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992). The court accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 162-163, 483 N.W.2d 26. Governmental immunity under M.C.L. § 691.1401 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.996(101) et seq. is an affirmative defense and must be stated in a defendant's responsive pleading, MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a). Id. at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26; McCummings v. Hurley Medical Center, 433 Mich. 404, 412, 446 N.W.2d 114 (1989). However, the plaintiff must allege facts justifying application of an exception to governmental immunity in order to survive a motion for summary disposition. Wade, supra at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26.

The State of Michigan provides under M.C.L. § 691.1407(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(107)(1) that governmental agencies are immune from tort liability when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. This statute provides for broad immunity. Wade, supra at 166, 483 N.W.2d 26; Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 595, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).

In 1986 PA 175, the Legislature, in response to our ruling in Ross, supra, amended the governmental immunity statute by creating the public hospital exception. Hyde v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 426 Mich. 223, 245, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986). In Ross, supra at 620, 363 N.W.2d 641, we defined the meaning of "governmental function" to be an "activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law." Under Ross, a public general hospital would be protected from liability whenever its activities were expressly or impliedly mandated by law. See Hyde, supra at 243, 393 N.W.2d 847. This decision impliedly overruled Parker v. Highland Park, 404 Mich. 183, 273 N.W.2d 413 (1978), which had held that a public hospital was subject to liability because its operation did not constitute the exercise of a governmental function. See Hyde, supra at 243, 393 N.W.2d 847. Act 175 adopted the principle from Parker that a governmental agency operating a general hospital was subject to tort liability. Stein v. Southeastern Michigan Family Planning Project, Inc., 432 Mich. 198, 203, 438 N.W.2d 76 (1989).

The hospital exception of the governmental immunity statute provides that a facility and its agents and employees are not immune under the statute if the facility meets the following four-part definition of "hospital": (1) it offers inpatient, overnight care and services; (2) for observation, diagnosis and active treatment; (3) of an individual with a medical, surgical, obstetric, chronic, or rehabilitative condition; (4) requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. ⁶

The rules of statutory construction are well established. First and foremost, we must give effect to the Legislature's intent. Reardon v. Mental Health Dep't, 430 Mich. 398, 407, 424 N.W.2d 248 (1988). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and judicial construction is not permitted. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). Further, we are to give statutory language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Id. at 27, 528 N.W.2d 681. However, when a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls. Detroit v. Muzzin & Vincenti, Inc., 74 Mich.App. 634, 639, 254 N.W.2d 599 (1977); Butterfield Theatres v. Revenue Dep't, 353 Mich. 345, 91 N.W.2d 269 (1958).

Applying these principles, the definition of "hospital" supplied in the statute, being clear and unambiguous, controls. Judicial construction is not permitted. ⁷ The clear language of the statute states that a "hospital" is any facility that offers overnight care and services for observation, diagnosis, and active treatment of an individual with a medical, surgical, obstetric, chronic, or rehabilitative condition requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. Thus, if a facility offers the requisite care to one individual, who does not need to be the individual bringing suit, the facility meets the definition.

The touchstone of the exception is the type of care offered to and required by an individual, not the general character of the facility. ⁸ When a long-term care facility offers the type of care required by the statutory definition of "hospital," it is not immune from suit.

The dissent suggests that to meet the requirement of daily physician direction or supervision, every resident must be seen by a physician each and every day of a stay at the facility. ⁹ If this were the intent, the Legislature could have explicitly required daily physician visits or that care be administered directly by a physician daily throughout the patient's entire stay. Instead, the statute only requires daily physician direction or supervision. ¹⁰ Each time a nurse administers medication, it is done under the direction of a physician. A physician's order directing the daily administration of a medication, or a policy requiring that a given order be renewed daily by a physician, clearly satisfies the criteria.

III

The first three elements of a "hospital" under the statute are for the most part undisputed; the facility offers inpatient, overnight care for observation, diagnosis, and treatment of individuals with medical, chronic, or rehabilitative conditions. Defendants dispute whether the facility offers active treatment for conditions requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. However, we find that the evidence indicates otherwise.

In this regard, the deposition testimony of Thomas Lindsay, the commandant of the facility, is instructive. Mr. Lindsay would not acknowledge that the facility was a "hospital," insisting instead that it was a long-term care facility. ¹¹ However, when questioned specifically on the four elements of a "hospital" under the statute, he testified that the ...