Del Turco v. Randolph Twp. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 18-15086 (KM) (MAH) |
| Parties | OFFICER JASON DEL TURCO, Plaintiff, v. RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, DAVID STOKOE, individually and in his capacity as the Chief of Police Of Randolph Township Police Department, TOWNSHIP OF RANDOLPH, MORRIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, BRADFORD SEABURY AND JOHN MCNAMARA, JR., both individually and in their capacities as current and/or former employees of Morris County Prosecutor's Office Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
:
Before the Court are motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint ("2AC", DE 49) brought by defendants the Randolph Township Police Department, Chief of Police David Stokoe, and the Township of Randolph (collectively, the "Randolph Defendants") (DE 50), and by defendants Morris County Prosecutor's Office, Bradford Seabury, and John McNamara, Jr. (collectively, the "Morris County Defendants") (DE 56).
The plaintiff admits that, when he was a Randolph Township police officer, he lied in testimony before the grand jury and again in court at a suppression hearing. He avoids specifying the precise falsehoods, but asserts the legal conclusion that his testimony, though false, did not constitute a Brady violation.1
Represented by counsel, he negotiated a deal with the County Prosecutor, who agreed not to press criminal charges in return for his immediate resignation. The County Prosecutor circulated two letters, the so-called "Brady Orders," which revealed the false testimony in jurisdictions or cases where Del Turco was involved. The plaintiff portrays himself as a scapegoat, claiming variously that he only perjured himself because he believed that was what the prosecutor wanted him to do, or that the prosecutor's circulation of the information that he had testified falsely amounted to dismissal, or the imposition of "discipline" without the requisite civil service protections. He suggests that Brady disclosures of his admitted perjury constitute a reputational harm entitling him to damages, and that the Brady Orders must be withdrawn.
The duty to tell the truth under oath is absolute and nondelegable. For a police officer to violate it in a criminal case, even if he thinks the prosecutor wanted him to do so, invites sanctions far more severe than dismissal. Nor can the prosecution suppress such information out of "fairness" to the officer. The prosecution's obligation to disclose that a police witness has testified falsely is a constitutional command under Brady and Giglio. Indeed, for the prosecutionto fail to take steps to ensure disclosure—as the plaintiff appears to be suggesting—would itself constitute wrongdoing of constitutional dimension.
For the reasons explained herein, I will grant defendants' motions to dismiss (DE 50, 56) as to the federal claims; I will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims; and I will remand this case to the state court from which it originated. Mr. Del Turco's accusations of scapegoating, violation of civil service protections, and ulterior prosecutorial motives may or may not support a state-law cause of action, a question I will leave to the state courts.
Mr. Del Turco was a patrolman employed by the Randolph Township Police Department ("Randolph PD"). (2AC ¶ 14)
The "factual background" portion of the 2AC (see id. at p. 3-5) is vague about the impetus for Mr. Del Turco's resignation from the Randolph PD. Counts 10-12 clarify that Del Turco's resignation stemmed from testimony he gave in the grand jury and at a suppression hearing concerning a motor vehicle stop that occurred on March 24, 2017. (Id. ¶ 13, p. 10-19; see also DE 58-4 (Video of Proffer Session) ("Exhibit D"))
The 2AC asserts, though not very clearly, that the motor vehicle stop unfolded as follows. Randolph PD notified MCPO that a confidential informant was assisting with a narcotics investigation that was targeting an individual,"D.W.", who was attempting to purchase heroin. (Id. ¶¶ 57-59) Mr. Del Turco was assigned to follow D.W. after the controlled drug purchase and to conduct a motor vehicle stop. (Id. ¶ 59) An MCPO "special enforcement unit" provided two trail cars to conduct surveillance of the buy, and MCPO detectives were on the scene to observe. (Id. ¶¶ 60-64) The 2AC suggests that the traffic stop was conducted by Mr. Del Turco and reported as a DWI. Del Turco asserts that MCPO's special enforcement unit ordered that video recording monitoring be turned off during the traffic stop. (id. ¶ 65) He further alleges that Chief Assistant Prosecutor Seabury ordered an illegal strip search of D.W. (Id. ¶¶ 66-69)
After the motor vehicle stop, Chief AP Seabury allegedly attempted to cover up the illegality of the strip search and change the justification for prosecuting D.W. from a pre-planned narcotics stop to a DWI arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 70-74) MCPO ordered that no reports were to be generated from the narcotics investigation. As a result, MCPO's general investigation unit was unaware that a special enforcement unit was involved, or that this was anything other than a DWI. (Id. ¶¶ 75-78) In advance of Mr. Del Turco's grand jury testimony, the assistant prosecutor prepared him to testify as to the DWI case. (Id. ¶¶ 80-84) (The implication may be that this particular prosecutor did not know about the drug aspect of the case.) Mr. Del Turco apparently did not reveal the drug aspects of the case. He does not otherwise specify the precise nature of the falsehoods in his testimony. Mr. Del Turco testified about the DWI, in line with his police report. (Id. ¶ 84) He believed that the prosecutor had made a deliberate decision that he should withhold further information, and so he did so. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86)
On January 10, 2018, Mr. Del Turco again testified, this time at a suppression hearing before the Hon. Thomas J. Critchley of the Superior Court of New Jersey. (Id.) Here there is a major gap in the presentation. Mr. Del Turco's complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that his testimony was "not a Brady violation" but declines to state what the testimony consisted of or themanner in which it was false. He states that his testimony was incorrectly characterized as a "Brady violation." Still, stating a legal conclusion about the testimony's status under Brady is not a substitute for stating factually what it consisted of—particularly where he admits that it was false, and acknowledges receipt of the transcript.
The Morris County defendants caused the issuance of two communications that the 2AC calls the "Brady Orders." These disclosed Del Turco's false testimony so that it could be disclosed to the defense in criminal cases pursuant to the government's Brady obligations. It seems that MCPO issued the first Brady Order on or about January 22, 2018. On March 1, 2018, Mr. Del Turco resigned as part of a non-prosecution agreement negotiated by his counsel. (Id. ¶¶ 96-98) On March 13, 2018, shortly after the resignation, MCPO issued a second, revised version of the Brady Order which stated that Del Turco had resigned. (Id. ¶¶ 16-18)
On April 23, 2018, Mr. Del Turco wrote to defendant David Stokoe, the Chief of Randolph PD. The Brady Orders, according to the letter, were "inaccurate." (Id. ¶ 19) The letter warned Chief Stokoe that for the Randolph Police Department to obey those orders would be unlawful. Here, it is fairly clear that Del Turco is invoking his state-law rights as a public employee; According to the 2AC, the letter stated that Brady disclosure of "information concerning Plaintiff's January 10, 2018 testimony and its effects on his future employment would constitute a violation of state law as it would disclose information related to Plaintiff's employment that is not subject to disclosure under the circumstances." (Id. ¶ 22) Chief Stokoe, through counsel, advised that he would abide by MCPO's Brady Orders. (Id. ¶ 24)
In early June 2018, Mr. Del Turco received an offer of employment from another police department within Morris County. (Id. ¶ 26) Del Turco alleges that MCPO and/or McNamara learned of this employment offer and sent that Chief of Police a letter with the intent of having the offer of employmentrevoked. (Id. ¶ 27) On or about June 17, 2018, Mr. Del Turco's offer of employment was revoked. (Id. ¶ 28)
Mr. Del Turco submits as part of his opposition to the Morris County Defendants' motion to dismiss a video recording of the March 1, 2018 proffer session that led to the non-prosecution agreement and his resignation. (Exhibit D) Because this proffer session is discussed in the 2AC (see id. ¶¶ 96-100), and the video is submitted by plaintiff himself, I will consider it. To be clear, I consider the video as a record of what was said, and as a summary of the basis on which the non-prosecution agreement was reached. I do not, for example, take as true the prosecutor's statements of historical fact.
Here is a summary of the video's contents:
Mr. Del Turco and his counsel, Amie Dicola, Esq., were present at the proffer session, as was Morris County Prosecutor John McNamara, Jr. Mr. McNamara began by explaining the rationale behind the decision by MCPO to offer a deal to Mr. Del Turco. MCPO had conducted an investigation and produced to Del Turco and his counsel some preliminary discovery. In particular, they had furnished to Mr. Del Turco a transcript of his testimony and some reports generated by the investigation.
McNamara then noted that it was Del Turco himself who reported that he had testified falsely at the suppression hearing. Because Del Turco had come forward voluntarily, the prosecutor's office was prepared to offer more lenient terms than it otherwise would have done. Nevertheless, McNamara's position was fairly firm in light of the fact that Del Turco's conduct had jeopardized pending MCPO cases.
Mr. McNamara stated that the investigation had revealed that Mr. Del Turco's...
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