Tucker v. Michael Bonsby Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC

• fullCitation: Tucker v. Michael Bonsby Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC, CIVIL TJS-21-2708 (D. Md. Sep 07, 2022)
• Decision Date: 07 September 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL TJS-21-2708
• Parties: ROBIN TUCKER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL BONSBY HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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ROBIN TUCKER, Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL BONSBY HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING, LLC, Defendants.

CIVIL No. TJS-21-2708

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 7, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 40) filed by Defendant Michael Bonsby Heating and Air Conditioning, LLC (“Bonsby”).^[1] Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 40, 49 & 54), the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. As stated in the Court's letter order dated August 11, 2022 (ECF No. 56), the Motion to Dismiss will be converted into a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and that motion will be granted in part and denied in part.^[2]

I. Background

Plaintiff Robin Tucker (“Tucker”) originally filed this lawsuit against Bonsby in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. ECF No. 3. Bonsby timely removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. Thereafter, Bonsby filed an answer to the Complaint (ECF No. 7) and a scheduling order was

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entered (ECF No. 13). During the discovery period, and with leave of Court, Tucker filed an Amended Complaint, in which Tucker dismissed three of her claims against Bonsby and amended some allegations of her remaining claims. ECF No. 29. Most recently, and again with leave of Court, Tucker filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 34). In doing so, Tucker dismissed one of her claims against Bonsby and amended some allegations of her remaining claims. Id. In response, Bonsby filed the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Tucker had failed to state any claims upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 40. Because Bonsby had already answered a previous version of Tucker's Complaint that asserted some of the same claims in the Second Amended Complaint, see ECF No. 7, however, Bonsby's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was untimely. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (explaining that a “motion asserting any of [the] defenses [set forth in Rule 12(b)] must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed”). Accordingly, the Court ordered Bonsby to file an answer to the Second Amended Complaint so that the pleadings could be considered closed and the Motion to Dismiss could be converted into a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). ECF No. 56.

Now that Bonsby has filed its answer (ECF No. 57), the pleadings are closed and the Court will convert Bonsby's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that, under Rule 12(h), an untimely motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) may be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)). This procedural change has little practical effect because the same standard applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. Bonsby's motion for judgment on the pleadings (“Motion”) is now ripe for decision.

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II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, [and not to] resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243. A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must consist of “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the well-pled allegations of the complaint and “construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). While a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” and “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint generally “does not need detailed factual allegations.” Id. So long as the factual allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” the complaint will be deemed sufficient. Id. A “well-pleaded complaint may

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proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Choice of Law

Although this case is before this Court based on federal question jurisdiction, two of Tucker's claims (Counts I and III) derive from state law, over which the Court has supplemental jurisdiction. “When choosing the applicable state substantive law while exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, a federal district court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state.” Green v. Obsu, No. ELH-19-2068, 2022 WL 2971950, at *11 (D. Md. July 27, 2022) (citing Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F.Supp.2d 678, 696 (D. Md. 2011); Colgan Air, Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 507 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Antwerpen Motorcars, Ltd., 807 F.Supp.2d 386, 389 n.13 (D. Md. 2011)). Maryland adheres to the lex loci delicti rule to determine the applicable law for tort claims. Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 744 (2000). Under this rule, the “substantive tort law of the state where the wrong occurs governs.” Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 123 (1983). For contract claims, Maryland applies the law of the state in which the contract was formed (“lex loci contractus”), unless the parties to the contract agreed to be bound by the law of another state. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lennox, 422 F.Supp.3d 948, 961 (D. Md. 2019) (citing Cunningham v. Feinberg, 441 Md. 310, 326 (2015)). “For choice-of-law purposes, a contract is made where the last act necessary to make the contract binding occurs.” Konover Prop. Tr., Inc. v. WHE Assocs., 142 Md.App. 476, 490 (2002).

The parties mainly cite Maryland state law in their briefs. Still, it appears that District of Columbia substantive law applies to Tucker's negligence claim (because the allegedly negligent acts were committed in the District of Columbia). As for the implied breach of warranty claim, the Court is not certain whether Maryland or District of Columbia law applies, because it is unclear

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where the contract at issue was formed. Still, as discussed below, the relevant laws of the two jurisdictions are identical on all points material to the resolution of this Motion, both as to the negligence claim and as to the breach of implied warranty claim.

C. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint

At this stage, the Court accepts the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint as true and construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to Tucker. In August 2017, Tucker contacted Bonsby to replace the home air conditioning unit and furnace at a property she owned, located at 5227 Chillum Pl. NE, Washington, DC (the “property”). ECF No. 36 ¶ 7. A Bonsby employee visited the property in August 2017 to collect information and to give a cost estimate to Tucker. Id. ¶ 10. Bonsby did not perform the following tests at any time: blower door test, duct leakage test, or external static pressure test. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In addition, “Bonsby did not consider the number of people living in the home, the age of the home, the state of the windows in the home, [or] the state of the air duct system in the home.” Id. ¶ 11. Bonsby informed Tucker that “the ducts in the property were leaking air and proposed an application of a duct sealing product known as Aeroseal.” Id. ¶ 17.

On August 15, 2017, Tucker agreed to the application of Aeroseal and contracted with Bonsby for the installation of a home air conditioning unit at the property.^[3] Id. ¶¶ 19-23; see also ECF No. 3 at 19-22 (Tucker did not append a copy of the contract to her Second Amended Complaint but it is included as an exhibit to the complaint she filed in state court). Later that month, Bonsby completed the installation of the contracted HVAC system. ECF No. 36 ¶ 27.

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About one year later, on August 25, 2018, tenants who were living at the property informed Tucker of water damage on the kitchen ceiling. Id. ¶ 30. Tucker inspected the water damage and observed a hole in the kitchen ceiling directly under an air duct. Id. ¶ 32. It appeared to her that moisture dripping from the air duct was causing the water damage and ceiling collapse. Id. ¶ 32. Tucker contacted Bonsby, who sent an employee to repair the water damage. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. This employee installed insulation around the duct where the water damage occurred. Id.

One week later, on September 1, 2018, Tucker's tenants alerted her...