Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 90-2149
Citation | 62 Ohio St.3d 541,584 N.E.2d 729 |
Decision Date | 12 February 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-2149,90-2149 |
Parties | , 7 IER Cases 309 TULLOH, Appellant, v. GOODYEAR ATOMIC CORPORATION, et al., Appellees. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
Absent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim.
Michael H. Tulloh, appellant, worked at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant as a uranium materials handler from 1976 through 1986. The plant was operated by appellee Goodyear Atomic Corporation ("Goodyear") from 1953 through November 1986. In November 1986, appellee Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. ("Marietta") assumed operations of the plant and has continued to operate the plant since that date. Tulloh alleges that while working at the plant he was exposed to radioactive dust, chips and fumes, causing him injuries including sinusitis, pharyngitis, laryngitis, abdominal pain, cramping, vomiting, nausea and extreme upper respiratory and gastrointestinal dysfunction. He alleges that both employers knew a health hazard existed from his exposure to the radioactive materials. Tulloh also alleges that he had expressed his concern about the safety of the work environment to Marietta. He contends that he made demands that the plant be operated in a manner consistent with statutory, regulatory and societal obligations. In November 1986, Tulloh was terminated by Marietta.
On February 19, 1988, Tulloh filed a complaint in the Pike County Common Pleas Court, alleging intentional tort and wrongful termination. Tulloh bases his intentional tort complaint on his alleged intentional and willful continued exposure to health hazards in the work environment by both his employers despite the fact that appellees knew a substantial certainty of harm to Tulloh existed. Appellant also asserts that his wrongful discharge claim is based in tort because he was fired for demanding a safer work environment. The trial court dismissed the intentional tort count for failure to state a claim and dismissed the wrongful termination count for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was preempted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, Section 185, Title 29, U.S.Code. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on the intentional tort claim, holding that the claim failed because there was no showing that appellees intended for appellant to be injured or that the injury was substantially certain to occur. The court of appeals also held that there is no tort basis for a wrongful discharge claim, but reversed dismissal of the count, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for breach of Tulloh's employment contract.
The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, Columbus, Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., and Paul DeMarco, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert E. Tait and James P. Kennedy, Columbus, for appellees.
Ronald D. Major, Cincinnati, urging reversal in part, for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
This case presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting appellees' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss appellant's claim for intentional tort; and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting appellees' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss appellant's allegation of wrongful discharge. For the following reasons, we hold that appellees' Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion was improperly granted on both counts. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals regarding the intentional tort claim and affirm its judgment regarding the wrongful discharge claim.
Intentional Tort
In his complaint, appellant stated:
After reviewing the complaint, the court of appeals held that:
As noted by the court of appeals, this court has addressed the pleading requirements in an intentional tort claim against an employer in Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753. In the syllabus of that case, we held that:
"A claim of intentional tort against an employer will be dismissed as failing to establish that the pleader is entitled to relief unless the complaint alleges facts showing that the employer: (1) specifically desired to injure the employee; or (2) knew that injury to an employee was certain or substantially certain to result from the employer's act and, despite this knowledge, still proceeded."
In Mitchell, however, the case arose out of the fatal shooting of a clerk who worked in a Lawson Milk Company ("Lawson") store. The complaint alleged that Lawson had committed an intentional tort by failing to provide adequate security or training in handling violent situations. In Mitchell, we found that:
Id. at 192-193, 532 N.E.2d at 756.
When construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is presumed that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts warranting recovery. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus. In Mitchell, it was found that when all the facts were taken as true, there could be no recovery. This is not the situation in the case at bar. Tulloh alleged that appellees knew that exposure to radioactive materials at the plant would be hazardous, and that appellees intentionally concealed this information from Tulloh with the knowledge that injury was substantially certain to occur. Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, Tulloh's complaint fulfills the requirements necessary to state a claim of intentional tort. As was stated in Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, paragraph two of the syllabus: While Tulloh ultimately states in his complaint his conclusion that appellees' acts were intentional, the factual allegations in the complaint also lead to the same conclusion.
The court of appeals erred by failing to take appellant's allegations in his complaint as true for the purposes of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. Appellant averred in his complaint that appellees concealed information regarding the dangers of the radioactive materials after appellees became aware of the risks. The court of appeals stated that: " * * * These are mere conclusions supported by no underlying facts. * * * " What the court of appeals in fact is requiring is that a plaintiff provide, along with his complaint, proof that the allegations are true. Whether appellees concealed information knowing that injury was substantially certain to occur would certainly be a disputed issue at trial, but there is no requirement that all evidence supporting these allegations be filed with the plaintiff's...
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