Trzaska v. Int'l Game Tech.
| Decision Date | 23 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | 2:10-CV-2268 JCM (GWF) |
| Parties | EDWARD SETH TRZASKA, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Presently before the court is defendants International Game Technology, Anchor Coin Inc., and Spin for Cash Wide Area Progressive motion (doc. # 11), and defendants filed a reply (doc. #12).
Plaintiff filed his pro se complaint against defendant IGT claiming his civil rights were violated under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1986; and (4-6) 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-243 (doc. #1-2). Plaintiff also makes claims for (7) injunctive relief; (8) declaratory relief; and (9) breach of a fiduciary duty for "failure to investigate properly" (doc. #1-2).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12©, "after the pleadings have closed-but early enough to not delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Judgment on the pleadings is appropriatewhen, even if all material facts in the pleading under attack are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hal Roach Studios Inc. v. Ricard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). The standard of review for judgment on the pleadings is viewed in the same light as that of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). To survive this motion, the complaint must demonstrate how plaintiff is entitled to relief, and must do so by providing the court with "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation" of the elements. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The motion can be granted only if the facts, taken as true, clearly show that the party is entitled to prevail. Austad v. U.S., 386 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1967). Furthermore, "[p]ro se complaints are to be construed liberally and may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-890 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, as plaintiff has filed pro se, his complaint is to be construed liberally. However, pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of substantive law."Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)).
In his complaint, plaintiff claims a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc. #1-2). The defendant asserts such a claim fails because it is incognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), barred by the statute of limitations, and fails to state a claim under § 1983 (doc #7).
Plaintiff's claims arise out of IGT's involvement in plaintiff's conviction for a 2nd degree felony in Iowa (doc. #1-2). For a claim that implicates the validity of a state court conviction to be cognizable, "a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on directappeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Moreover, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, "the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed. . . ." Id.
Here, plaintiff has not even challenged the validity of his conviction in Iowa. A finding that would award plaintiff damages for IGT's alleged wrongdoings during the investigation of that crime in Iowa would necessarily bring into question the validity of the conviction. Therefore, before plaintiff can make a claim under § 1983, he must prove that his conviction has been overturned. Absent such a showing, the plaintiff's claim under § 1983 is incognizable, warranting judgment in favor of defendant.
The statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to § 1983 is two (2) years. Perez v. Seevers, 869 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1989). Claims under § 1983 that are governed by Heck cognizableness do not start the clock for statute of limitations until the conviction is overturned. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489.
Here, plaintiff's claim is incognizable under Heck. Accordingly, the statute of limitations will not begin until and unless the plaintiff's conviction in Iowa is overturned.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal statute, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. American Manuf. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The Ninth Circuit has recognized three tests to determine if an action by a private party is under color of state law: the joint action test, the symbiotic relationship test, and the public function test. See Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura County, 294 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, plaintiff does not allege the deprivation of any specific constitutional or federal right. The complaint merely alleges generally that plaintiff's civil rights and constitutional rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (doc #1-2). This is insufficient because § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights on its own. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979). Furthermore, even if a deprivation of a right was pled in the complaint, the § 1983 claim would still fail because IGT did not act under color of state law under any of the Ninth Circuit's tests.
The joint action test requires a private party to be a "willful participant" with state actors, and the private party's actions must be "inextricably intertwined" with the state actors' actions in an activity that deprives an individual of his constitutional or federal rights. Id. at 1211. A conspiracy between the private party and the state may also satisfy the joint action test if there is "(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages." Ciambrello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002); see Brunette, 295 F.3d at 1211 (). To be considered to be in joint activity with the state, the private actor needs to have some control over the state actors' decision making. Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981).
Here, there is no evidence presented that IGT's actions were "inextricably intertwined" with the actions of the Iowa police. Nothing suggests that IGT had any control over the decision making of the Iowa police—its employee merely answered the officers' questions. This is not sufficient to constitute joint action. See Lee v. Town of Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1987) (). Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint beyond conclusory statements that suggests that a conspiracy occurred between IGT and any state actor. Therefore, IGT did not act under color of state law according to the joint action test.
For a private party to act under color of state law under the symbiotic relationship test, the government must have "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence [with a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . ." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). The symbiotic relationship is often created via financial dependence or ultimate control by either the state or private entity over the other. See Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1213.
Here, the fact that IGT provided information to police during an investigation does not rise to such a level that it would be considered a "position of interdependence." There are no allegations of financial dependence or rendering of indispensable services. Therefore, IGT did not act under color of state law according to the symbiotic relationship test.
Private action is considered to be under the color of state law if it is traditionally considered to be the "exclusive prerogative" of the state. See Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1214.
Providing information to the police cannot be considered to be a function of the state, much less the "exclusive prerogative" of the state. Accordingly, IGT did not act under color of state law according to the public function test.
There are three subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiff does not make clear under which subsections he is stating a claim, but only § 1985(3) could be applicable to the case at hand. To prove a § 1985 conspiracy between a private party and the government, the plaintiff must show an agreement by the defendants to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1989). An "insidiously discriminatory, racial, or class-based animus" must be alleged to state a claim under § 1985(3). United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1983). Furthermore, the absence of a § 1983 deprivation of rights necessarily precludes a claim under § 1985(3). Caldeira, 866 F.2d at 1181....
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