Tucker v. Catoe
Decision Date | 23 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 25332.,25332. |
Citation | 346 S.C. 483,552 S.E.2d 712 |
Parties | Richard Anthony TUCKER, Petitioner, v. William CATOE, Director, South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, and Charles M. Condon, Attorney General of South Carolina, Respondents. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Thomas R. Haggard, of Ridgeway, and Teresa L. Norris, of Columbia, for petitioner.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, of Columbia, for respondents.
This matter is before the Court on a Butler1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner, now on death row,2 contends that errors in his capital sentencing proceeding warrant this Court's exercise of the writ. We find that the Allen3 charge given to petitioner's sentencing jury was unconstitutionally coercive and "in the setting, constitute[d] a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice." Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 468, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990). Accordingly, we grant the writ and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.
We have adopted, with minor modifications, the findings of fact4 made by the state post-conviction relief (PCR) judge:
Well, let met [sic] state that I know that the Court is going to give additional instructions. Prior to anything that would be either a watered-down version of an Allen charge, we would ask that the Court inquire as to whether or not in the jury's opinion they feel that they are hopelessly deadlocked. Additionally, we would further submit that if the Court gives a charge that would be, again, a watered-down Allen charge we would also request that the Court instruct the jury that other consequences of not reaching a decision in a death-penalty case dealing specifically with the penalty phase, that the defendant would receive life imprisonment. Our authority is based primarily on some Florida cases. I can cite those to you, but that basically would be our position on that.
The trial court then gives this charge:
Petitioner's counsel then objects again:
Petitioner's trial attorney asked that the jury be informed of the consequences of its inability to reach a sentencing decision. Following the Allen charge, which did not include a "consequences" charge, the trial attorney objected to the Allen charge as coercive "in toto and "per se," and objected that the charge could be interpreted as singling out the minority juror. On direct appeal, petitioner argued (1) that the trial judge should have instructed the jury not to reveal its vote and (2) that the Allen charge was improper because the judge knew there was only one juror holding out. State v. Tucker, 319 S.C. at 427-28, 462 S.E.2d at 264-65. We found these claims procedurally barred because petitioner was improperly altering the grounds raised at trial on appeal. Id. at 428, 462 S.E.2d at 265.5 At the PCR proceeding, petitioner claimed appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in altering the Allen charge argument. Appellate counsel acknowledged he had deliberately "blurred" the issues because his research convinced him that the objection at trial would not succeed on appeal. The PCR judge found no constitutional deprivation since appellate counsel has no duty to raise every non-frivolous issue, and must be allowed to exercise his reasonable professional judgment. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Thrift v. State, 302 S.C. 535, 397 S.E.2d 523 (1990). We denied certiorari.
As the foregoing demonstrates, this Court has never addressed petitioner's allegation that the Allen charge was unconstitutionally coercive on the merits. Further, we consider for the first time petitioner's claim that his jury engaged in "reasonable deliberation" as a matter of law, thereby requiring the trial judge to direct a life sentence pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp.2000).6
In keeping with our policy of not reaching constitutional issues unless necessary to the solution of the case, we first discuss petitioner's statutory claim. E.g., Fairway Ford, Inc. v. County of Greenville, 324 S.C. 84, 476 S.E.2d 490 (1996).
The interpretation of § 16-3-20(C)'s instruction that the trial judge impose a life sentence if a capital sentencing jury cannot reach a recommendation after a "reasonable deliberation" presents a novel question. While "reasonable deliberation" is something less than the "due and thorough deliberation" standard of our "two return" statute,7 we hold that the determination whether a particular jury has met such a standard is a matter committed to the trial judge's discretion. See, e.g., Buff v. South Carolina Dep't of Transportation, 342 S.C. 416, 537 S.E.2d...
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...the denial of fundamental fairness which, in the setting, is shocking to the universal sense of justice. See Tucker v. Catoe , 346 S.C. 483, 494–95, 552 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2001) (stating the finding of a constitutional violation "does not end our Butler inquiry, for relief is appropriate only......
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Moore v. Stirling
...and (2) the denial of fundamental fairness which, in the setting, is shocking to the universal sense of justice. See Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 494-95, 552 S.E.2d 712, 718 (2001) (stating the finding of a constitutional violation "does not end our Butler inquiry, for relief is appropria......
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...in making this statement to comment on the propriety of including such an instruction in an Allen charge. See Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 493, 552 S.E.2d 712, 717 (2001) (analyzing the circumstance that the "jury was told of the importance of a unanimous verdict" as a relevant factor in ......
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...in making this statement to comment on the propriety of including such an instruction in an Allen charge. See Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 493, 552 S.E.2d 712, 717 (2001) (analyzing the circumstance that the "jury was told of the importance of a unanimous verdict" as a relevant factor in ......