Tuggle v. State

Citation253 Ind. 279,252 N.E.2d 796
Decision Date09 December 1969
Docket NumberNo. 169S1,169S1
PartiesTommie TUGGLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

W. T. Robinette, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John B. Ramming, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HUNTER, Judge.

The appellant was charged and tried for first degree burglary pursuant to an indictment returned by the grand jury of Marion County, Indiana, and filed in the Marion Criminal Court, Division One. Trial was had by jury and the appellant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment in the Indiana State Prison for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years under the lesser includable offense of entry with intent to commit a felony. The indictment reads as follows:

'The Grand Jury for the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, upon their oath do present that Tommie Tuggle on or about the 23rd day of October, A.D. 1967, at and in the County of Marion and in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously break and enter into the dwelling house and place of human habitation of Pauline Mann, then and there situated at 3148 Indianapolis Avene, in the City of Indianapolis, County of Marion, State of Indiana, in which said dwelling house the said PAULINE MANN then lived, with intent t commit a felony therein, to-wit: to unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly obtain and exert unauthorized control over property of the said PAULINE MANN and to deprive the said PAULINE MANN permanently of the use and benefit of said property, then and there being * * * contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'

The statutes under which appellant was convicted are: Ind.Ann.Stat. § 10--704

'Entering to commit a felony--Penalty--Whoever enters any dwelling-house, or other place of human habitation, * * * with the intent to commit a felony therein, shall, on conviction, be imprisoned for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years, and be disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for any determinate period.'

and § 10--3030

'Theft in general.--

A person commits theft when he (1) knowingly:

(a) obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner; or

(2) either:

(a) intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property; * * *.'

The sole issue presented to this court by this appeal is one involving the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict.

The three elements essential to a conviction for 'Entering to commit a felony' under the above set out statute are as follows:

(1) entry (2) into the dwelling house and place of human habitation,

(3) with the intent to commit a felony therein.

If there is substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to establish each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm the trial court. Liston v. State (1969), Ind., 250 N.E.2d 739; King v. State (1968), Ind., 234 N.E.2d 465; Freeman v. State (1967), Ind., 231 N.E.2d 246.

Since appellant admits elements nos. 1 and 2, we will limit our examination to determining the sufficiency of the evidence going to the proof of element no. 3. And in so doing we will only consider the evidence and all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which is favorable to the state. Carter v. State (1968), Ind., 234 N.E.2d 850; Capps v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 472, 229 N.E.2d 794; Beatty v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 598, 194 N.E.2d 727.

On direct examination, Bonita Marie Mann, who was the first to arrive home on the day of the alleged crime, testified to the following: the front door of the house was locked so she got out her key, opened the door, and was going into the living room. As she did a man in the house was coming towards her and she backed out. She asked him who he was and what he was doing in her house. At the same time she walked down to the sidewalk where her mother was pulling up from work. As she went back down to the sidewalk, she observed appellant go back into the house, and come out again sometime after he mother went to the door. She was present when appellant was arrested and searched. She observed the items taken off the appellant's person by the police officer. She told a jury that she saw a black leather beanie hat that belonged to her sister and an old watch that belonged to her mother, and a knife that belonged to her mother which the latter used to use at work.

Also called as a witness by the state was Pauline Mann, mother of Bonita Mann, and owner of the house. Her testimony may be summarized as follows: on the day in question, she came home from work at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon. When she drove up in front of her house, two girls, Andrea Williams and her oldest girl Bonita, were running away from the door down the steps. She said they were running from appellant who was walking out onto the porch. She asked him how he got in her house. She told one of the girls to call the police and kept talking to appellant 'so the police would get there.' After a brief conversation with appellant in which he told her that he was there at her request for the purpose of burning trash, appellant walked away and Mrs. Mann proceeded into the house. She walked into her...

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25 cases
  • Van Bibber v. Norris
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 3, 1980
    ...IC 35-17-5-3 is possible only when the bank intends to deprive Norris permanently of his property. IC 35-17-5-3(2); Tuggle v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796, 799; Miller v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 338, 236 N.E.2d 173. However that intent is absent where the bank has attempted to ......
  • Mosley v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2009
  • Advisors v. Pence
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • January 14, 2011
    ...Ind.App. 375, 348 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind.Ct.App.1976) (citing Robinson v. State, 257 Ind. 38, 271 N.E.2d 727 (1971) and Tuggle v. State, 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796 (1969)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Meridian, the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fac......
  • Marsillett v. State, 484S159
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • July 22, 1986
    ...The intent to deprive the owner of his property may be inferred from the unauthorized possession of the property. Tuggle v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 279, 252 N.E.2d 796. The jury could infer that defendant intended to deprive Leander Rose of the $990 which was in excess of the $10 check which......
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