Tsugawa v. Reinartz

• Decision Date: 31 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 5419,5419
• Citation: 527 P.2d 1278,56 Haw. 67
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: Ernest K. TSUGAWA and Ethel T. Tsugawa, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Paul J. REINARTZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

Page 1278

527 P.2d 1278

56 Haw. 67

Ernest K. TSUGAWA and Ethel T. Tsugawa, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Paul J. REINARTZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 5419.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Oct 31, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. On motions for a directed verdict, the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorably to the party against whom the motion is directed and if the evidence and the inferences viewed in that manner are of such character that reasonable persons in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment may reach different conclusions upon the crucial issue then the motion should be denied and the issue should be submitted to the jury; but where there is no such conflict from the evidence and but one inference can be drawn from the facts, it is the duty of the court to pass upon the question of negligence and proximate cause as questions of law.

2. Where a party is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law, but is denied such verdict, and the jury returns an adverse verdict to such party, then such party is also entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

3. Where a person operates a motor vehicle and he is put on notice that he is travelling in heavy traffic, following a line of seven or eight cars on a highway, such a person, as a reasonably prudent driver, under the circumstances, should be fully aware that this condition could produce a 'stop and go' situation. His speed and following distance should be adjusted accordingly and the movement of his line of traffic should be the focal point of his attention. If his failure to so conduct himself proximately causes a collision with the vehicle to his front, then he is negligent and he is liable for such collision in the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the driver of the front vehicle which is a proximate cause of such collision.

4. An unsigned statement of a party responding to interrogatories, which unsigned statement is nevertheless attached to such answers in answer to one of such interrogatories, is a part and parcel of the answers to such interrogatories.

David H. C. Lee, Honolulu (Herbert K. Shimabukuro, Honolulu, with him on the briefs; Nishimura & Lee, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

David J. Dezzani, Honolulu (Goodsill, Anderson & Quinn, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and KATO, Circuit Judge, in place of LEVINSON, J., recused.

OGATA, Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Ernest K. Tsugawa and Ethel T. Tsugawa, husband and wife, brought this action against defendant-appellee, Paul J. Reinartz, Jr., in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit to recover for personal injuries and property damages sustained by plaintiffs-appellants as a result of a three-car automobile collision. The case was tried before a jury which found a verdict in favor of the defendant-appellee and against the plaintiffs-appellants. A judgment was entered on this verdict. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we reverse the judgment.

On June 14, 1969, the motor vehicle operated by plaintiff-appellant, Ernest K. Tsugawa, ¹ was struck in the rear by a motor vehicle operated by the defendant-appellee. This collision occurred on Likelike Highway in Honolulu on a clear, dry Saturday afternoon. Prior to the collision, the parties were stopped in the ewa (inside) lane, mauka (north) bound, behind a line of cars at the red traffic light at the intersection of Likelike Highway and Nalanieha Street. The defendant-appellee's vehicle was then stopped immediately behind plaintiff-appellant's vehicle. When the light turned green, the line of cars proceeded through the intersection in the mauka direction on Likelike Highway. When the plaintiff-appellant's vehicle had moved approximately ninety-six feet mauka of the intersection, the line of cars then slowed down again and came to a stop; however, the defendant-appellee, being unable to stop his vehicle, collided into the rear of the plaintiff-appellant's vehicle. The plaintiff-appellant contends that not only was his automobile struck in the rear by defendant-appellee's vehicle, but that the impact of this collision pushed forward the plaintiff-appellant's automobile into the rear of a forward vehicle driven by a Mr. Kazunaga. Both Likelike Highway and Nalanieha Street were paved with asphalt, and the grade of Likelike Highway in the vicinity of the collision is slightly inclined. Defendant-appellee was driving a standard size 1964 Chevrolet stationwagon. Plaintiff-appellant was driving a white 1966 Chevy II stationwagon and Mr. Kazunaga was driving a blue 1969 Buick stationwagon.

According to the version of defendant-appellee, who testified in this case relative to the collision between his vehicle and plaintiff-appellant's vehicle, it appears that just prior to the collision, but while defendant-appellee was proceeding through the Nalanieha Street intersection, he observed a dead or injured dog which was lying along the left side of the highway and which extended about a foot into his lane of travel. As a result defendant-appellee briefly diverted his attention from the line of traffic to glance at the dog, glance to the right to see if there was traffic to the right of his automobile, and make a slight directional adjustment within his lane to avoid hitting the dog. Defendant-appellee was then following plaintiff-appellant by approximately two or three standard car lengths at twenty-five to thirty miles an hour. When he looked forward again the defendant-appellee observed that the plaintiff-appellant's vehicle was no longer moving forward; the defendant-appellee then slammed on his brake but his vehicle collided against the rear of plaintiff-appellant's vehicle. According to defendant-appellee's testimony, after he had applied his brake to his vehicle, it was coming to a stop, and that the collision between his vehicle and the plaintiff-appellant's car was slight. Defendant-appellee maintains that he came to a full stop after the collision. He further testified that he did not see the rear brake lights flashing on plaintiff-appellant's vehicle and did not see plaintiff-appellant's car collide with Mr. Kazunaga's car. Defendant-appellee and his wife (who was a passenger in defendant-appellee's car at the time of the accident) both testified that they did not see plaintiff-appellant's vehicle roll backward.

At the close of all the evidence, and after the defendant-appellee had rested his case, plaintiffs-appellants moved the court below to direct the jury to find in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants on the question of liability for the rear-end collision between the vehicles of plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee. This motion for directed verdict on liability was denied.

It is not necessary in our disposition of this appeal to decide which of the collisions occurred first or which collision (if not both) caused the alleged injuries and damages to plaintiffs-appellants. All we decide now is that as a matter of law, on the record of this case, defendant-appellee is liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the injuries and damages proximately caused as a result of the collision between defendant-appellee's vehicle and plaintiff-appellant's vehicle and that plaintiffs-appellants were entitled to and they should have been granted a directed verdict against the defendant-appellee on the issue of liability. Consequently, the role and function of the jury should have been limited under appropriate instructions to the single issue and responsibility of determining the damages, if any, to be awarded to plaintiffs-appellants. It follows from the foregoing view that we have expressed and we, therefore, hold that the court also erred in denying the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the question of liability and for a new trial on the question of damages filed by plaintiffs-appellants after the entry of the judgment.

The standard for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been delineated in several cases in this jurisdiction: State Savings & Loan v. Corey, 53 Haw. 132, 488 P.2d 703 (1971); Nagata v. Kahului Development Co., 49 Haw. 378, 420 P.2d 103 (1966); Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 388 P.2d 203 (1963). Thus, we have stated in State Savings & Loan v. Corey, supra, 53 Haw. at page 145, 488 P.2d at page 711: 'that verdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the jury's findings. More particularly, in relation to directed verdicts we have held in Chambers v. City and County of Honolulu, 48 Haw. 539, 541, 406 P.2d 380, 382 (1965), quoting from Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 313, 388 P.2d 203, 206 (1963); Young v. Price, 48 Haw. 22, 24, 395 P.2d 365, 367 (1964), that: '(O)n motions for a directed verdict, the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and if the evidence and inferences viewed in that manner are of such character that reasonable persons in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment may reach different conclusions upon the crucial issue, then the motion should be denied and the issue should be submitted to the jury."

This court has further held in Young v. Price, supra, 47 Haw. at page 313, 388 P.2d at 206: "where there is no conflict from the evidence and but one inference can be drawn from the facts, it is the duty of the court to pass upon the question of negligence and proximate cause as questions of law.' Carreira v. Territory, 40 Haw. 513, 517. This is equally true where contributory negligence is the issue. Ferrage v. Honolulu Rapid Transit, 24 Haw. 87, 91.' See also Deponte v. Ulupalakua Ranch, Ltd., 48 Haw. 17, 395 P.2d 273 (1964).

While reasonable people may differ in their assessment of the...