Tucker v. Callahan
| Decision Date | 26 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-86-0725.,3-86-0725. |
| Citation | 663 F. Supp. 375 |
| Parties | Mitchell B. TUCKER v. Jack CALLAHAN, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Bob Lynch, Jr., Gilbert & Milom, Nashville, Tenn., William W. Gibson, Graham Matherne, for Tucker.
Charles N. Griffith, Waverly, Tenn., for Callahan, Glasgow, Brewer and City of New Johnsonville.
Darrell G. Townsend, Howell, Fisher, Branham & North, Nashville, Tenn., for Springer.
The defendant has filed a motion asking this Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction by dismissing or, in the alternative, staying this action on the grounds of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The issue before the Court is whether or not to decline to exercise federal jurisdiction over plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
The plaintiff, Mitchell Tucker, states that he was assaulted and severely injured in the Harbour Inn parking lot in New Johnsonville, Tennessee. Plaintiff alleges that Wilburn Springer, a New Johnsonville police officer, was on duty at the time, witnessed the assault, and failed to intervene or to render medical assistance to Mr. Tucker. Plaintiff has filed suit in this Court against Officer Springer, the City of New Johnsonville, and the city's Mayor, Police Commissioner and Chief of Police alleging that they violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claim is exclusively federal in nature and requires no exercise of the Court's pendent jurisdiction.
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on August 19, 1986. On the same day he also filed suit in state court seeking recovery against the above defendants under the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-3-103. In addition, the state suit seeks recovery against two additional defendants — the Harbour Inn, under a claim of negligence, and the alleged assailant under a claim of civil assault and battery. Although the state suit arises out of the same incident, it relies solely on state constitutional and state tort law.
Abstention is a judicially created doctrine.
The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d at 495-96 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has articulated four categories in which it may be appropriate for a District Court to decline to exercise federal jurisdiction.
A federal court should abstain when a state court's resolution of unsettled state law questions may make consideration of the federal constitutional question unnecessary. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). In Pullman, the Commission had issued an order which was, probably, violative of state law and of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court stayed the federal action until the state had an opportunity to construe the statute. Here, there is no question of state law that would moot consideration of the federal constitutional issue presented.
Second, federal courts may abstain when exercise of federal jurisdiction would undermine or conflict with a state's attempt to "provide a unified method for the formation of policy" on issues of public concern. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 1106, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). In Burford, a state commission was primarily responsible for regulating oil and gas fields. Because state courts provided adequate judicial review and conflicts with federal courts would undermine state policy, the Supreme Court held that the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction. No questions affecting state policy of the type raised in Burford are presented in this case.
Abstention may be appropriate if action by the federal courts unduly interferes with a state's right to enforce state laws in its own courts. This was first applied to federal interference with pending state criminal proceedings in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669. Younger abstentions may also apply in civil cases if the state interest at issue is of sufficient importance to require its application. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). This case presents no issue of interference with state law.
The final category in which a court may decline to exercise federal jurisdiction is one of "concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts, or by state and federal courts." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d at 498. The Colorado River doctrine is guided by principles that "rest on considerations of `wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'" Id. (citations omitted).
Colorado River concerned the adjudication of federal water rights under state law. Congress had passed the McCarran Amendment, which stated that the United States would consent to be a defendant in cases concerning the "adjudication" or "administration" of water rights. Id. at 802-03, 96 S.Ct. at 1239, 47 L.Ed.2d at 489. The State of Colorado had established an extensive and comprehensive state forum for the "allocation" and "adjudication" of water rights. Id. at 804, 96 S.Ct. at 1239, 47 L.Ed.2d at 490.
The federal government filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Colorado seeking determination of government water rights. The District Court abstained in deference to state court proceedings. The Supreme Court held that although the McCarran Amendment did not restrict federal jurisdiction to adjudicate federal water rights, the District Court had appropriately dismissed the case.
The Court held that when concurrent state-federal jurisdiction exists, a federal court may defer to a concurrent state proceeding based on principles of "wise judicial administration" if "exceptional circumstances" exist. Id. at 818, 96 S.Ct. at 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d at 498. The Court emphasized the "unflagging obligation" of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction and stated that, therefore, appropriate circumstances for dismissal on these grounds "are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention."1Id. "Only the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal." Id. at 819, 96 S.Ct. at 1247, 47 L.Ed.2d at 499.
The most persuasive factor that weighed against concurrent federal proceedings in Colorado River was that the purpose of the McCarran Amendment was to avoid "piecemeal adjudication of water rights" by deferring to "comprehensive state systems for the adjudication of those rights." Id. Because Colorado had an available, comprehensive state system to adjudicate water rights it would be inconsistent with the policy of the McCarran Amendment to simultaneously litigate those rights in federal court.2
The Supreme Court applied the Colorado River standard to overturn a writ of mandamus to the district court in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978). There was no majority opinion, but in the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that although a pending state action does not bar litigation on the same matter in federal court, the federal court is not obligated to exercise its jurisdiction. Id. at 662, 98 S.Ct. at 2557, 57 L.Ed.2d at 512. The "decision in such circumstances is largely committed to the discretion of the district court ... even when matters of substantive federal law are involved in the case." Id. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment only because the District Court's order was issued prior to the Colorado River decision. He stated that the case should be remanded to be reconsidered in light of Colorado River. Id. at 667, 98 S.Ct. at 2559, 57 L.Ed.2d 515.
The Supreme Court next extended the Colorado River standard to apply to stays as well as dismissals. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). At issue was whether or not the District Court had properly stayed a federal claim under the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4, pending the resolution of a concurrent state court proceeding on the same issue. The Court held the District Court had abused its discretion in granting the stay.
The Court stated that Will did not modify the standard enunciated in Colorado River, and that the "exceptional circumstances" test was still controlling. Id. 460 U.S. at 19, 103 S.Ct. at 938, 74 L.Ed.2d at 782. The Court then listed two additional factors from Will that weigh against declining jurisdiction, "the fact that federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits," and "the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceeding to protect a party's rights." Id. at 22, 26, 103 S.Ct. at 940, 942, 74 L.Ed.2d at 784, 786. Although the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in Moses Cone, the Supreme Court found that federal issues were involved, and "the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against surrender" of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 24, 26, 103 S.Ct. at 941, 942, 74 L.Ed.2d at 785, 786.3
Turning to the case at hand, we must determine whether exceptional circumstances exist that would warrant a dismissal or stay of federal proceedings under Colorado River. To determine whether this is appropriate we must first look to the Congressional intent behind 42 U.S.C....
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