Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc.

Decision Date05 December 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. G-95-007.
Citation906 F. Supp. 1120
PartiesJohn R. TURCO, Plaintiff, v. HOECHST CELANESE CHEMICAL GROUP, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

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Michael E. St. John, Stevenson & St. John, Houston, TX, for plaintiff.

Richard R. Brann & Paul L. Mitchell, Baker & Botts, Houston, TX, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

HUGH GIBSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 21, 1995, requesting the Court to grant judgment as a matter of law against Plaintiff upon his Americans with Disabilities Act claim.1 Not only has plaintiff duly responded to this motion, but the parties have also filed replies, ripostes, rebuttals, and supplements in support of their respective positions. Having carefully considered the issues so exhaustively briefed by both parties, the Court finds that defendant's motion should be granted.

I. Background

The record contains several salient, undisputed facts. Plaintiff John Turco ("Turco") worked as a chemical process operator for Defendant Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc. ("Hoechst") at its Clear Lake plant for thirteen years. Turco worked a rotating shift, and routinely was required to work through the night. In the mid-1980s Turco was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus and began taking oral medication to keep his condition regulated. Apparently, this treatment succeeded for several years. In January, 1994, however, progressive exacerbation of Turco's diabetes culminated in his being prescribed insulin to regulate his blood sugar. Turco's co-workers and supervisors as well as Hoechst's human resource personnel were well aware, nearly from the onset, that Turco was a diabetic; they were also aware of his becoming an insulin-dependent diabetic.

Though testimonial evidence in the record indicates that Turco's supervisors considered him a capable operator overall, Turco's year-end performance appraisals in 1992 and 1993 emphasized that he needed to improve his attitude, cooperation, poor attendance record, and commitment to safety. Though the parties dispute the cause, Turco's performance by his own admission began to deteriorate in 1994. He occasionally became confused and lost concentration, at one point "forgetting what to do next" while working in the plant's control room. Turco's confusion apparently impeded his ability to remember and follow standard operating procedures. For example, on February 11, 1994, Turco was acting as a "step-up" or stand-in supervisor when the plant received an odor complaint. In violation of the apparently recently revised procedure, Turco failed to notify a Utilities Representative, instead opting to drive to the area in question to assess the odor himself. Turco was informally verbally "counseled" or reprimanded about the incident, but was never formally disciplined.

Given his admitted, increasing difficulties on the job, Turco responded on March 11, 1994 to an internal job posting for the available position of process analyzer technician. The testimony is undisputed that the analyzer technician's job is less physically demanding than that of a process operator. Though the job entails no routine night-shift work, it does require the technician to respond to 24-hour emergency call and to work some over-time. Turco was not chosen to fill the analyzer technician position. By letter dated March 21, 1994, Turco's treating physician, Dr. James Eden, recommended that Turco be transferred to a daylight position, concluding that the more predictable eating, sleeping, and exercise patterns accompanying an exclusively daytime schedule would facilitate the regulation of his blood sugar levels. In response to this letter, Hoechst's company nurse met with Turco shortly thereafter and requested him to make an appointment with a company-selected endocrinologist so that his diabetic condition could be independently evaluated. Whether the responsibility lay with Turco or with the nurse to arrange this appointment is subject to considerable controversy in the record. This factual dispute notwithstanding, Turco clearly never met with this endocrinologist.

In the meantime, Turco was formally subjected to disciplinary action for two further violations of Hoechst's safety protocol. Though evidence of other of Turco's procedural lapses appear in the record, it is to these two "primary incidents" of policy transgression which Hoechst attributes Turco's eventual termination. The first occurred during Turco's night shift on March 24, 1994. Noticing that the water level in the liquid incinerator was low, Turco connected the plant's fire water supply to the incinerator's high pressure valve. Resolving the fact disputes surrounding the incident in Turco's favor, the Court finds that Turco recorded his actions in the shift book and apparently relayed the information to his relief operator when he ended his shift at 6:00 a.m. that morning. He then went home. Several hours later, workers testing the fire water nozzles at the "tank farm" detected acrylic acid and other chemicals in the water. Many of the hazardous organic materials which contaminated the water during the hook-up to the incinerator were highly flammable. As fire water is used, as the name suggests, to extinguish fires in the plant, the perils of contamination are obvious. When asked during deposition whether he recognized the danger of making such a hookup, Turco himself admitted that "he knew it was dangerous, extremely dangerous." Were one to douse a fire with contaminated water, Turco conceded, one would "have a mess." Plant workers spent nearly twelve hours flushing the water of all hazardous materials. The evidence is clear that Hoechst considered terminating Turco for this violation, but that Turco's immediate supervisor, Don Hardt, spoke in his behalf and convinced management to give him another chance. On May 2, 1994, Turco was subjected to written corrective action for his acts.

The second primary incident to which defendant attributes Turco's termination occurred on May 13, 1994. While cleaning a strainer on a crude acrylic acid truck and rail circulation filter, Turco exposed his arms to acrylic acid polymer. The record reveals that during the cleaning process Turco had rolled up the sleeves on his protective splash suit and had rolled down his rubber gloves, in violation of safety regulations, and that he may have failed to wash the exposed area for the full recommended time of fifteen minutes. His most serious procedural violation, however, apparently consisted in his failure to promptly report the incident to his supervisor. Instead, Turco went home after his shift and went to bed, awaking during the early morning in response to the discomfort and swelling in his forearms. He reported the injury upon his arrival at work the next morning, and a physician subsequently treated him for first-degree chemical burns. On June 3, 1994, citing Turco's "repeated behaviors of not following procedures" and his "failure to demonstrate a sustained willingness to change this behavior," Hoechst terminated Turco's employment.

II. Issues

John Turco brings his claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. He claims that, contrary to defendant's assertion that he was fired for repeatedly failing to follow standard operating and safety procedures, Hoechst fired him because he is disabled, that is, because he is a diabetic, and because his diabetes frequently forced him to miss work. He claims also that defendant violated the terms of the ADA in that it failed to reasonably accommodate him by declining to transfer him to a position as analyzer technician or another daytime-shift position.2 Defendant Hoechst Celanese contends that plaintiff's extensive history of absenteeism and his pattern of procedural neglect, which on several occasions gravely endangered the health and safety of other workers at the plant, provided Hoechst with ample legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons to end Turco's tenure with the company.

III. Analysis

A party seeking summary judgment must produce evidence which tends to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists in the case and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the movant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that such a fact issue does remain. See Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). "This showing requires more than `some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1354-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). A court must "review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986)). In this case, Hoechst claims that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to any element of Turco's ADA claim and that, therefore, summary judgment should be entered in its favor.

In order to prevail upon his claim under the Act, Turco must prove that:

(1) he is disabled; that is, he suffers a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity3;
(2) he is a "qualified" individual with a disability; that is, he is one who "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position....";
(3) he was discharged or subjected to some other adverse action with regard to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; and,
(4) it was more likely than not
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    ...of the major life activities, "`working' does not mean working at a particular job of one's choice." Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 1120, 1127 (S.D.Tex. 1995) (citing Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir.1995)); see also Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 727. "......
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    ...Lines, Inc., 2001 WL 649676 at * 6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7693, *22 & n.5 (same); see also Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1129-30 n.8 (S.D. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996); Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1996......
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    ...Inc. , 2001 WL 649676 at * 6, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7693, *22 & n.5 (same); see also Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc. , 906 F. Supp. 1120, 1129-30 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d , 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996); Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. , 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 19......
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