Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 93-676-SD.
• Citation: 893 F. Supp. 109
• Parties: Cheryl TSETSERANOS v. TECH PROTOTYPE, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

893 F. Supp. 109

Cheryl TSETSERANOS v.TECH PROTOTYPE, INC.

Civ. No. 93-676-SD.

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire.

April 10, 1995.

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Robert E. Jauron, Manchester, NH, for Cheryl Tsetseranos.

Randall E. Wilbert, Nashua, NH, for Tech Prototype, Inc.

ORDER

DEVINE, Senior District Judge.

In this civil action, plaintiffCheryl Tsetseranos asserts that her employment was terminated by Tech Prototype, Inc., because of her pregnancy and related medical conditions, in violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k);Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117;andNew Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 354-A:7.Plaintiff also asserts a state-law claim for wrongful discharge.

Presently before the court are defendant's motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion to amend its answer, to which plaintiff objects.

Discussion

1.Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Summary judgment is a procedure that involves shifting burdens between the moving and the nonmoving parties.Initially, the onus falls upon the moving party to aver "`an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'"Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,895 F.2d 46, 48(1st Cir.1990)(quotingCelotex Corp. v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 325106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)).Once the moving party satisfies this requirement, the pendulum swings back to the nonmoving party, who must oppose the motion by presenting facts that show that there is a "genuine issue for trial."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 256106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986)(citingFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e))....

LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co.,6 F.3d 836, 841(1st Cir.1993), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72(1994).

When the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial, there can no longer be a genuine issue as to any material fact: the failure of proof as to an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc.,40 F.3d 11, 12(1st Cir.1994)(citingCelotex Corp., supra,477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53), petition for cert. filed,63 U.S.L.W. 3644(U.S.Feb. 21, 1995)(No. 94-1416).

"Even in an employment discrimination case, `"where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."'"Smith, supra,40 F.3d at 13(quotingGoldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston,985 F.2d 1113, 1116(1st Cir.1993)(quotingMedina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,896 F.2d 5, 8(1st Cir.1990))).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court construes the evidence and draws all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.Anderson, supra,477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.

2.Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment because of or on the basis of sex.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994).¹In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination ActamendedTitle VII to define the phrases "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" to include

because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

The basic principle of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act"is that women affected by pregnancy and related conditions must be treated the same as other applicants and employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work."29 C.F.R. Pt. 1604, App.at 197(1994)."In the area of fringe benefits, such as disability benefits, sick leave and health insurance, the same principle applies.A woman unable to work for pregnancy-related reasons is entitled to disability benefits or sick leave on the same basis as employees unable to work for other medical reasons."²Id.

Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated because of her pregnancy and related medical conditions in violation of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.As plaintiff has produced no direct evidence of discrimination, the court analyzes her claim under the now-familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973).

In applying the facts of this case to the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework, the court is mindful of the Supreme Court's oft-repeated admonition "that the Title VIIplaintiff at all times bears the `ultimate burden of persuasion.'"St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407(1993).

a. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case

The first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of discrimination.In order to meet this burden under Title VII, plaintiff

must show that (1)she is a member of a protected class; (2)she was performing her job at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job performance; (3)she suffered an adverse job action by her employer; and (4) her employer sought a replacement for her with roughly equivalent qualifications.

Smith, supra,40 F.3d at 15(citingMesnick v. General Elec. Co.,950 F.2d 816, 823(1st Cir.1991), cert. denied,504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586(1992)).The plaintiff's burden of making out the prima facie case of discrimination is "`not onerous.'"Id.,40 F.3d at 15 n. 4(quotingMesnick, supra,950 F.2d at 823).

In this case, it is undisputed that Tsetseranos was pregnant and had ovarian cysts at the time of her termination.³Further, for the purposes of its summary judgment motion only, defendant concedes that plaintiff was replaced by someone with roughly equivalent qualifications.

Defendant asserts, however, that plaintiff cannot meet the second element of her prima facie case: that she was performing her job at a level that rules out the possibility that she was fired for inadequate job performance.Because plaintiff's prima facie burden is not onerous, the First Circuit has interpreted the second element as requiring plaintiff to "put forth sufficient evidence to `support an inference that the plaintiff's job performance at the time of her discharge was adequate to meet the employer's legitimate needs.'"Smith, supra,40 F.3d at 15 n. 4(quotingKeisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc.,19 F.3d 755, 760(1st Cir.1994))(alterations inSmith).

As proof of plaintiff's allegedly inadequate work performance, defendant submits an evaluation of Tsetseranos dated June 8, 1992.This evaluation indicates that Tsetseranos was meeting the standard for her "ability to do job assigned" and "productivity," but it also details problems in both of these areas.Tsetseranos Evaluationat 1(attached to Affidavit of Roger Somers as Exhibit A).Further, plaintiff's cooperation, attitude, and initiative were all rated "good," but her work habits were characterized as "poor."Id.Her evaluator stated in his comments,

Your work habits are affected by priority setting & organization problems.You must establish clear performance goals for the various aspects of your job so you can work smarter.You work very hard but mostly you are reacting to the phone or specific tasks as they come up rather than prioritizing and managing them systematically.This is very inefficient and wastes time.

Id.

In the overall comments section of the evaluation, the evaluator states, "In preparing for this review I was disappointed to discover that many of the issues I planned to discuss were also corrective action items from our last review.There has been improvement but you should have put many of these issues behind you by now."Id. at 2.The evaluation concludes with a list of nine problem areas for Tsetseranos to "work on."⁴Id. at 3.

The Employee Warning Report filled out by Somers on the day of plaintiff's termination states, "There has been no change since your review in level of mistakes, improved organization (in spite of attending a seminar) and the files are a mess — not reviewing PO's has cost us many losses...."Employee Warning Report dated October 1, 1992(attached to Somers Affidavit as Exhibit B).The explanation given in the report for plaintiff's discharge is, "No signs of improving or correcting problems."Id.

To support her contention that she was adequately performing her job, plaintiff points first to her earnings history.Plaintiff began working at Tech Prototype in May 1990 for $9.00 per hour or $18,720 per year.Affidavit of Cheryl (Tsetseranos) Jeffrey 2; ADP Employee Earnings Record for Cheryl Tsetseranos(attached to Jeffrey Affidavit as Exhibit A).Plaintiff received four raises in pay during the twenty-nine months she worked at Tech Prototype.Id.When Tsetseranos was terminated on October 1, 1992, she was earning $28,000 per year.Id.

Plaintiff states that following her June 8, 1992, evaluation, she attended a seminar on "organizing and prioritizing."She further states that "during the time period...