Tucker v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 12 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 12236,12236
• Citation: 29 Ill.App.3d 489,330 N.E.2d 274
• Parties: Richard Lee TUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donna Delores TUCKER, Individually and as mother and next friend of Eric Dean Tucker, et al., Defendants-Appellants, and Beatrice Daisy Tucker, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 274

330 N.E.2d 274

29 Ill.App.3d 489

Richard Lee TUCKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donna Delores TUCKER, Individually and as mother and next friend of Eric Dean Tucker, et al., Defendants-Appellants and Beatrice Daisy Tucker, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12236.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

June 12, 1975.

Rehearing Denied July 16, 1975.

John L. Knuppel, Knuppel, Grosboll, Becker & Tice, Petersburg, for defendants-appellants.

L. Milton McClure, McClure, McClure & Brannan, Beardstown, for plaintiff-appellee.

TRAPP, Justice:

Defendant, Donna Tucker, herein designated wife, appeals from a decree of partition of a joint tenancy and from denial of her motion to set off homestead in the real estate. She also appeals from an order denying her motion as next friend of minor children to dismiss the partition proceedings alleging that it was against public policy for the husband and wife to partition or dispose of real estate unless they had provided minor children with another homestead.

The trial court denied the wife's motion to set off homestead, ruling that the equities between the parties had been considered in a prior divorce decree which provided that the parties should share the homestead equally.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed in behalf of the minor children, concluding that there were no legal grounds for such motion and that the divorce decree entered provided for the welfare of the children as well as the other equities of the case.

It is argued here that the divorce decree is void upon its face for the reason that such decree granted each party a divorce from the other upon the grounds of mental cruelty. In Mogged v. Mogged, the trial court entered a decree of divorce in favor of each party upon the grounds of mental cruelty. The husband appealed apparently upon the ground that the evidence did not support a finding of his fault. The appellate court (5 Ill.App.3d 581, 284 N.E.2d 663) found that the evidence supported the decree. That court determined that the real issue was whether the doctrine of recrimination could automatically bar a divorce when each party was guilty of misconduct of equal quality and concluded that the doctrine of recrimination was a matter for the exercise of sound judicial discretion dependent upon public policy, the welfare of the parties and the exigencies of the case. Finding no abuse of such discretion, the court affirmed.

The Supreme Court (55 Ill.2d 221, 302 N.E.2d 293) reversed, noting that divorce was a remedy granted only through the General Assembly and that the 1974 Divorce Act had been construed in Duberstein v. Duberstein, 171 Ill. 133, 49 N.E. 316, as only affording relief to a wronged party and withholding relief from parties who were equally to blame. The court concluded that it was not for the courts to modify the long established doctrine of recrimination but that abolition or modification of the doctrine should await legislative action. The cause was remanded because the record disclosed that the trial court entered its decree before the parties had completed the evidence introduced at the hearing.

In the light of Mogged, the issue here is whether the decree is void and subject to collateral attack at any time or is merely erroneous and only voidable upon direct proceedings.

It is stated that where the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, a decree cannot be the subject of collateral attack no mater how erroneous. (Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435, 44 N.E.2d 54; Joseph v. Joseph, 336 Ill.App. 258, 83 N.E.2d 600; Coolbaugh v. Coolbaugh, 33 Ill.App.2d 444, 178 N.E.2d 702.) Conversely, if the court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the case, the decree is a nullity and may be attacked at any time or in any proceeding. (Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435, 44 N.E.2d 54; Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger, 336 Ill.App. 226, 83 N.E.2d 382; Geiermann v. Geiermann, 12 Ill.App.2d 484, 139 N.E.2d 838.) Here, there is no contention that there was a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties in the divorce proceeding.

The Mogged opinion does not discuss the divorce decree in the context of being void. Upon the analogy of the opinion in Collins v. Collins, 14 Ill.2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813, we conclude that the issue here was erroneous and subject to attack in direct proceedings for review, but was not void and subject to collateral attack. In Collins, the wife procured a divorce upon the grounds that the spouse was guilty of habitual drunkenness for a period of two years. After the death of the husband, the wife brought proceedings under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act to vacate the decree. The trial court found that the divorce decree was void for the reason that the record showed that the decree of divorce was entered about 18 months after the date of the marriage so that the statutory requirement of a period of two years was not met. The Supreme Court determined that the Section 72 proceeding permitted examination of the divorce decree as in a bill of review for purposes of granting relief where errors are apparent on the face of the record. It affirmed the trial court because the face of the record showed that the divorce decree was contrary to a rule of law or a statutory provision. The dissenting opinion points out that the initial opinion of the court ruled that the divorce decree was void in that the trial court had been without jurisdiction to enter it. It is further disclosed that upon a petition for rehearing, such opinion was modified to eliminate the holding that the decree was void for want of jurisdiction and to adopt the view that the divorce decree was erroneous and should be reversed for the error appearing on the face of the record.

Again in Joseph v. Joseph, 336 Ill.App. 258, 83 N.E.2d 600, the decree of divorce directed that the wife pay her attorney's fees from the proceeds of the divorce settlement. Six months after the decree, she procured an order deleting such provision and the attorney appealed. The wife contended that the divorce statute does not authorize the court to direct a litigant to pay her own attorney's fee and that such decretal provision was a nullity. Finding that the trial court had had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter at the time of the decree, the court quoted from Sheahen v. Madigan, 275 Ill. 372, 114 N.E. 135:

'Where a court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, its judgments or decrees cannot be questioned collaterally no matter how erroneous they may be. Spring v. Kane, 86 Ill. 580; Swiggart v. Harber, 4 Scam. 364, 39 Am.Dec. 418; Marsh v. Irwin, 168 Ill. 50, 47 N.E. 768; Stempel v. Thomas, 89 Ill. 146. The judgments and decrees of courts having jurisdiction are final and conclusive between the parties until reversed in a direct proceeding in the manner provided by law, and they are immune from collateral attack. The immunity rests upon the power to hear and determine the cause, and it is not affected by any error, however gross.'

See also Anderson v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 435, 44 N.E.2d 54. For such reason we conclude that error in the divorce decree is not the subject of review upon appeal from the decree in partition.

In argument it is urged that the wife has an absolute right to have a homestead interest setoff and that the court cannot order a sale unless a homestead has...