Turaani v. Wray
| Decision Date | 20 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-11768 |
| Citation | 440 F.Supp.3d 733 |
| Parties | Khalid M. TURAANI, Plaintiff, v. Christopher A. WRAY, Charles H. Kable, IV, and Jayson R. Chambers, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Jamil K. Khuja, Khuja Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Dearborn, MI, Christina A. Jump, Constitutional Law Center for Muslims in America, Richardson, TX, for Plaintiff.
Bradley Darling, U.S. Department of Justice, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Kahlid M. Turaani sues Defendants Christopher A. Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Charles H. Kable, IV, Director of the Terrorist Screening Center ("TSC"), and Jayson R. Chambers, an FBI agent. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4, ¶¶ 5-7; ECF No. 14, PageID.101.) Plaintiff asserts violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706, procedural due process, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 1, PageID.17-25, ¶¶ 81-123.) Defendants allegedly prevented Plaintiff from purchasing a firearm by approaching the would-be seller and disclosing confidential information about Plaintiff.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff has responded. (ECF No. 17.) The court finds a hearing unnecessary. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons provided below, Defendants' motion will be granted and the case will be dismissed.
The following are facts as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. In a motion to dismiss, the court accepts Plaintiff's factual allegations as true but makes no overt finding as to truth or falsity. Kardules v. City of Columbus , 95 F.3d 1335, 1347 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing standing); Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ().
On Sunday, August 5, 2018, Plaintiff attended a gun show in Birch Run, Michigan. (ECF No. 1, PageID.10, ¶ 39.) While there, Plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm. (Id. , ¶ 41.) The seller of the firearm received a "delay" response from the National Instant Criminal Background Check ("NICS"), a system designed and operated by the FBI to conduct rapid background checks for proposed firearm purchases. 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(B) (). (Id. , ¶ 42.) The seller informed Plaintiff that the gun could not be sold at that time , but that Plaintiff could return in three days to complete the purchase. (Id. , PageID.10-11, ¶¶ 43-44.) Plaintiff does not contest that the FBI background check and a "delay" response were ordinary and legal.
Plaintiff contacted the seller at the end of the week. (Id. , PageID.11, ¶ 45.) The seller told Plaintiff that an FBI agent, believed to be Defendant Chambers, visited the seller's place of business the day after Plaintiff's purchase inquiry. (Id. ) The agent asked the seller what Plaintiff had "filled out himself regarding the attempted purchase," told the seller that "we have a problem with the company [Plaintiff] keeps," and showed the seller a photograph of Plaintiff "in a suit" with another individual believed to be "of Middle Eastern descent," asking the seller if he recognized the other individual. (Id. , ¶¶ 46-48.) The agent then left contact information, including an email address for "JR Chambers," and asked that the seller pass the information along to Plaintiff. (Id. , PageID.12, ¶ 51.)
When Plaintiff contacted the seller some time later, the seller told Plaintiff that he chose to not sell the gun to Plaintiff, even though enough time had passed to allow a legally cleared transaction, i.e., Plaintiff's background check was now listed as "open" after the three day "delay" period. (Id. , ¶ 52.) The seller explained to Plaintiff that he "was no longer comfortable [selling Plaintiff the weapon] because of the visit by and statements made by the FBI agent regarding Plaintiff." (Id. )
Article III Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits judicial power to cases and controversies. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). "Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case and controversy." Id. "The Supreme Court has enumerated the following elements necessary to establish standing:
First, Plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact–an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of–the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."
Parsons v. U.S. Dept. of Justice , 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the basis of standing, the court "must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Kardules , 95 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). The plaintiff does, however, bear the burden of establishing standing and must "clearly allege facts demonstrating each element." Parsons , 801 F.3d at 710 (quoting Warth , 422 U.S. at 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197 ).
Standing has three elements: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. Parsons , 801 F.3d at 710. For injury in fact, "a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ " Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citations removed). "For an injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. (citations removed). To be concrete, an injury "must be de facto ; that is, it must actually exist." Id.
The requirement of alleging an injury-in-fact is met in this case. Plaintiff is alleging a violation of his right to purchase a firearm. In Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff relies only upon this injury to establish standing.1 Being denied the right to purchase a firearm is concrete and real. District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Magaw , 132 F.3d 272, 282-84 (6th Cir. 1997) (). It is also particularized to Plaintiff himself. Magaw , 132 F.3d at 282-84.
The court's finding conforms to the reasoning of another judge of this court who dismissed a very similar lawsuit filed by Plaintiff in 2018, in part for lack of standing. Turaani v. Sessions , 316 F.Supp.3d 998 (E.D.Mich. 2018) (Drain, J.). There too Plaintiff alleged that FBI agents made an illegal communication to a gun seller supposedly revealing that Plaintiff was under FBI investigation. Id. at 1005-06. Plaintiff also included a claim that he was harmed due to a three-day delay, initiated by NICS.2 28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(B). After the three-day delay, the seller allegedly refused to sell a firearm to Plaintiff, despite being legally entitled to do so. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the seller would not sell Plaintiff a firearm due to the FBI's communication. Id. The lawsuit named an FBI agent, the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, the Director of the TSC, and the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives as defendants. Id. at 1004. The court found that Plaintiff had alleged an injury in fact. Id. at 1007. The court reasoned that the "constructive denial," in which the gun seller was influenced by the call from the FBI to not sell Plaintiff a weapon, was particularized because it "impact[ed] [Plaintiff's] individual right to obtain a firearm." Id. The injury was concrete because "[Plaintiff] contend[ed] that the delay transpired and that the store clerk continues to deny his request to purchase the gun." Id. Additionally, the court found that the three-day delay itself constituted an injury in fact. Id.
The central issue in dispute is traceability. When "standing depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict," the plaintiff must "adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will...
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...(emphasis in original) (citing Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 169, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) ); see Turaani v. Wray , 440 F. Supp. 3d 733, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (holding that plaintiff could not trace injury to an FBI agent where the agent convinced a gun seller to renege on ......