Tungate v. Thoms
| Decision Date | 13 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 01-271-JMH.,CIV.A. 01-271-JMH. |
| Parties | Charles TUNGATE Plaintiff v. Maryellen THOMS, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Charles Tungate, FMC-Lexington, Lexington, KY, Pro se.
Mason Moore Kessinger, U.S. Attorney's Office, EDKY, Lexington, KY, for Kathleen M. Hawk-Sawyer, defendants.
David A. Arthur, Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for William O. Smith, defendant.
This matter is before the court upon the motions of (1) Defendant Smith, by counsel, to dismiss or for summary judgment [Record No. 10]; (2) Defendant Sawyer-Hawk, by counsel, to dismiss or for summary judgment [Record No. 15]; Plaintiff Tungate for discovery and leave to amend his complaint [Record Nos. 19-20].
On July 5, 2001, the plaintiff, a prisoner at the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, paid the requisite filing fee and submitted a pro se civil rights action, complaining of a detainer which had been lodged against him by officials of Decatur County, Indiana. Naming numerous defendants within the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and in Indiana, he sought to have the detainer removed and he also sought damages, including punitive damages. The plaintiff specifically claimed (1) violations of the provisions and underlying policy of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IAD"); (2) a violation of the plaintiff's right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution; (3) a conspiracy among the defendants to violate the plaintiff's rights under the IAD and the United States Constitution; and (4) the illegality of enforcing certain paragraphs in BOP Program Statement (PS) 5130.06, attached to the complaint, on the grounds that it was enacted after the plaintiff began the IAD process and it violates the IAD's underlying policy, the U.S. Constitution, and the plaintiff's federal rights.
On September 4, 2001, Senior Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr. issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order [Record No. 2] setting forth the above-listed claims; reciting a chronology of events with regard to the detainer; dismissing a number of defendants and claims for reasons stated in the order; and ordering that summons issue for BOP Director Kathleen Hawk-Sawyer, individually and officially for injunctive relief and for Decatur County Prosecutor William O. Smith, in his official capacity for injunctive relief and his individual capacity for damages. Id.
After the instant case was reassigned to the undersigned, in November of 2001, both defendants filed the dispositive motions before the court today. The plaintiff has filed responses to both motions and his own motions. Before addressing those motions, however, the court will recount the plaintiff's version of the facts and applicable law.
The following is a summary or construction of the factual allegations and legal bases the plaintiff presents in his complaint and exhibits attached thereto [Record No. 1].
The detainer at issue herein was filed by the Decatur County Sheriff's Department on or about January 15, 1999. On January 28, 1999, the FMC-Lexington warden provided the plaintiff with the formal IAD notice of the untried charges against him and of his right to request their disposition. Exhibit [hereinafter "Ex."] A. This document identifies the state drug charges against him and gives the address of prosecuting attorney Smith. Id. The plaintiff responded by asking that the warden file an IAD request for disposition of the charges for him and signing thereon that he understood the terms to which he was agreeing, including the fact that his request would be "deemed to be a waiver of extradition." Id. Accordingly, on February 8, 1999, the warden executed and forwarded an IAD "Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody" of the plaintiff to defendant prosecutor Smith (Ex. B); and the plaintiff signed another IAD document, which is also attached and in which he acknowledges his understanding that the transfer would be only temporary from federal to state custody, with his being returned to federal custody at the conclusion of the state trial.
On July 1, 1999, the plaintiff was removed from federal custody at FMC-Lexington and brought before the court in Indiana, Case No. 16CO1-98-CV-87. After his arraignment, he was returned to federal custody in Lexington on July 7. The plaintiff states that his trial was originally set for November 21, 1999, but this date was rescheduled to January 18, 2000; the second trial date was also rescheduled, with a third trial date of March 7, 2000 being set.
Four days before the scheduled trial, on March 3, 2000, with no notice or opportunity to object to the state's taking custody of him again, the plaintiff was removed from the federal prison for the second time and placed in the custody of the County of Decatur. However, the plaintiff states that he refused to enter into a plea agreement, and the trial did not take place, a fourth trial date being set for August 21, 2000. Meanwhile, the plaintiff was returned to federal custody on April 15, 2000. Later in April, on the 18th, the state court denied a motion to dismiss the charges and permitted the plaintiff's attorney to withdraw from his case.
At some point in May of 2000, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion in the state trial court, to dismiss the case against him for the trial court's failure to comply with certain provisions of the IAD. He argued then, and now, that dismissal of the charges was required because IAD Article III(d) and Article IV(e) both provide that if a state takes custody of a prisoner and returns him without the trial being had, then the indictment or information "shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." Also, Article IV(a) requires that when the state requests the prisoner's custody, "there should be a period of thirty (30) days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored ...," but the instant plaintiff was not given this period of time in which to object to his second taking by the State of Indiana. Ex. D. The plaintiff claims not to have received any ruling on this motion at the time of filing the complaint, one year later; he does not explain what happened to the fourth trial date, that of August 21, 2000.
The plaintiff began the year 2001 by requesting that the BOP remove the detainer, setting out the above stated sequence of events and IAD claims. The warden's response was that (1) all of the postponements of his trials were accomplished under the terms of the IAD; (2) she is obligated to enforce BOP P.S. 5130.06, which requires that a detainer stay in place and that the federal authorities continue to release the detainee upon later requests from charging state, until written authorization to remove the detainer is received from the charging state; and (3) officials at the prison had made certain efforts in his behalf and received the following indication that the detainer would soon be removed:
The Inmate Systems Manager contacted the authorities at Decatur County in reference to your detainer and learned the prosecutor's office will enter a motion to have you released on your own recognizance on the pending case and have the detainer removed. Upon receipt of this document from the detaining authority, the detainer will be removed.
Ex. A. However, a month later, the plaintiff's appeal to the Regional Office concluded, "No written request for detainer removal has been received to date." Id. The May 17, 2001 response of the national office was that (1) the BOP cannot grant the plaintiff relief from the detainer, as only the charging state court can rule on any IAD violation; (2) the BOP's hands are tied until the Decatur County Sheriff's Office requests removal of the detainer, the response providing the address thereof so that the plaintiff could contact that office directly; and (3) Program Statement 5130.06 does not violate the law.
The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit claiming that the pendency of the detainer was harming him as follows: (1) preventing him from being transferred to a lower security institution closer to his family; (2) keeping him in a higher, more violent and hostile environment; and (3) barring his access to participation in a drug program, which could net him a year off of his current sentence and six months in a half-way house. Therefore, the detainer also violates several of the underlying policies of the IAD, as stated in Article I, and violates the mandate in Article IX to liberally construe to effectuate the policies.
In response to the complaint, Defendant Smith has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, or for entry of summary judgment in his favor pursuant Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; the motion is supported by an attached memorandum [Record No. 10]. The defendant prosecutor informs the court that on May 22, 2001, the state charges against the plaintiff in Decatur County were dismissed. A certified copy of the order of dismissal is Record No. 12. Therefore, when the instant lawsuit was filed in July of 2001, there was no case or controversy and none exists today. He cites to well-known Supreme Court law regarding the constitutional need for a controversy at the time of filing of the lawsuit and at the time a decision is rendered. Since the plaintiff has received the only injunctive relief which could be provided him, i.e., dismissal of the charges, his claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed.
As to the plaintiff's claim for damages from this defendant, Smith argues that, as a prosecutor, he is absolutely immune under the holding and rationale of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). He also cites to another district court's disposition of a claim...
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Odhinn v. State
...final disposition of charges was without effect because, under the IAD, the request is deemed to be a waiver. See also Tungate v. Thoms, 199 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Ky.2002) where, after signing a request for final disposition, the defendant denied waiving extradition and the court upheld as eff......