Tucci v. State Farm Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | 35 E.D. 1982,39 E.D. 1982 and 41 E.D. 1982. |
| Citation | 503 Pa. 447,469 A.2d 1025 |
| Parties | Mary R. TUCCI, Appellee, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Arlene Anne CARR, Appellee, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Barbara SAUNDERS, Appellee, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued Oct. 20, 1983.
Reargument Denied Feb. 23, 1984.
Alan Dion, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Samuel Merovitz, Donald J. Klein, Philadelphia, for Tucci at No 35.
Bernard M. Gross, Philadelphia, for Carr at No. 39.
Phillip Baer, Philadelphia, for Saunders at No. 41.
Richard C. Angino, Harrisburg, for Saunders and amicus.
Before ROBERTS, C.J., and NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT HUTCHINSON and ZAPPALA, JJ.
These three cases in which State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals by allowance involve the same issue and arise out of arbitration awards under no-fault policies. Therefore, we have consolidated them.
The awards were all made by the same arbitrator, confirmed by Philadelphia Common Pleas and affirmed by the same panel of Superior Court. The issue in each is whether an insured can doubly recover the same economic losses, or "special damages", under the personal injury protection provisions of a no-fault policy and also under the uninsured motorist coverage required in all liability policies by the Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 909, 40 P.S. § 2000. [1] We hold the legislature did not intend to afford such duplicate recovery beyond the actual special damages an insured suffered and, therefore, reverse Superior Court.
Each of these appellees received payment of her claim for economic loss or "special damages", i.e. medical expenses and loss of earnings, under the basic loss coverage of her no-fault insurance. Each of them then claimed additional damages under the uninsured motorist coverage of her liability policy. These claims were submitted to the arbitrator who made the following awards:
(1) for Mary R. Tucci against State Farm in the amount of $12,500.00,
(2) for Arlene Carr against State Farm in the amount of $25,500.00, [2]
(3) for Barbara Saunders against State Farm in the amount of $9,987.00.
Each award specified the portion of the amount awarded attributable to noneconomic loss or "general damages", i.e. pain and suffering, which would be recoverable in trespass under Section 301 of our No-Fault Act [3] and the portion attributable to "special damages" which latter was, in each case, identical with the amounts received under the appellees' no-fault coverage for basic loss. [4] Appellant petitioned the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for modification of the arbitrator's awards under the Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, 5 P.S. § 161-179, on the ground that the award is against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the jury the court would have entered different or other judgment notwithstanding the verdict. [5] With the judiciary's scope of review so defined, we now reexamine these awards.
The Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 909, 40 P.S. § 2000, was enacted to require, with limitations, "that insurance policies insuring against loss occurring in connection with motor vehicles provide protection against certain uninsured motorists." [6] Relevant to our discussion here is subsection (a) which provides:
(a) No motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State, unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death as are fixed from time to time by the General Assembly in section 1421 of article XIV of "The Vehicle Code," act of April 29, 1959 (P.L. 58), under provisions approved by the Insurance Commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, ....
In Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968), we interpreted this act as follows:
The purpose of the uninsured motorist law is to provide protection to innocent victims of irresponsible drivers. The amount of the coverage to be afforded by the uninsured motorist feature of the policy is set by the statute, but nowhere, explicitly or implicitly, does the act place a limit on the total amount a victim may recover if he suffers a loss resulting from the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
In Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967), we quoted with approval the language of Katz v. American Motorists Ins. Co. , 53 Cal.Rptr. 669 (1966), that such statutes are "designed to give monetary protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons who while lawfully using the highways themselves suffer grave injuries through the negligent use of those highways by others." We there declared for liberal construction of the statute in order to achieve the legislative intent, and we here adhere to that declaration.
Eleven years after the passage of the uninsured motorists act, the legislature attempted to establish "a Statewide low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system of compensating and restoring motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims" [7] intending to avoid the "confusion, complexity, uncertainty, and chaos which would be engendered by a multiplicity of noncomplementary systems." [8] This effort was entitled the "Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act." There is no direct reference in that No-Fault Act to the 1963 "uninsured motorists act", despite the fact that the No-Fault Act has provisions which directly apply to uninsured motor vehicle owners. [9] Based on the absence of explicit cross-reference, appellees argue that the 1974 No-Fault Act does not "supersede or even interrelate" with the prior act and, therefore, they can doubly recover medical and work loss expenses under both acts. We note, however, that both these statutes relate to losses from injuries occurring in connection with motor vehicles and the obligations of motor vehicle owners to obtain insurance protection against accidental injuries, especially those caused by uninsured motorists. Logically, therefore, we should, if possible, read them in pari materia since they relate to the same class of persons or things and, under general rules of statutory construction, are to be construed together, if possible, as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932. [10]
Hence, we are bound to assume that when the legislature indicated its intention to set up "a Statewide low-cost, comprehensive, and fair system of compensating and restoring motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims", specifically addressing certain aspects of the injuries caused by uninsured motorists and leaving the earlier uninsured motorist legislation intact, it intended that earlier legislation to become a rational part of the new comprehensive system. Thus, the new act should be viewed as complementing the earlier policy of requiring all motorists to carry liability protection and protection against personal injury losses caused by uninsured motorists.
Section 102(b) of the No-Fault Act, states its purpose "to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims...." Under the definitions in Section 103, "loss" means "accrued economic detriment resulting from injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle consisting of, and limited to, allowable expense, work loss, replacement services loss, and survivor's loss." "Basic loss benefits" are defined as "benefits provided in accordance with this act for the net loss sustained by a victim...." (Emphasis added.) If we then substitute the Section 103 definitions into Section 102(b), the latter section sets forth a purpose to establish a statewide system of prompt and adequate benefits for the net economic detriment sustained by a motor accident victim.
The correlation between this purpose of the No-Fault Act and that of the Uninsured Motorist Act has been perceptively articulated by Judge Teitelbaum in Carnevale v. Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Company, 469 F.Supp. 681 (W.D.Pa.1979):
The purpose of Pennsylvania's no-fault law is to create a first party contractual right of action against one's own insurer for economic loss and to preserve the common law cause of action for non-economic loss where certain threshold conditions have been met.1 Uninsured motorist coverage is designed to provide protection against being left with a worthless cause of action against the uninsured driver for non-economic loss.2
Absent the set-off provision, plaintiff is reimbursed for his economic losses under the no-fault coverage and reimbursed for his non-economic losses up to the policy limit by the uninsured motorist coverage. In this manner, the legislatively intended distinction between economic and non-economic losses is preserved. Public policy is also furthered in that premiums paid for uninsured motorist coverage will provide protection against non-economic losses occasioned by an uninsured motorist's actions.
The rationale of Tubner v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 496 Pa. 215, 436 A.2d 621 (1981)...
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