Tuman v. Genesis Associates

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: PADOVA
• Citation: Tuman v. Genesis Associates, 935 F.Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
• Decision Date: 25 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-272.
• Parties: Kenneth J. TUMAN and Joan E. Tuman v. GENESIS ASSOCIATES; Patricia A. Mansmann; and Patricia A. Neuhausel.

935 F. Supp. 1375

Kenneth J. TUMAN and Joan E. Tuman v. GENESIS ASSOCIATES; Patricia A. Mansmann; and Patricia A. Neuhausel.

Civil Action No. 95-272.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 25, 1996.

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Joseph F. Rizzo, Darby, PA, Gary David Ginsberg, Brian P. O'Connor, Law Offices of Gary D. Ginsberg, Mt. Laurel, NJ, for plaintiffs.

Jeffrey R. Lerman, Stephen G. Rhoads, Marianne Bechtle Daniels, Cynthia B. Mac Queen, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, John J. Levy, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Cherry Hill, NJ, Cornelia Farrell Maggio Exton, PA, Stephen Ledva, Jr., Edelstein, Mintzer and Sarowitz, Westmont, NJ, David S. Cohen, Edelstein, Mintzer and Sarowitz, Philadelphia, PA, for defendants.

Jeffrey R. Lerman, Marianne Bechtle Daniels, Cynthia B. MacQueen, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoades, Philadelphia, PA, John J. Levy, Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoades, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Patricia A. Neuhausel.

MEMORANDUM

PADOVA, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Kenneth J. and Joan E. Tuman instituted this suit against two mental health professionals, Defendants Patricia A. Mansmann and Patricia A. Neuhausel, and their corporate practice, Defendant Genesis Associates, alleging that Defendants breached a contract and committed various tortious acts in treating Plaintiffs' daughter, Diane Tuman, a non-party to this action.¹ Presently before the Court are Defendants Neuhausel's and Genesis Associates' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 as to the claims against them, and Defendant Mansmann's separate motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims against her.² For the reasons discussed below, I will grant in part and deny in part Defendants Neuhausel's and Genesis Associates' motion, and grant Defendant Mansmann's motion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on Sept. 21, 1994, raising state law contract and tort claims. Plaintiffs allege that they entered into a contract with Defendants in 1990 for Defendants to provide mental health therapy to their daughter, Diane Tuman, then 20 years old, to treat Diane for bulimia and other emotional problems. Defendants treated Diane for a two-year period from 1990 to 1992. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants provided Diane with substandard care and that the treatment methods Defendants employed with Diane deviated from good and accepted practices in the mental health field.³

In summary, Plaintiffs allege the following. Defendants required Plaintiffs to "detach" from Diane for a two-year period, during which time Plaintiffs could not communicate with Diane. During the course of her therapy, Defendants implanted "false memories" in Diane that Plaintiffs sexually assaulted Diane and routinely performed bizarre satanic rituals, including murdering children. Defendants fostered these beliefs in Diane by, for example, stating in group therapy sessions that Diane had been subject to sexual and satanic ritualistic abuse and then urging Diane to identify her abusers. Defendants encouraged Diane to believe these "memories," despite the fact that Defendants never attempted to independently verify them. Plaintiffs claim that Diane's mental condition deteriorated significantly while treating with Defendants. Moreover, Diane, believing that Plaintiffs are dangerous, fled the area, assumed a new identity, and broke off contact with Plaintiffs; as of the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs had not seen or spoken with Diane in more than two years.

Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' suit. Applying Pennsylvania law,⁴ I denied Defendants' motion with respect to all but two of Plaintiffs' causes of action in July 1995. 894 F.Supp. 183 (E.D.Pa.1995).⁵ The surviving counts of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint raise claims against all three Defendants for: (1) negligence; (2) breach of contract; (3) defamation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) misrepresentation; and (6) punitive damages. The parties have now completed discovery, and the case is scheduled for trial next month.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" only if there is sufficient evidence with which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Furthermore, bearing in mind that all uncertainties are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, a factual dispute is only "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case. Id. Rule 56(c) directs summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient enough to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Negligence Claim

Plaintiffs contend that through negligent treatment of Diane, Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiffs⁶ and thereby caused harm to them. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants were negligent because they implanted and/or fostered false memories in Diane of sexual and satanic ritualistic abuse by her parents without ever attempting to ascertain whether these allegations were true, and then terminated therapy with Diane at a time when these beliefs were entrenched in Diane's mind. Plaintiffs contend that because Diane has severed all contact with them and has told others, including the police, that Plaintiffs engage in such practices, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress which has manifested itself in the form of depression, anxiety, sleeplessness, weight gain, hypertension, and sexual dysfunction.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the negligence claim, asserting four separate grounds. First, the claim is time-barred. Second, Plaintiffs will be unable to establish at trial that Defendants' methods deviated from good and accepted practices in the mental health field, because Plaintiffs' expert testimony is inadmissible as a matter of law. Third, Defendant Mansmann argues that Plaintiffs will be unable to prove at trial that the alleged deviation in Defendants' treatment of Diane caused Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, because Plaintiffs' expert report does not opine as to a causal link between the deviation and the alleged physical injuries. Fourth and finally, Defendant Mansmann asserts that Plaintiffs' negligence claim must fail because Pennsylvania courts only recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in "bystander" cases. Defendant Mansmann also moves separately for summary judgment as to the negligence claim against her, asserting that there is no evidence that she specifically undertook to treat Diane for Plaintiffs or that she was involved in a therapeutic relationship with Diane. I will address each of these arguments in turn.

1. Is the claim time-barred?

Plaintiffs' negligence claim is governed by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524 (West 1995). "This two year period begins to run `as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations.'" A. McD. v. Rosen, 423 Pa.Super. 304, 621 A.2d 128, 130 (1993) (citing Pocono Int'l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983)). An individual asserting a claim must use "all reasonable diligence" to become informed of all the facts and circumstances possibly giving rise to a right of recovery, and then file his/her complaint before the limitations period has run. Id.

A judicially-created device called the "discovery rule" applies to toll the running of the statute of limitations when the plaintiff is unable, "despite the exercise of diligence, to determine the existence of the injury or its cause." Stauffer v. Ebersole, 385 Pa.Super. 306, 560 A.2d 816, 817 (citations omitted), app. denied, 524 Pa. 622, 571 A.2d 384 (1989). Accord A. McD., 621 A.2d at 130 (noting that discovery rule may apply to toll the statute of limitations "in those circumstances where the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of the injury or of its cause") (citing Pocono Int'l Raceway v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 503 Pa. 80, 468 A.2d 468, 471 (1983)). Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know, first, that an injury has occurred and, second, another party's conduct caused the injury. A. McD., 621 A.2d at 130 (citation omitted); Stauffer, 560 A.2d at 817 (citations omitted). In other words, the period begins to run when the individual has "`sufficient critical facts to put him on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he need investigate whether he is entitled to redress.'" A. McD., 621 A.2d at 130 (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that by July 1992 at the latest, Plaintiffs knew all the facts necessary to initiate suit against Defendants for malpractice and the other claims raised in this action. Alternatively, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of salient facts by July 1992 to impose on Plaintiffs a duty to investigate whether Defendants caused injury to them; Plaintiffs, however, failed to exercise reasonable diligence and, therefore, the discovery rule does not apply to toll the limitations period.

In support of their argument, Defendants point...