Turgeon v. Schneider
| Decision Date | 19 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-517,86-517 |
| Citation | 553 A.2d 548,150 Vt. 268 |
| Parties | Romeo TURGEON and Marie Turgeon v. Jean Claude SCHNEIDER, Eleanor Schneider and Claude Andre Schneider. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Peter F. Langrock and Anna E. Saxman of Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiffs-appellees.
David G. Miller, St. Albans, for defendants-appellants.
Before PECK and DOOLEY, JJ., and BARNEY, C.J. (Ret.), KEYSER, J. (Ret.) and LEWIS E. SPRINGER, District Judge (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
In this case a jury found defendants liable for waste of plaintiffs' farm, awarded damages, and denied defendants' counterclaims for alleged breach of warranties relating to the water system and a Harvestore silo. The trial judge denied defendants' alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Defendants appeal from the verdict and the denial of their motions. We affirm.
In 1983, due to plaintiff Romeo Turgeon's ill health, plaintiffs put their Alburg farm up for sale, asking $400,000 for the real estate, cattle, machinery and equipment. Defendants, who were farming in Iberville, Quebec, responded. After talking with plaintiffs and observing the conditions of the farm and its operation, defendants attempted to obtain financing for the full price of the farm, but were unable to do so. Taking this into account, on November 29, 1983, the parties entered into a written agreement under which plaintiffs sold to defendants the cattle, machinery and two silos for $125,000, and leased the real estate to defendants with an option to purchase it for $215,000 at the end of the term of one year, the term to begin January 1, 1984.
On January 1, 1984, defendants moved onto the farm and took over its operation. Soon afterward defendants began changing the nature of the operation of the farm by culling the milking herd, bringing in new cows from their Iberville farm, changing the milking system, and altering the real estate in various ways to accommodate these changes. The changes in the milking system increased the need for water, the source of which was the village water system. Plaintiffs made the necessary arrangements, and a new water line was installed.
In September, 1984, defendants notified plaintiffs by letter that they would not exercise their option to purchase the farm. On January 11, 1985, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking the removal of defendants from the premises. On January 16, 1985, defendants left the farm, taking the cattle, machinery and equipment that they had purchased and delivering the keys to the farm to their own attorney, who was instructed to deliver the keys to plaintiffs' attorney.
Plaintiffs returned to their farm four or five days later, and alleged that they only learned of defendants' departure from neighbors. They found that, due to freezing weather, forty drinking bowls in the barn were broken and water lines had burst, that a vacuum pump, milk lines and a grain bin top were missing, and that ten windows and sashes were broken and Blue Seal grain bags had been stapled over them. Later they found that 175 acres of alfalfa had been overgrazed and badly damaged.
During a three-day trial both parties presented extensive evidence in connection with plaintiffs' claims for waste and defendants' claim for breach of warranties as to the silo and the adequacy of the water system. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs on damage to the windows--$400, grain bin--$400, water bowls and pipes--$1,750, vacuum pump and milk lines--$1,200, and alfalfa fields--$21,250. The jury rejected defendants' counterclaims, denying liability.
On appeal defendants make several claims: (1) there was not sufficient evidence to support the verdict; (2) the verdict was excessive; (3) testimony of one of defendants' expert witnesses was improperly and prejudicially excluded; (4) another of defendants' expert witnesses was prejudicially excluded from the category of expert and (5) there were errors in the jury instructions on warranties and waste.
Defendants appeal the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the jury verdict. The parties agree, correctly, that on appellate review of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the standard of review is whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and excluding any modifying evidence, there is any evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to support the jury verdict. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Deuso, 146 Vt. 424, 426, 505 A.2d 666, 667 (1985); Lowe v. Beaty, 145 Vt. 215, 216, 485 A.2d 1255, 1256 (1984).
With regard to all the waste claims, except the damage to the alfalfa fields, defendants argue that because plaintiffs did not return to the farm until four or five days after defendants vacated it, the jury had to speculate on the cause of the injuries and that, even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence was nothing more than opinion and speculation of the witnesses. In essence, defendants are arguing that plaintiffs must prove that there were no other possible causes for the damages before there can be liability, and that circumstantial evidence cannot be used to prove liability. This, however, is the wrong standard of proof. Plaintiffs must only prove that it was more probable than not that defendants were responsible for the damage. See Shields v. Vermont Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 102 Vt. 224, 238, 147 A. 352, 358 (1929). Furthermore, circumstantial evidence may be used to establish facts where the circumstances themselves are proven. Cf. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 146 Vt. at 426, 428-29, 505 A.2d at 667, 669.
Plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence on each item to convince the jury that defendants were responsible for the damages. Considering the evidence that grain bags had been tacked up in place of the broken windows, that defendants vacated the farm without taking proper precautions against freezing water in the pipe lines and water bowls, that there was intentional dismantling and removal by defendants of other equipment without reinstallation of the original equipment, it is clear that the jury had sufficient evidence on which to find liability as to all the items damaged in and around the barn.
Where there is conflicting evidence on what occurred, it is up to the jury to weigh the evidence and the relative credibility of the witnesses. "The weight of the evidence and the witnesses' credibility are for the jury, and, on appeal, all conflicts are to be resolved against the excepting party." Brunelle v. Coffey, 128 Vt. 367, 373, 264 A.2d 782, 785 (1970). The jury believed plaintiffs' witnesses over the defendants', and their findings will not be disturbed by this Court. Additionally, the defendants' claim that the damage could have occurred during the period between the time they vacated and when plaintiffs returned does not support their argument that the evidence on liability was purely speculative. Defendants left the farm without notifying plaintiffs; they simply gave the keys to the farm to their attorney. If anything, the jury could have considered these facts as further evidence of defendants' neglect of plaintiffs' premises.
Defendants claim that plaintiffs' testimony concerning the alfalfa fields was untenable, and that defendants' evidence clearly outweighed the evidence presented by plaintiffs on this issue. Defendants contend that the jury found for plaintiffs on the damage to the alfalfa fields because of passion, prejudice, or some misconception, and a new trial must be granted on this basis. See McKenna v. May, 134 Vt. 145, 148, 353 A.2d 359, 361 (1976). However, even though there was conflicting evidence as to the cause and extent of the injury done to the alfalfa fields, the evidence was such that the jury could find that the fields had been well established, were producing two or more cuttings of good quality hay or green chop each year and were being properly maintained before defendants took over the farm, and that defendants, by their own admission, pastured those fields at a time of year when severe long-term injury would result from overgrazing and that overgrazing in fact occurred.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as we must, there is little doubt that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy their burden of proof. "Where each side of an issue is fairly supported by the evidence ... the trial court ought not to usurp the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts." Grow v. Wolcott, 123 Vt. 490, 497-98, 194 A.2d 403, 408 (1963) (Hulburd, C.J., dissenting). "The ruling of the court must stand if there is credible evidence to support it, even though there may be substantial evidence to the contrary." Lockwood v. Bougher, 145 Vt. 329, 331, 488 A.2d 754, 755 (1985). The trial court was correct in denying defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
Defendants attack the jury award as excessive on several items. To overturn a jury award, an appellant must demonstrate that the verdict was "entirely excessive," while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's finding. Banker v. Dodge, 126 Vt. 534, 537, 237 A.2d 121, 124 (1967). Quesnel v. Raleigh, 128 Vt. 95, 100, 258 A.2d 840, 843 (1969). We are not convinced that the jury's assessment of plaintiffs' damage was unreasonable given the evidence.
Defendants first claim that the jury award for damage done to the water bowls and lines was excessive because the...
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