Tucker v. Phyfer
| Decision Date | 22 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-7653,85-7653 |
| Citation | 819 F.2d 1030 |
| Parties | Larry TUCKER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, Melvin P., a minor, by his Next Friend, Sandra Powell, Applicant for Intervention-Appellant, v. George PHYFER, who is sued individually and as Director for the Alabama Department of Youth Services; Charles Fred Collisson, individually and as Region I Coordinator, for the Alabama Department of Youth Services; Lauderdale County, Alabama; J.R. Austin, James H. Hamilton, Selton Killen, Larry J. Hayes, individually and as Commissioners of Lauderdale County, Alabama; Billy Townsend, individually and as Sheriff of Lauderdale County, Alabama; Deborah Bell Paseur, Judge of the Juvenile Court of Lauderdale County, Alabama; Harry Williams, individually and as Chief Probation Officer of Lauderdale County, Alabama, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
James R. Bell, Youth Law Center, Carole B. Shauffer, Loren M. Warboys, San Francisco, Cal., John R. Benn, Robert W. Bunch, Florence, Ala., Mark I. Soler, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Marvin A. Wilson, Florence, Ala., for Billy Townsend.
J.R. Brooks, Huntsville, Ala., for Lauderdale County, Ala., J.R. Austin, William Duncan, James H. Hamilton, Larry J. Hayes & Selton Killen.
Thomas R. Christian, Montgomery, Ala., William J. Samford, II, Mt. Meigs, Ala., Robert T.J. Childers, Montgomery, Ala., for George Phyfer, Charles F. Collisson, Deborah Bell Paseur & Harry Williams.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and EATON *, Senior District Judge.
I.
Appellant, Larry Tucker, was sixteen years old when his mother and Next Friend, Ruby Tucker, filed this case on his behalf on September 25, 1981. Tucker was incarcerated in the Lauderdale County jail in Florence, Alabama, and he claimed that the defendants, the Lauderdale County sheriff and other officials responsible for the operation of the jail, were confining him and other juveniles in the jail under dangerous, inadequate, and unlawful conditions in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 1 Tucker sought money damages for himself and declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and a class of people consisting of "all juveniles who are currently, have been during the year prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' original Complaint, and in the future will be confined in the Lauderdale ... County Jai[l]."
On August 11, 1983, nearly two years after bringing suit, Tucker moved the district court to certify his case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a)-(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Tucker requested that the class consist of "all juveniles who have been detained, incarcerated, or placed in the Lauderdale County adult or juvenile jail facilities since September 25, 1980" and asked that the court name him as the representative of the class. By the time Tucker requested class certification he was eighteen years old, had been released from the Lauderdale County jail, and was no longer subject to incarceration as a juvenile.
On August 28, 1984, a magistrate recommended that the district court deny Tucker's motion for class certification. The magistrate found that because Tucker lacked juvenile status when he moved for class certification, his claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was moot, thereby rendering him ineligible to prosecute that claim on behalf of those then incarcerated in the jail. The magistrate found alternatively that Tucker could not adequately and fairly represent the class because (1) in the event the defendants offered to settle the case, Tucker, having only a claim for damages, might have a conflict of interest with those seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) Tucker's testimony indicated that he was unaware of his responsibilities as class representative, was unfamiliar with his attorneys, and had little interest in the lawsuit; and (3) Tucker's counsel had demonstrated several shortcomings, leading the magistrate to question their ability to prosecute the case on behalf of the class members.
Tucker filed a timely objection to the magistrate's report, and the district court heard arguments on September 28, 1984. While the court had the matter under advisement, Tucker's attorneys moved the court on behalf of appellant Melvin P. to allow Melvin P., through his Next Friend, Sandra Powell Redding, to intervene as a party-plaintiff and class representative. Melvin P. was at that time a fourteen-year-old juvenile incarcerated in the Lauderdale County jail under the same allegedly unconstitutional conditions described in Tucker's complaint.
On January 11, 1985, at a pretrial conference, the district court heard argument on Melvin P.'s motion to intervene and further argument on Tucker's motion for class certification. At the conclusion of the conference, the court orally announced that it would deny both motions, dismiss Tucker's claim for prospective equitable relief on the ground of mootness, and retain jurisdiction of Tucker's damages claim for further proceedings. On April 8, 1985, the court memorialized these rulings in a written order. Tucker and Melvin P. then moved the court to certify the rulings for interlocutory appeal. The court granted their motion, and we accepted jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). We affirm the district court as to each of its challenged rulings.
II.
It is well settled that at the time a plaintiff brings suit he must have standing to prosecute his claim; he must have a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396-97, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). The mootness doctrine requires that the plaintiff's controversy remain live throughout the litigation; once the controversy ceases to exist, the court must dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463-64, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 604 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986). In a class action, the claim of the named plaintiff, who seeks to represent the class, must be live both at the time he brings suit and when the district court determines whether to certify the putative class. If the plaintiff's claim is not live, the court lacks a justiciable controversy and must dismiss the claim as moot. See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 & n. 11, 100 S.Ct. at 1213 & n. 11.
The foregoing principles apply to every claim the plaintiff presents in his complaint. The Supreme Court made this point clear in Lyons. In that case, the plaintiff sued the city of Los Angeles, California, and four of its police officers, claiming that the officers had injured him and infringed his constitutional rights by applying a "chokehold," a technique sanctioned by the city's police department, to subdue him following a traffic stop. The plaintiff sought money damages for the injuries he had sustained and injunctive relief on behalf of himself and others "similarly situated" against the police department's further use of the chokehold. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 1663. The district court granted the defendants a partial summary judgment, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), dismissing the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief on the ground that he lacked standing to seek such relief. The court of appeals reversed. It reasoned that the plaintiff and others might be exposed to chokehold incidents like the one the plaintiff had experienced and, invoking the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine of Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), concluded that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equitable claim. See Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir.1980).
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, reversed. The Court held that the mere possibility that the plaintiff might again be exposed to the chokehold did not suffice to give him standing to seek injunctive relief. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. The Court acknowledged, however, that a live controversy existed with respect to the plaintiff's damages claim; consequently, the district court was free to adjudicate that claim to a conclusion. Id. at 109, 103 S.Ct. at 1669.
Lyons stands for the proposition that a plaintiff who has standing to bring a damages claim does not automatically have standing to litigate a claim for injunctive relief arising out of the same set of operative facts. In holding that Lyons had no standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief, the Court necessarily concluded that the live controversy concerning the injury Lyons had suffered and any money damages that might be due him could not perform "double duty," simultaneously providing Lyons with standing to prosecute both his claim for damages and his claim for injunctive relief. In sum, article III's command that a plaintiff have standing to assert his claim clearly mandates more than that the plaintiff and the defendant have a dispute over something; it means that the plaintiff and the defendant must have a justiciable dispute over the specific claim the plaintiff asserts.
Article III requires that a plaintiff's claim be live not just when he first brings suit, but throughout the litigation. 3 See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., 777 F.2d at 604; C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 3533 (2d ed. 1984). In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), and in ...
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