Turczi v. State
| Decision Date | 30 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 1078S234,1078S234 |
| Citation | 271 Ind. 329,392 N.E.2d 481 |
| Parties | Michael R. TURCZI, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Nile Stanton, Indianapolis, for appellant (defendant below).
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Jack R. O'Neill, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee (plaintiff below).
The petitioner is before this Court appealing from the denial of his petition for relief under Post-Conviction Relief, Rule 1. His conviction for first-degree murder was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal, Turczi v. State, (1973) 261 Ind. 273, 301 N.E.2d 752. He now raises two issues concerning an alleged agreement between the state and a material witness:
1. Whether the court erred in failing to find that there was an agreement between the state and a material witness whereby the witness agreed to testify in exchange for his freedom; and
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that petitioner had been denied due process of law in that the jury was never advised that the charges against the material witness had been Nol prossed.
In January, 1971, a charge of murder was filed against the petitioner and two other men, Sunny Hudkins, and George Bobis. Subsequently in February, 1971, the Lake County Grand Jury filed indictments against petitioner and Hudkins but returned no indictment as to Bobis. The prosecutor's office then issued a Nolle prosequi against all three men on the original charges. The grand jury indictments were filed against the petitioner and Hudkins, and Bobis was released. He later testified before the grand jury and was a material witness at the trials of both petitioner and Hudkins. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, but Hudkins was acquitted.
Petitioner first contends that even though all the participants denied the existence of an agreement, the totality of the circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that there was an agreement between the state and Bobis.
The petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that he had talked to Hudkins while they were both in jail and that Hudkins told him that Bobis had made a deal with the state and was going to testify against them. Another circumstance which the petitioner argues points to an agreement is the fact that Bobis was released on a Nolle prosequi and was not afraid to sign a waiver of immunity when he testified before the grand jury. Bobis was represented by an attorney at this time.
However, there was also evidence presented at the hearing which tended to establish that no agreement was ever made. The chief deputy prosecuting attorney of Lake County and the deputy prosecutor in charge of defendant's case both submitted affidavits stating that the testimony of Bobis was not procured by any promise of leniency or any agreement whatsoever. An affidavit of the attorney who represented Bobis was presented which stated that the testimony of Bobis before the grand jury and at defendant's trial was not induced by any promise or agreement of leniency. George Bobis himself testified that he had no agreement or understanding with the state of any leniency or reward in exchange for his testimony.
In post-conviction proceedings the burden of proof rests with the petitioner to establish his grounds to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.R.P.C. 1 § 5; Laird v. State, (1979) Ind., 385 N.E.2d 452; Davis v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 327, 330 N.E.2d 738. The judge hearing the petition is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. This decision will be reversed only where the evidence is without conflict and leads unerringly to a result not reached by the trial court. Laird, supra; Cottingham v. State, (1978) Ind., 379 N.E.2d 984. In the instant case, while defendant points to some circumstances supporting his allegation about the existence of an agreement, the affidavits of the prosecuting attorneys as well as the testimony of Bobis himself are substantial evidence of probative value which support the finding of the trial court that there was no agreement. We find no reversible error here.
The petitioner next argues that he was denied due process because the jury...
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Jefferson v. State
...nor was he unresponsive on the witness stand. The question in issue was posed during direct examination. Compare, e. g., Turczi v. State (1979), Ind., 392 N.E.2d 481. 11 In Pruitt, the plaintiffs, four pre-trial detainees in the Lake County Jail, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus......
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Carey v. State
...of immunity, or a reward offered in return for testimony. E. g., Campbell v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 568, 570; Turczi v. State, (1979) Ind., 392 N.E.2d 481, 483; Hoskins v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 290, 296, 375 N.E.2d 191, 194; Newman v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 572-73, 334 N.E.2d ......
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St. John v. State
...not required when witness pled guilty two weeks after testifying; no evidence an agreement was reached before trial); Turczi v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 329, 392 N.E.2d 481 (disclosure not required when information against two witnesses dismissed after grand jury failed to return indictments;......
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