Tug Allie-B Inc. v. U.S., ALLIE-

• Decision Date: 16 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-15305,ALLIE-,INC
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) TUG, a corporation, as owner of the tug Allie B, a commercial tug boat, official document number 524008, DANN OCEAN TOWING, as operator of said vessel, in a cause of action for exoneration from or limitation of liability, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Claimant-Appellee, ALLIED TOWING CORP., Claimant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 936

273 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2001)

TUG ALLIE-B, INC., a corporation, as owner of the tug Allie B, a commercial tug boat, official document number 524008, DANN OCEAN TOWING, as operator of said vessel, in a cause of action for exoneration from or limitation of liability, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Claimant-Appellee, ALLIED TOWING CORP., Claimant.

No. 00-15305

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

November 16, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

Before BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and TIDWELL^*, District Judge.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Tug Allie-B, Inc., and Dann Ocean Towing, Inc. (collectively "Tug Allie") appeal an order declaring that claims by the United States brought pursuant to the Park System Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 19jj et seq. ("PSRPA"), for damages caused by the tug Allie-B to a coral reef while towing a barge owned by Allied Towing Corporation ("Allied"), are not subject to the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. ("Limitation Act"). The question of whether the United States' claims brought pursuant to PSRPA are subject to the Limitation Act is one of first impression.

BACKGROUND

On July 20, 1998, the tug Allie-B, a commercial tug boat towing Allied's 354-foot barge, ATC-350, ran aground and collided with coral reefs in the vicinity of Ledbury Reef in Biscayne National Park ("National Park"). The tug managed to power itself off the reef, but, in doing so, caused a crater-like blow hole in the ocean floor. The tug boat then pulled the barge free from its grounded position atop the reef. The grounding of the tug boat and barge, and the efforts to remove them from the reef, caused significant injury to natural resources located within the National Park. The hulls of both vessels, and the cable connecting the vessels, destroyed extensive tracts of coral reef, including hard and soft corals and reef framework.

After the collision, Tug Allie-B, Inc., as owner of the tug boat, and Dann Ocean Towing, Inc. ("Dann Towing"), as operator of the tug boat, filed a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability, pursuant to the Limitation Act, for damages arising out of the grounding of the tug boat and barge. The Limitation Act limits a vessel owner's liability for any damages arising from a maritime accident to the post-accident value of the vessel and its pending freight. 46 U.S.C. app § 183(a).¹ Tug Allie alleged that the post-accident value of the vessel and pending freight amounted to $1,204,860 which would limit liability to that amount pursuant to the Limitation Act.² The United States and Allied filed an Answer to the limitation claims and filed their own claims for damages against Tug Allie in an amount that exceeded the limitation fund by approximately $2,864,340. Allied sought $1,000,000 for damages incurred as a result of the grounding of its barge. The United States sought $3,069,200 in damages, claiming that, pursuant to the PSRPA, it was entitled to all damages due to injuries to resources in the National Park as a result of the grounding.³ The relevant provisions of the PSRPA include:

16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(a):

[A]ny person who destroys, causes the loss of, or injures any park system resource is liable to the United States for the response costs and damages resulting from such destruction, loss, or injury.

16 U.S.C. § 19jj-1(b):

[a]ny instrumentality, including but not limited to a vessel, vehicle, aircraft, or other equipment that destroys, causes the loss of, or injures any park system resource or any marine or aquatic park resource shall be liable in rem to the United States for response costs and damages resulting from such destruction, loss, or injury to the same extent as a person is liable under subsection (a) of this section.

16 U.S.C. § 19jj(c):

"Response costs" means the costs of actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior to prevent or minimize destruction or loss of, or injury to, park system resources; or to abate or minimize the imminent risk of such destruction, loss or injury; or to monitor the ongoing effects of incidents causing such destruction, loss or injury.

16 U.S.C. § 19jj(b):

"Damages" includes the following:

(1) Compensation for -

(A) (i) the cost of replacing, restoring, or acquiring the equivalent of a park system resource; and

(ii) the value of any significant loss of use of a park system resource pending its restoration or replacement or the acquisition of an equivalent resource, or

(B) the value of the park system resource in the event the resource cannot be replaced or restored.

(2) The cost of damage assessments under section 19jj-2(b) of this title.

The district court determined that the Government's claims under the PSRPA are not subject to the Limitation Act, and the United States would be entitled to a complete recovery of its damages, if proven. This appeal followed.⁴ Because the district court's ruling involved purely an issue of law, that is, statutory construction, we review its determination de novo. Marine Trans. Serv. Sea Barge Group, Inc. v. Python High Performance Marine Group, 16 F.3d 1133, 1138 (11th Cir. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Tug Allie argues on appeal that the Limitation Act and the PSRPA can be read harmoniously by holding that although claims can be brought under the PSRPA, damages would be limited in accordance with the Limitation Act. The Government argues that both the relevant statutory language and the congressional intent underlying the statutory schemes reflect a clear conflict that cannot be reconciled without limiting one statutory enactment to accommodate the other. Because the PSRPA is the later-enacted statute, as well as the more specific, the Government argues that the conflict must be resolved by applying the PSRPA without limiting its claims for damages pursuant to the Limitation Act.

To resolve the issue presented, we employ the fundamental principles of statutory construction. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."). Additionally, we follow the long established rule, that "a new[er] statute will not be read as wholly or even partially amending a prior one unless there exists a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new and those of the old that cannot be reconciled." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974). Stated alternatively, "[c]ourts generally adhere to the principle that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously if possible, and if not, that more recent or specific statutes should prevail over older or more general ones." Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, Cullman County, 197 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted). Consistent with this view, we begin by reviewing the language of both the PSRPA and the Limitation Act, and then examine the purpose and structure of each Act to determine whether the two Acts can be read harmoniously or if when read together they present "a positive repugnancy" or conflict that cannot be reconciled. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 134. The starting point for all statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). We note first that there is nothing in the language of the PSRPA which suggests that any damages under the Act should be in any way limited. To the contrary, the PSRPA expressly speaks to the liability for "response costs and damages" in terms of making the government whole for all of its losses. Response costs are those taken to prevent, abate or minimize any injury, or imminent risk of injury, to park system resources, as well as whatever costs are incurred to monitor the ongoing effects of incidents causing destruction, loss or injury. See 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(c). Damages include compensation for replacing, restoring, or acquiring the equivalent of a park system resource or its value; for the loss of use until the restoration, replacement or acquisition of an equivalent resource is accomplished; and for the cost of damage assessments under section 19jj-2(b). See 16 U.S.C. § 19jj(b). As the above language shows, the measure of damages under the PSRPA is defined solely by reference to the damage an entity has inflicted on the park land at issue, and secondary losses stemming from that injury. Nothing in the statute suggests that the damages are capped by any external factor. Therefore, in the absence of any explicit statutory language limiting damages under the PSRPA, we conclude that Congress contemplated that the Government could seek full recovery under the statute for accidents causing injury to park lands.

On the other hand, the language of the Limitation Act provides for a limitation on the total of all recoverable damages in a marine accident to the post-accident value of the ship and its cargo, no matter how many claimants there may be. See 46 U.S.C. § 183(a). See also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. of Hartford, 273 U.S. at 214 ("liability as owner shall be limited to the value of the vessel as appraised after the occurrence of the loss and the pending freight for the voyage"). Accordingly, application of the Limitation Act here, in a case where a ship has destroyed Government park land, would prevent the United States from recovering all of the costs itemized as damages under the PSRPA. Indeed, in some circumstances, the Limitation Act's application would result in the inability of the United States to recover any of the PSRPA damage remedies, such as when the ship causing the damage is a total loss, rendering its post-accident value as zero....