Tucker v. Toia

• Decision Date: 12 November 1976
• Citation: 54 A.D.2d 322,388 N.Y.S.2d 475
• Parties: Angela TUCKER et al., Respondents, v. Philip L. TOIA, Individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 475

388 N.Y.S.2d 475

54 A.D.2d 322

Angela TUCKER et al., Respondents, v. Philip L. TOIA, Individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Nov. 12, 1976.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., Albany, for appellant (William Goldman, Auburn, of counsel).

Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Rochester, for respondents (Wade Eaton, Rochester, of counsel).

Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., New York City, Brooklyn Legal Services Corp., Brooklyn, amici curiae (Cynthia Mann, Brooklyn, of counsel).

Community Service Society of New York, New York City, Community Council for Greater New York, New York City, amici curiae (William Haley, of counsel).

Before MOULE, J.P., and SIMONS, DILLON, GOLDMAN and WITMER, JJ.

GOLDMAN, Justice:

Defendant Philip L. Toia, individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, appeals from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant Toia, pending a final resolution of the merits of this action, from implementing or directing or permitting the implementation of section 15 of Chapter 76 of the Laws of 1976.

On March 30, 1976, Chapter 76 of the Laws of 1976 was approved. By section 15 it amended Social Services Law section 158(a) to read:

'(a) Any person unable to provide for himself, or who is unable to secure support from a legally responsible relative, who is not receiving needed assistance or care under other provisions of this chapter, or from other sources, shall be eligible for home relief; Provided, however that no person under the age of twenty-one years except a married person living with their spouse, living apart from a legally responsible relative shall be eligible for home relief unless a proceeding has been brought by or on behalf of such person to compel such legally responsible relative to provide for or contribute to such person's support and until an order of disposition has been entered in such proceeding.' (New matter in italics.)

Although this amendment was to be effective forty-five days after its enactment, a temporary restraining order staying implementation of the statute was issued in connection with an action challenging the amendment's validity under the federal Constitution brought in federal district court for the southern district of New York. On September 13, 1976 a three-judge district court rendered a decision upholding section 15 under the federal Constitution and ordered the temporary restraining order vacated (Rasmussen v. Toia, 420 F.Supp. 757 (three-judge Ct., S.D.N.Y., decided September 13, 1976)).

Subsequently, defendant Toia attempted to implement the provisions of section 15 by means of an administrative letter dated October 19, 1976, providing for the discontinuance of home relief aid to all persons rendered ineligible by section 15, the cut-off date to be November 8, 1976.

On October 26, 1976 the plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleging that their home relief benefits were about to be terminated by the implementation of this amendment, instituted this action for a declaratory judgment declaring section 15 to be unconstitutional under the New York State Constitution. Because of the time constraints faced by plaintiffs on account of the threatened November 8 shut-off of benefits, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against further implementation of the amendment pending a final resolution of the merits was scheduled for October 29, 1976. At that hearing, Special Term orally determined that section 15 was unconstitutional, but the order entered upon this decision limited plaintiffs' preliminary relief to an injunction of defendant Toia, 'pending a final resolution of the merits of the action, from implementing or directing or permitting the implementation of § 15'.

Defendant Toia immediately appealed this order and thereby automatically stayed the enforcement of the preliminary injunction (CPLR 5519, subd. (a), par. (1)). Thereupon, plaintiffs appeared before a member of this court and obtained an order directing defendant Toia to show cause why an order should not be made vacating defendant's statutory stay and further why an order should not be issued requiring the defendant to perfect his appeal by November 5, 1976 so that argument could be heard that day. Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the automatic stay pending a determination of defendant's appeal was granted by this court and argument was set for November 5.

The only issue before us on this appeal is whether Special Term abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in this action (CPLR 6301; Western Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. v. Town of Henrietta, 46 A.D.2d 1010, 363 N.Y.S.2d 320; R. & J. Bottling Co. v. Rosenthal, 40 A.D.2d 911, 912, 337 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785; Swarts v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Rochester, 42 Misc.2d 761, 764--765, 249 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47--49).

The moving party, in order to succeed in convincing the court of original jurisdiction to exercise its discretion favorably to him, must show '(1) the likelihood of (his) ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury to (him) if the injunction is not granted, and (3) a balancing of the equities in (his) favor' (Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. Village of Tuckaho 67 Misc.2d 895, 900--901, 325 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722--724, affd. 38 A.D.2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 615, see also, Albini v. Solork Assoc., 37 A.D.2d 835, 326 N.Y.S.2d 150). That plaintiffs, and the class they represent, meet the requirements of the last two of these tests is not seriously disputed.

The analysis of whether Special Term properly exercised its discretion, then, must be focused upon whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of their ultimate success on the merits. Such ultimate success would require an adjudication that the challenged statute is unconstitutional. Defendant Toia argues that the statute has already withstood a similar constitutional challenge in Rasmussen v. Toia, supra, and for that reason plaintiffs' success at trial is highly unlikely.

Rasmussen cannot control this case because it involved a challenge based solely upon the federal Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal protection. Most importantly, the Rasmussen plaintiffs eschewed reliance upon Article XVII of the New York Constitution and conceded that section 15 did not impinge upon any federally recognized 'fundamental right' and that the statute's 'constitutional validity need only be subjected to minimal judicial scrutiny' under the traditional 'two tier' equal protection test (Rasmussen, p. 765). The instant plaintiffs, on the other hand, base much of their challenge on the argument that Article XVII, § 1, which provided that '(t)he aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns', creates a 'fundamental right' of state constitutional dimensions sufficient to trigger the strict scrutiny test under the New York Constitution's own equal protection clause (N.Y.Const., Art. I, § 11; see, e.g., discussion in Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59--60, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 16--17, 340 N.E.2d 444, 455--456). Alternatively, plaintiffs...