Tucker v. State

• Decision Date: 28 April 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 43922
• Citation: 394 P.3d 54,162 Idaho 11
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Tracy TUCKER, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, Jeremy Payne, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Idaho; C.L. "Butch" Otter, in his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry, in their official capacities as members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, Defendants-Respondents.

162 Idaho 11

394 P.3d 54

Tracy TUCKER, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, Jeremy Payne, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.STATE of Idaho; C.L. "Butch" Otter, in his official capacity as Governor of Idaho; Hon. Linda Copple Trout, Darrell G. Bolz, Sara B. Thomas, William H. Wellman, Kimber Ricks, Sen. Chuck Winder, and Rep. Christy Perry, in their official capacities as members of the Idaho State Public Defense Commission, Defendants-Respondents.

Docket No. 43922

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2017 Term.

Filed: April 28, 2017

American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation, Richard Alan Eppink, Boise, for appellants. Jason D. Williamson argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondents Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, Trout, Bolz, Ricks, Winder and Perry. Michael S. Gilmore, Deputy Attorney General argued.

Cantrill, Skinner, Lewis, Casey & Sorensen, LLP, Boise, for respondents Thomas and Wellman. Daniel J. Skinner argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Tracy Tucker, Jason Sharp, Naomi Morley, and Jeremy Payne, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated (Appellants), bring this appeal from the Ada County District Court. Appellants filed a class action complaint in which they alleged Idaho's public defense system is inadequate under federal and state constitutional standards. The district court reasoned that Appellants' claims were not justiciable on standing, ripeness, and separation of powers grounds and dismissed the complaint. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellants constitute a putative class of criminal defendants who seek to challenge Idaho's public defense system. They filed a class action complaint on June 17, 2015. Appellants allege Idaho's public defense system violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. As defendants, Appellants named (1) the State of Idaho; (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, in his official capacity; and (3) the seven members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission (PDC), in their official capacities.¹ Appellants seek various forms of equitable relief, including a declaration that Idaho's public defense system is unconstitutional and an injunction requiring Respondents to bring Idaho's public defense system into constitutional compliance.

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the case was not justiciable because Appellants did not sue the proper defendants. Since the provision of public defense has been delegated to Idaho's forty-four counties under Idaho Code section 19-859, Respondents maintained that Appellants erred by not suing the counties. Appellants countered that the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally adequate public defense, contending they had sued the proper defendants.

The district court held that Appellants' claims were not justiciable and dismissed their complaint on standing, ripeness, and separation of powers grounds. This appeal timely followed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Is the State of Idaho immune from state law claims alleging constitutional violations?

2. Do the justiciability doctrines bar this lawsuit?

3. Are Appellants entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Jurisdictional issues, like standing, are questions of law, over which this Court exercises free review." In re Jerome Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, 1086 (2012). Similarly, this Court has free review over whether dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was properly granted. See Meisner v. Potlatch Corp. , 131 Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 (1998).

IV. ANALYSIS

We first address the two main bases of the district court's dismissal order: immunity, and the justiciability doctrines. We then address whether Appellants should receive attorney fees on appeal.

A. Is the State of Idaho immune from state law claims alleging constitutional violations?

Appellants sued (1) the State of Idaho; (2) Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter, in his official capacity; and (3) the seven members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission (PDC), in their official capacities. Against each defendant, Appellants alleged claims under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Concerning immunity, the district court held that the State was immune from the federal law claims alleged, but not the state law claims. The district court further held that neither Governor Otter nor the PDC have immunity. The only immunity issue before us on appeal is whether the State is immune from Appellants' state law claims alleging constitutional violations.

Respondents set forth two bases to contend the State is immune. First, they contend Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(b) shields the State from claims under state law for injunctive relief. In relevant part, when the complaint was filed, Rule 3(b), entitled "Designation of Parties," provided:

[A]ll civil actions by or against a governmental unit or agency, or corporation, shall designate such party in its governmental or corporate name only, and individuals constituting the governing boards of governmental units ... shall not be designated as parties in any capacity unless the action is brought against them individually or for relief under Rules 65 or 74.

I.R.C.P. 3(b) (2015).²

Respondents bolster their argument with Weyyakin Ranch Property Owners' Association, Inc. v. City of Ketchum , 127 Idaho 1, 1–3, 896 P.2d 327, 327–29 (1995). In Weyyakin , the plaintiff sued the City of Ketchum, seeking to enjoin enforcement of a subdivision annexation ordinance. Id. The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the ordinance. Id. When the City of Ketchum, through its elected officials, failed to comply with the TRO, the district court held the officials in contempt. Id. On appeal, this Court held that the district court's contempt order violated Rule 3(b) because the complaint named the "City of Ketchum," not the "elected officials individually." Id. at 3, 896 P.2d at 329.

Respondents' argument is unavailing. Nothing in the plain language of Rule 3(b) shields the State from claims under state law for injunctive relief. Nor does Weyyakin support Respondents' argument. Weyyakin merely held that the district court erred by holding the elected officials in contempt because they were not named in the complaint "individually or for relief under Rules 65 or 74," as Rule 3(b) required. Id. As a result, "[b]ecause the temporary restraining orders failed to name the elected officials individually, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over them, and therefore did not have the authority to find them in contempt." Id. Nothing similar is at issue in this case.

Second, Respondents argue the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the State from Appellants' state law claims alleging constitutional violations. "It is the general rule that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a governmental unit can only be sued upon its consent." Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth. , 128 Idaho 580, 591, 917 P.2d 737, 748 (1996). Even so, many other jurisdictions hold that sovereign immunity does not apply when constitutional violations are alleged, as a contrary rule would render constitutional rights meaningless. See, e.g. , Columbia Air Servs., Inc. v. Conn. Dep't of Transp. , 293 Conn. 342, 977 A.2d 636, 645 (2009) ; Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein , 646 So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1994) ; Corum v. Univ. of N.C. Through Bd. of Governors , 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292 (1992) ; Ashton v. Brown , 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447, 463 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) ; Kilgo v. Ga. Dep't of Corrs. , 202 Ga.App. 50, 413 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1991).

Though we have never addressed the issue, we have recognized that because sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine, the judiciary has the power to modify it. Haeg v. City of Pocatello , 98 Idaho 315, 317, 563 P.2d 39, 41 (1977). Were we to accept Respondents' position that sovereign immunity shields the State from suit in this instance, we would leave parties unable to vindicate constitutional rights against the State. This we decline to do. Accordingly, aligning with our sister jurisdictions identified above, we hold that sovereign immunity is inapplicable when constitutional violations are alleged.

B. Do the justiciability doctrines bar this lawsuit?

The justiciability doctrines are the second basis of the district court's dismissal order. The justiciability doctrines "identify appropriate or suitable occasions for adjudication by a court." State v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 158 Idaho 874, 881, 354 P.3d 187, 194 (2015). Before reviewing the district court's justiciability analysis, we take a moment to clarify which standard of review should be employed when justiciability challenges are made. We note that the district court applied Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) governs dismissal for failure to state a claim, inquiring into the factual sufficiency of the substantive claims alleged. The justiciability doctrines, however, are wholly dissimilar from whether a substantive claim is adequately alleged. Indeed, the justiciability doctrines implicate jurisdiction. E.g. , Martin v. Camas Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs , 150 Idaho 508, 512, 248 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2011).

As such, we pronounce that justiciability challenges are subject to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) since they implicate jurisdiction.³ This, in turn, gives rise to a different standard of review than the one which Rule 12(b)(6) supplies. See Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n , 141 Idaho 129, 133 n.1, 106 P.3d 455, 459 n.1 (2005). The district court's error in this regard, however, does not constitute grounds for reversal. For one, our earlier cases left the issue unsettled. Compare Martin , 150 Idaho at 512, 248 P.3d at 1247 ("Where a plaintiff does not have standing it...