Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 20050744.

• Court: Supreme Court of Utah
• Writing for the Court: Parrish
• Citation: 163 P.3d 615,2007 UT 37
• Parties: Julie TSCHAGGENY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY and Does 1 through 5, inclusive, Defendants and Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 20050744.,20050744.
• Decision Date: 27 April 2007

163 P.3d 615 2007 UT 37 Julie TSCHAGGENY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY and Does 1 through 5, inclusive, Defendants and Appellees. No. 20050744. Supreme Court of Utah. April 27, 2007. Rehearing Denied June 13, 2007.

[163 P.3d 617]

Steve S. Christensen, Robert J. Labrum, Travis R. Terry, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

John R. Lund, Robert W. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for defendant Milbank.

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Julie Tschaggeny was injured in an automobile accident and submitted a claim to Milbank Insurance Company ("Milbank") under her uninsured motorist policy. Milbank denied coverage, and Tschaggeny sued for a determination of benefits.¹ A jury awarded a verdict for Tschaggeny, but she argues that the final judgment amount was inadequate in three separate respects.

¶ 2 First, Tschaggeny argues that the trial court erred both in granting Milbank's motion in limine to exclude from evidence medical bills that had been written off and in denying Tschaggeny's motion to reconsider that issue. Second, Tschaggeny contends that the trial court failed to follow Utah Code section 78-27-44 in its award of prejudgment interest. Third, Tschaggeny asserts that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to add to the jury's verdict the amount of the excluded medical bills and the value of replacement services. Because we find no reversible error under any of these theories, we affirm the trial court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 At the time of her accident, Tschaggeny was covered under two separate insurance policies—an uninsured motorist policy with Milbank and a health insurance policy. Because Tschaggeny's medical expenses were covered under her health insurance policy, a portion of her medical expenses were written off pursuant to a contractual agreement between her health insurer and the health care providers.

¶ 4 When Tschaggeny and Milbank were unable to agree on Milbank's obligation to cover certain medical expenses, Tschaggeny sued. On February 18, 2004, Milbank filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court prevent Tschaggeny from submitting evidence of the medical expenses that had been written off. Tschaggeny failed to file any memorandum in opposition to the motion. Over four months later, the district court held a pretrial hearing to resolve all pending matters, including the motion in limine. When asked at the hearing whether Tschaggeny opposed the motion in limine, her counsel initially responded that she did. Later, however, her counsel conceded that "the way this has been presented by the defense makes sense and probably does not need an opposition." The trial judge accordingly granted the motion in limine from the bench.

¶ 5 A jury trial was scheduled to begin approximately three months later. On the morning of trial, however, just minutes before the jury was to be seated, Tschaggeny's counsel handed the trial judge a motion to reconsider her ruling on the motion in limine. In her supporting memorandum, Tschaggeny argued for the first time that excluding the medical bill write-offs violated the collateral source rule. The trial court ordered a one-day continuance to review Tschaggeny's motion. The following day, the trial judge denied Tschaggeny's motion for reconsideration as untimely. Even so, the trial judge indicated that if Tschaggeny would move for a continuance, she would consider the merits of the motion. Tschaggeny elected not to do so, and the trial proceeded without any evidence of the written-off medical expenses.

¶ 6 At the conclusion of trial, the jury awarded Tschaggeny both special and general damages. However, the jury did not award any damages for the replacement services that Tschaggeny allegedly incurred for household duties that were performed by others while she was injured.

¶ 7 The trial judge entered judgment on the jury's verdict after adding prejudgment interest on the special damages awarded by the jury and giving Milbank credit for $12,915.46, which Milbank had paid to Tschaggeny approximately eighteen months

163 P.3d 618

after the accident.² In calculating prejudgment interest on the special damages, the trial court allowed interest from the date of the accident to the date of judgment, with one exception. With respect to the $12,915.46 that Milbank had already paid, the trial court awarded prejudgment interest for only that eighteen-month period, rather than for the full period of time from the date of the accident until the date of judgment.

¶ 8 After the trial court entered judgment, Tschaggeny filed a "Motion to Amend Judgment, Motion for Additur, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial." In her memorandum in support of these motions, Tschaggeny argued that the trial judge should add to the judgment additional damages for the amount of the excluded medical bills and the value of the replacement services. In the alternative, Tschaggeny argued that the court should require Milbank to stipulate to an additur for those items or face a new trial. The trial court denied Tschaggeny's motions in their entirety.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, Tschaggeny argues that the trial court erred in (1) granting Milbank's motion in limine, (2) calculating prejudgment interest, and (3) denying her motion for additur or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

I. EXCLUSION OF THE MEDICAL BILL WRITE-OFFS

¶ 10 As is typical in the industry, Tschaggeny's health insurer negotiated a lower rate for health care services for its policy holders than any member of the uninsured general public is able to bargain for, resulting in a discounted medical bill. Thus, it is a perverse irony of our modern health care system that those who are least able to pay are typically billed at a significantly higher rate than insured individuals for the same services. In seeking to realize the benefits that she earned by paying premiums under her uninsured motorist policy, Tschaggeny argues that the benefit she received from the contractual arrangements between her health insurer and medical providers falls under the collateral source rule. Under that rule, she claims she is entitled to recover the amount that her health care providers charged uninsured individuals, rather than the discounted charges that were actually paid by her health insurer.

¶ 11 The trial court did not address the merits of Tschaggeny's argument because it concluded that the issue was not properly presented. Tschaggeny asserts that the trial court erred in this conclusion and asks us to review two separate rulings: (1) the trial court's initial decision to grant Milbank's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the written-off amounts, and (2) the trial court's denial of her motion to reconsider that ruling.

A. The Motion in Limine

¶ 12 We will not review the trial court's order granting Milbank's motion in limine because Tschaggeny's counsel invited that result. The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking "`advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 15, 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742). "Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues." Id. ¶ 16.

¶ 13 At the hearing on the motion in limine, Tschaggeny's counsel essentially stipulated that it be granted. While initially opposing the motion, counsel later conceded that he had no objection to the motion so long as the order was confined to only those amounts that had actually been written off:

So we would ask even though — I think the way this has been presented by the defense makes sense and probably does not need an opposition in terms of there's binding [sic] write down. I think to avoid

163 P.3d 619

future complications with the health insurance overlayer we'd just ask the court to restrict the motion to what it has been brought rather than as a broad writeoff of any health insurance amounts. And on that basis we will submit it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm going to grant the motion in limine and I am going to restrict it to precisely the terms of the motion.

Thus, despite his initial opposition to the motion, in the end, counsel for Tschaggeny clearly communicated his agreement to the relief ordered. To the extent the trial judge committed any legal error in granting the motion, she was invited to do so by Tschaggeny's own counsel. Under the invited error doctrine, it would be inappropriate to reverse the trial court for a decision that it was invited to make by the party now attempting to renege on that invitation.

B. The Motion to Reconsider

¶ 14 We next address Tschaggeny's claim that the trial court erred in denying her motion to reconsider its original ruling on the motion in limine. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion as untimely. And in any event, Tschaggeny failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

1. The Trial Court's Denial of the Motion on Timeliness Grounds

¶ 15 We begin our analysis by establishing the proper standard of review. Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 135 P.3d 861. Because trial courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary. If Tschaggeny wanted to oppose the motion in limine, her proper course of action was to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days of its filing. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). Any memoranda filed beyond this ten-day window would be untimely and could be considered only with leave of court. Id. In short, the decision to consider...