Tuomela v. Waldorf-Astoria Grand Wailea Hotel
Decision Date | 26 June 2020 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 20-00117 JMS-RT |
Parties | WENDY TUOMELA, Plaintiff, v. WALDORF-ASTORIA GRAND WAILEA HOTEL, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Defendant Waldorf-Astoria Management, LLC1 moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings as to Count One of pro se Plaintiff Wendy Tuomela's ("Plaintiff" or "Tuomela") Complaint. ECF No. 18. The court has reviewed the Motion; the Opposition, ECF No. 23; and the Reply, ECF No. 24; and decides the matter under Local Rule 7.1(c) without a hearing. Based on the following, the motion is GRANTED—Count One is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Count One of the Complaint alleges in full as follows:
ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #12.2 This Count apparently seeks to enforce (or seeks damages for violation of) Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 707-764, which is astatute criminalizing extortion.3
Waldorf-Astoria argues that Count One should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce a criminal statute, and there is no civil cause of action for violation of the statute.4 The court agrees.
"[I]n American jurisprudence . . . a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Rather, whether to prosecute criminal statutes and bring charges are decisions left to the discretion of a prosecutor. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); see also, e.g., Kapu v. Attorney Gen., Haw., 2017 WL 4479252, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 6, 2017) ( ); Retanan v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 2012 WL 1833888, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) () (citations omitted).
Moreover, individuals rarely have an implied private cause of action for violations of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) ( ); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) ( )(citations omitted); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) () (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975)).
And so, courts consistently dismiss civil causes of action based on criminal statutes, including Hawaii criminal statutes. See, e.g., DeAlcantara v. Shigemura, 2016 WL 6518618, at *2 (D. Haw. Nov. 2, 2016) (); Pitts v. Espinda, 2016 WL 475137, at *10 (D. Haw. Feb. 8, 2016) (); Finley v. Rivas, 2010 WL 3001915, at *5 (D. Haw. July 10, 2010) ( )(citation omitted); Jaentsch v. Puha, 2018 WL 1463348, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 23, 2018) (). And nothing indicates an intent to create a private cause of action for violations of HRS § 707-764.
Accordingly, Count One is DISMISSED. Ordinarily, "a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal," Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995), but that opportunity does not apply if "it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect," id. And here it would be futile to amend Count One to allege a civil cause of action for extortion because Hawaii courts have been Myers v. Cohen, 5 Haw. App. 232, 245, 687 P.2d 6, 16 (Haw. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 67 Haw. 389, 688 P.2d 1145 (1984).5
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count One (Extortion), ECF No. 18, is GRANTED. Count One is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, June 26, 2020.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
1. The pro se Complaint and caption name Defendant as "Waldorf-Astoria Grand Wailea Hotel." The court refers to Defendant simply as "Waldorf-Astoria" or "Defendant."
2. The Complaint also alleges four other Counts (breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, wrongful termination, and breach of contract) which are not at issue here. See ECF No. 1-1 at PageID #13-19.
3. Count One also mentions HRS § 663-2, but that statute—which provides for certain defenses—does not provide a cause of action for anything, much less for extortion.
4. The court applies the same standard to a Rule 12(c) motion as it does to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637...
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