Tucker v. Ozmint

Decision Date01 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. 03-5.,03-5.
Citation350 F.3d 433
PartiesJames Neil TUCKER, Sr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jon E. OZMINT, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections; Henry Dargan McMaster, Attorney General, State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Robert Edward Lominack, Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

Donald John Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Teresa L. Norris, Center for Capital Litigation, Columbia, South Carolina; Thomas R. Haggard, Ridgeway, South Carolina, for Appellant. Henry Dargan McMaster, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge SHEDD wrote the opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL and Judge DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ joined.

OPINION

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

James Neil Tucker was convicted by a South Carolina jury of the murder of Rosa Lee "Dolly" Oakley. Upon the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Tucker to death. After his direct appeal and post-conviction review yielded no relief in the state courts, Tucker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Tucker claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel (1) failed to provide the defense expert two documents relating to Tucker's childhood sexual abuse and (2) failed to discover that one of the State's three experts was subject to professional discipline at the time of trial. We issued a certificate of appealability on both of these claims. After further review, we find no error in the denial of habeas relief, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Dolly Oakley was in her yard at her Sumter County, South Carolina residence when Tucker pulled into her driveway on June 25, 1992.1 Tucker pulled out a gun and forced Oakley into the house and then into her bedroom. Just as Tucker was preparing to bind Oakley with tape, Joe Black rang the doorbell. Black and James Howard (who waited outside in the car) were looking for Oakley's husband. Both Tucker and Oakley went out into the driveway as Black was leaving the house. Oakley began screaming, "Don't leave me, he's going to kill me," holding Black's arm as he sat in Howard's car. Howard panicked and drove away. Tucker dragged Oakley back into the house, took fourteen dollars from her purse, and shot her twice in the head at close range. Tucker testified that he shot her the first time when she tried to grab the gun. He shot her a second time to "put her out of her misery."

Tucker's crime spree did not end with the murder of Dolly Oakley. Still in Sumter County, he broke into the Christian Fellowship Church and later the mobile home of Kenneth Parker. Tucker moved on to neighboring Calhoun County, where he murdered another woman, Shannon Mellon, and stole her car. Tucker then drove north, abandoned the car, and crossed the state line into North Carolina. Tucker was finally captured in Maggie Valley, North Carolina on July 10, 1992. Once in custody, Tucker confessed to the murders of both Oakley and Mellon.

Tucker was first tried in Calhoun County for the murder of Shannon Mellon. That jury convicted Tucker of murder, armed robbery, first-degree burglary, and grand larceny of a vehicle. Tucker was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the convictions but reversed the death sentence. State v. Tucker, 320 S.C. 206, 464 S.E.2d 105 (1995). At a subsequent sentencing hearing, Tucker again received a death sentence, which the Supreme Court of South Carolina later affirmed. State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1, 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999).

The jury in this case found Tucker guilty of murder, kidnapping, first-degree burglary, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime for his actions at the Oakley residence. The jury also found Tucker guilty of third-degree burglary for the break-in at Christian Fellowship Church. Finally, the jury convicted Tucker of first-degree burglary and larceny for the break-in at Parker's mobile home.

At sentencing, Tucker's counsel argued that Tucker should not receive a death sentence because he suffered from an antisocial personality disorder stemming from horrific physical and sexual abuse. Dr. Robert Noelker, an expert in forensic psychology retained by the defense, testified that Tucker had suffered from "sustained, prolonged, [and] severe" abuse as a child — physical abuse from his step-father and sexual abuse from his older step-brother. As a result of this abuse, Tucker "was taught that aggression was a way of getting things, being assertive, being aggressive, being violent was a way of getting something." In sum, Dr. Noelker concluded that Tucker understood the requirements of the law but lacked the ability to conform his behavior to those standards. "That inability to conform," in Dr. Noelker's opinion, was "a result of [Tucker's] life's total experiences, but more specifically as a result of his antisocial personality disorder."

The State countered Tucker's mitigation case with three expert witnesses who testified that antisocial personality disorder is merely a description of behavior, not a mental disease or defect that caused Tucker to murder Oakley. Forensic psychiatrist Dr. Richard Frierson diagnosed Tucker as having antisocial personality disorder, but he explained that "[a]ntisocial personality disorder does not affect a person's ability to choose [his] behavior.... The disorder does not cause criminal behavior." Likewise, Dr. Steven Shea, a clinical psychologist, testified that Tucker "has an antisocial personality disorder" but that the disorder "does not preclude [him] from choosing whether or not to act." According to Dr. Shea, "[t]he personality disorders are a way of describing people who have a certain tendency to act a certain way. It's not a mental disease in the sense that it's a — a brain disease." Finally, Dr. John Dunlap agreed with the State's other experts that antisocial personality disorder is descriptive, not causative: "Actually the diagnosis of antisocial personality is primarily a description of behavior that you have. It's not the reason you have the behaviors."

The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider four statutory aggravating factors and four statutory mitigating factors. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)-(b). In particular, the jury was instructed that it could consider as mitigating circumstances Tucker's mental or emotional disturbance, whether he acted under duress, any mental incapacity, and his age or mentality at the time of the crime. See id. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (5)-(7). At defense counsel's request, the trial court submitted the following non-statutory mitigation factors for consideration as well: (1) cooperation with law enforcement officials, (2) circumstances surrounding Tucker's childhood, (3) circumstances surrounding Tucker's experience in prison, (4) any non-statutory mitigating circumstances, and (5) any mitigating circumstances supported by the evidence.

The jury found the existence of three statutory aggravating factors and recommended a death sentence. The trial court then sentenced Tucker to death for the murder of Dolly Oakley, life imprisonment for kidnapping, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, twenty-five years for armed robbery, five years for possession of a weapon, five years for third-degree burglary, and thirty days for larceny.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the convictions and the sentence, State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, Tucker v. South Carolina, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S.Ct. 1561, 137 L.Ed.2d 708 (1997). Tucker then filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court; after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied relief on the merits of Tucker's claims. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied certiorari, as did the Supreme Court of the United States, Tucker v. Maynard, 534 U.S. 1073, 122 S.Ct. 802, 151 L.Ed.2d 688 (2002). Tucker then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Upon a recommendation from the magistrate judge, the district court denied relief on the merits of Tucker's claims. This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the district court's denial of habeas relief based on a state court record. Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir.2003). Where a state court resolved the merits of a claim for post-conviction relief, federal habeas relief is not available unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d) have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Relief is available under the "contrary to" clause "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. Alternatively, relief is available under the "unreasonable application" clause "if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principles from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Id. The focus of...

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