Turner, In re

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: Turner, In re, 310 N.W.2d 802, 108 Mich.App. 583 (Mich. App. 1981)
• Decision Date: 24 June 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 45186
• Parties: In re Cecil H. TURNER. Lois P. TURNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, Respondent-Appellee.

Page 802

310 N.W.2d 802

108 Mich.App. 583

In re Cecil H. TURNER Lois P. TURNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, Respondent-Appellee.

Docket No. 45186.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 24, 1981.

Released for Publication Oct. 20, 1981.

Rosemary Scott, Grand Rapids, for petitioner-appellant.

George L. McCargar, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for respondent-appellee.

Before HOLBROOK, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and HOTCHKISS, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Cecil H. Turner was a patient at the Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hospital from 1969 until his death in 1979. This case centers on the liability of his estate and spouse to reimburse the state for mental health services.

In 1969, Lois P. Turner petitioned the Kent Probate Court to reduce or eliminate a prior order for 100 percent reimbursement of the expenses for mental health services rendered to her husband, Cecil H. Turner, mentally incompetent. On December 9, 1969, the probate court ordered that no further reimbursement would be required, provided that the petitioner pay Cecil H. Turner's retirement benefit and his portion of social security benefits then being received to the Department of Treasury. This order was dependent upon payment by the petitioner of the full reimbursement charge for the year 1969.

The new Mental Health Code effective in 1975 changed the method of determining financial liability for mental health services. M.C.L. § 330.1800 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.800(800) et seq. Under provisions of the new code, the respondent made a determination of the petitioner's financial liability for services provided to Cecil H. Turner by the state. The petitioner contested the respondent's determination of financial liability by requesting an administrative hearing pursuant to M.C.L. § 330.1834; M.S.A. § 14.800(834). At the administrative hearing, counsel for the petitioner argued that the 1969 probate court order was controlling and barred a subsequent redetermination of liability under the new Mental Health Code. In addition counsel protested the absence of rules pertaining to a determination of ability to pay. The Mental Health Code requires that rules be promulgated to particularize procedures for determining ability to pay. M.C.L. § 330.1842; M.S.A. § 14.800(842).

The administrative law judge entered an interim order which required the respondent to redetermine the petitioner's liability based on appropriate information to be provided by the petitioner. The petitioner refused to make a full disclosure of appropriate information so the administrative law judge affirmed the original determination of liability. The administrative law judge found that the respondent had no rules in effect at the time of the hearing but concluded that since the hearing was held pursuant to the contested case provision of the Administrative Procedures Act, M.C.L. § 24.271 et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(171) et seq., the petitioner was afforded due process. Further, the respondent's procedures do provide adequate guidelines regarding the formulation of a liability determination and provide adequate due process notice of the course which the petitioner must pursue.

The petitioner appealed the decision of the administrative law judge to the Kent County Probate Court as provided by the code, M.C.L. § 330.1836; M.S.A. § 14.800(836). On September 11, 1978, the probate court entered an order affirming the administrative law judge.

The petitioner appealed the probate court decision to Kent County Circuit Court. The circuit court found that the December, 1969, probate court order was not a bar to the establishment of a new reimbursement liability. In addition, the circuit court judge found that the administrative procedures of the administrative law judge were in compliance with the Mental Health Code and did afford the parties due process of law. In the court's opinion the determination of the ability to pay was not that complicated, was one that is determined in many aspects of life and information and that data needed for that computation is readily available. This Court granted leave to appeal.

First, we deal with the petitioner's contention that the December, 1969, probate court order bars a redetermination of plaintiff's reimbursement liability. The 1969 probate court decision indicates that the order for reimbursement was of a continuing nature. Regular payments of plaintiff's retirement benefits and social security benefits were to replace the prior 100 percent reimbursement order. Since institutionalization was a continuing factor, it was not the intent of the former order to hold that the Mental Health Code could not reach or attempt to reach persons responsible for Cecil H. Turner's care in order to determine whether there was an ability to pay. The purpose and intent of the 1969 order was not to act as a full and final determination of the liabilities between the parties.

The petitioner has asserted that the 1969 order of the probate court is res judicata and therefore bars any further action by the state or the petitioner. In a similar case, this Court in In re Raseman Estate, 18 Mich.App. 91, 170 N.W.2d 503 (1969), found that the doctrine of res judicata is not immutable. The reason why the probate court order can be modified is because it operates in futuro as to facts that had not occurred when the order was entered. We conclude that the 1969 order of the probate court does not prevent a redetermination of liability and subsequent enforcement proceedings where in the interval the facts have changed which alter the legal rights and relations of the parties.

Additionally, the Legislature contemplated that probate court orders imposing a continuing financial liability would remain in effect only until defendant redetermined financial liability. Prior to the new Mental Health Code, the probate court's reimbursement order was pursuant to 1923 P.A. 151. This act was specifically repealed under the new Mental Health Code, M.C.L. § 330.2106; M.S.A. § 14.800(1106). Section 1104 of the act, M.C.L. § 330.2104; M.S.A. § 14.800(1104), mandates that all actions having legal affect under any act repealed by the new code which are inconsistent with the new code shall be redetermined and made consistent with the new act. The respondent was obligated to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Mental Health Code which required a redetermination of financial liability.

Thus, under either prior law or the new Mental Health Code, the order of the probate court was subject to modification.

We now turn to the second issue raised by the petitioner. The petitioner argues a denial of due process because the respondent had not promulgated substantive rules to use in determining financial responsibility. Section 842 of...