Tucker v. Pace Investments Associates

• Decision Date: 10 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 11303,11303
• Citation: 629 A.2d 470,32 Conn.App. 384
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stanley V. TUCKER v. PACE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES et al.

Page 470

629 A.2d 470

32 Conn.App. 384

Stanley V. TUCKER v. PACE INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES et al.

No. 11303.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 2, 1993.

Decided Aug. 10, 1993.

Stanley V. Tucker, pro se.

I. Milton Widem, Hartford, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Paul D. Buhl, Moodus, for appellees (defendant Northeast Sav., F.A., et al.).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and SCHALLER, JJ.

SCHALLER, Judge.

The plaintiff, Stanley V. Tucker, appeals from the judgment dismissing his civil rights claim against the defendants and from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants with respect to his claim of abuse of process. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the doctrine of res judicata provides a basis on which we can affirm the trial court's judgment. Because res judicata operates to bar Tucker's civil rights claim and his abuse of process claim, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are not in dispute. The long and tortured history of this case began in 1978, when Northeast Savings, F.A. (then Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Association), brought a foreclosure action against Tucker. The foreclosure action involved four properties located in Hartford. The trial court granted Tucker's motion for an appointment of a rent receiver. After the court rendered judgments of foreclosure on the four properties, Tucker appealed to our Supreme Court. For reasons unrelated to the present appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of foreclosure in Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 607, 436 A.2d 1259 (1980).

Northeast Savings, F.A., again sought foreclosure against Tucker alleging nonpayment of the mortgages. Tucker denied nonpayment, pleaded special defenses and brought a counterclaim for damages. Subsequently, the original rent receiver resigned, and, on October 26, 1981, Northeast applied to the court for a replacement. Tucker objected, asserting that Practice Book §§ 504 through 510 are unconstitutional and void. Tucker further sought the appointment of himself as the rent receiver. After a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motions and, on December 21, 1981, appointed Plaza Realty as rent receiver. When the trial court rendered final judgments of strict foreclosure on all four properties, Tucker appealed to the Supreme Court.

In Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 196 Conn. 172, 491 A.2d 1084, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920, 106 S.Ct. 250, 88 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985) (Hartford Federal II ), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In doing so, the court rejected Tucker's assertion that Practice Book §§ 504 through 510 are unconstitutional and void. Further, the court was not persuaded that the judgments of strict foreclosure were invalid.

Ultimately, the defendant in this case, Northeast Savings, F.A., transferred title in the properties to the defendants, Donna Galluzo and Lorraine Whitehouse. Galluzo and Whitehouse, in turn, mortgaged the properties to the named defendant, Pace Investments Association. ¹ Tucker then filed an action in the United States District Court against Northeast Savings, F.A., Robert Basine, Galluzo and Whitehouse, claiming monetary and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tucker v. Northeast Savings, 675 F.Supp. 763 (D.Conn.1987), appeal dismissed, 849 F.2d 1468 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989). That action was predicated on the notion that Practice Book §§ 504 through 510 are unconstitutional both factually and as applied to the foreclosures at issue. Id. The District Court dismissed Tucker's action reasoning that "the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the application of the state procedures to Tucker in the foreclosure proceedings did not deny him due process of law and that he was given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the appointment of the receiver." Id., at 767.

On April 7, 1989, Tucker brought the present action against the defendants. In count one of his complaint, Tucker asserted a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The gravamen of Tucker's claim was that Practice Book §§ 504 through 510 are unconstitutional and void as applied to this case. In count two of the complaint, Tucker alleged an action sounding in fraud. On June 2, 1989, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss count one of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to review a decision of an appellate court. The trial court granted the motion and an appeal to this court followed. In April, 1990, this court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Tucker v. Pace Investments Associates, 21 Conn.App. 821, 576 A.2d 593 (1990).

On May 7, 1990, Tucker filed a substitute complaint through which he replaced his fraud claim in the original complaint with an action for abuse of process. Specifically, Tucker alleged that the defendants abused the use of rent receivers. The trial court struck the substitute complaint because the defendants could not be held liable for the conduct of the court appointed receiver.

Again Tucker attempted to initiate an action for abuse of process, and again the trial court struck the complaint. On January 10, 1991, Tucker filed yet another substitute complaint alleging abuse of process and seeking equitable relief. On February 19, 1991, the trial court struck Tucker's claim for equitable relief. With respect to the abuse of process claim, the defendants filed an answer and raised as special defenses the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata.

On May 31, 1991, the defendants moved for summary judgment relying on the statute of limitations and res judicata. On January 3, 1992, the trial court agreed with the defendants that the abuse of process action was time barred and rendered summary judgment accordingly. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court concluded: "It is clear that pursuant to the plaintiff's pleadings, the conduct complained of ended in June, 1986 and, therefore, the plaintiff ... would have had to assert his claim for abuse of process by June of 1989. Since it was filed for the first time in May of 1990, it is time barred by the three year limitation period of General Statutes § 52-577." From the judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and from summary judgment on his abuse of process claim, Tucker brought the present appeal.

Before turning to Tucker's individual claims, it is necessary to understand fully the law of res judicata in Connecticut and its operation. " 'Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits....' " In re John B., 20 Conn.App. 725, 729, 570 A.2d 237 (1990), quoting Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 501, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988). "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment serves as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving any claims relating to such cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham, 221 Conn. 384, 391-92, 604 A.2d 347 (1992).

The theory of "merger" and the "transactional test" steer the operation of res judicata. Id., at 392 n. 10, 604 A.2d 347; Legassey v. Shulansky, 28 Conn.App. 653, 656, 611 A.2d 930 (1992). Merger reflects the fact that " '[w]hen the plaintiff recovers a valid and final personal judgment, his original claim is extinguished and rights upon the judgment are substituted for it. The plaintiff's original claim is said to be "merged" in the judgment.' " Legassey v. Shulansky, supra, quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 18.

An application of the transactional test defines the contours of the original claim. Once this claim is ascertained, a court can then assess the preclusive effects of the prior judgment. Vakalis v. Kagan, 18 Conn.App. 363, 367, 557 A.2d 1285 (1989). "In determining the nature of a cause of action for these purposes, we have long looked to the group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff ... and have noted that [e]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several different kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dunham v. Dunham, supra. "What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 221 Conn. at 392 n. 10, 604 A.2d 347.

Further, courts must implement res judicata to foster the important public policy of preventing a party from relitigating a matter that he has already had an opportunity to litigate. Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Ins. Co., 200 Conn. 360, 363-64, 511 A.2d 333 (1986). "Res judicata, as a judicial doctrine ... should be applied as necessary to promote its underlying purposes. These purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose.... State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 465-66, 497 A.2d 974 (1985)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 216 Conn. 135, 139, 577 A.2d 1058 (1990). Against this legal backdrop, we turn to Tucker's claims against the defendants.

I THE PLAINTIFF'S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

After a careful reading of our Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Federal II, supra, we are satisfied that the...