Tucker v. Prisock, 2000-CP-00208-SCT.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
Citation | 791 So.2d 190 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-CP-00208-SCT.,2000-CP-00208-SCT. |
Parties | Taylor TUCKER v. Travis L. PRISOCK, Sr. |
Decision Date | 08 March 2001 |
791 So.2d 190
Taylor TUCKERv.
Travis L. PRISOCK, Sr
No. 2000-CP-00208-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 8, 2001.
Rehearing Denied August 9, 2001.
Appellant Pro Se.
James C. Mayo, David T. Wilson, Jr., Louisville, for Appellee.
COBB, Justice, for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. This Court has previously reviewed this case, and the underlying facts are found in the prior opinion, Prisock v. Perkins, 735 So.2d 440 (Miss.1999). The Board of Trustees of the Louisville Municipal School District granted a hunting and fishing lease on certain sixteenth section lands to Taylor Tucker rather than the most recent leaseholder, Travis L. Prisock, Sr. Id. at 440. Prisock brought suit in the Winston County Circuit Court seeking to reverse that decision, but the circuit court dismissed Prisock's claim for failure to file a bill of exceptions as required by law. Id. at 442.
¶ 2. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case to the Winston County Chancery Court which on remand reversed the Board's decision and set aside Tucker's lease. However, the chancellor denied Prisock's request for an injunction mandating the Board to grant the lease to him. Thus the Board was left with the option of either granting the lease to Prisock or readvertising with recognition of Prisock's statutory preference as the most recent leaseholder.
¶ 3. Aggrieved at the loss of the lease, Tucker appeals on the following issue:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT TO AWARD THE HUNTING AND FISHING LEASE TO TAYLOR TUCKER.
¶ 4. Prisock, aggrieved because he was not granted the lease outright, cross-appeals, raising the following issue:
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PRISOCK'S REQUEST FOR AN INJUNCTION MANDATING THE LOUISVILLE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT GRANT THE HUNTING AND FISHING LEASE TO HIM.
¶ 5. We affirm the chancery court's setting aside of the lease to Tucker and reverse and render on the cross appeal, finding that the plain language of Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-41 (2000) requires that Prisock be granted the hunting and fishing lease.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 6. The facts of this case are not disputed. In February of 1992, the Louisville Municipal School District leased the hunting and fishing rights on its sixteenth section land to Prisock. Prisock, 735 So.2d at 441. That lease expired in 1997, and the Board advertised the lease for bid. Id. Initially, Prisock was the sole bidder and the Board rejected his bid, which was about one-half the amount of his 1992-97 rent, as being too low. Id. The Board then re-advertised the lease and received two bids—one from Taylor Tucker, and an increased bid from Prisock, which was still lower than his 1992-97 rent. Id.
¶ 7. Tucker's bid was higher, but Prisock tendered a check to the Board equal to the amount of Tucker's bid, claiming his rights as "the most recent holder" pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 29-3-41 (2000). This statute gives the most recent holder of hunting and fishing rights on sixteenth section land the final right to extend his rights by matching the highest bid. Id. at 442. However, the Board, meeting in special session, concluded that Prisock's two bids "were not bona fide, good faith bids but were technical bids intended to preserve the leaseholder's prior rights" and granted the lease to Tucker. Id. at 441.
¶ 9. On remand, the chancery court reversed the decision of the Board, finding that the Board had circumvented the legislative intent that the most recent holder of 16th Section hunting and fishing rights would have a statutory preference. The chancery court set aside and held for naught the lease to Tucker, but denied Prisock's request for an injunction mandating that the school district grant him the hunting and fishing rights. The final judgment stated that the school district "may re-advertise according to law for bids on this 16th section Hunting Land recognizing that Travis L. Prisock, Sr. is hereby adjudicated statutory...
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Evans v. Evans, s. 2009–CP–00953–COA
...When reviewing a chancellor's interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001). ¶ 11. We conduct a heightened review when a chancellor simply adopts one party's findings verbatim. City of Jackson v. Presle......
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Rhodes v. Rhodes
...But when reviewing a chancellor's interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001).52 So.3d 436DISCUSSION ¶ 16. Stacey raises nine issues for our review. She alleges the chancellor erred by: (1) failing to......
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Vaughn v. Vaughn, 2009–CA–00915–COA.
...When reviewing a chancellor's interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So.2d 190, 192 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001). [56 So.3d 1289] ¶ 18. Terri's grandmother sold the marital home to Terri and Craig for approximately $70,000. From the procee......
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Evans v. Evans, 2009-CP-00953-COA
...2003). When reviewing a chancellor's interpretation and application of the law, our standard of review is de novo. Tucker v. Prisock, 791 So. 2d 190, 192 (¶10) (Miss. 2001). ¶11. We conduct a heightened review when a chancellor simply adopts one party's findings verbatim. City of Jackson v.......