Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Co.
Decision Date | 19 June 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 14078.,14078. |
Parties | TURNER v. ALTON BANKING & TRUST CO. et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Chase Morsey, St. Louis, Mo. (Jones, Hocker, Gladney & Grand, Lon Hocker, Jr., Benjamin Roth, St. Louis, Mo., and Wm. M. P. Smith, Edwardsville, Ill., on the brief), for appellant.
B. Sherman Landau, St. Louis, Mo. (Louis E. Miller, St. Louis, Mo., Cross, Streuber, Gibbons & Gwillim, Alton, Ill., and Miller & Landau, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from a judgment for $141,205.76 entered upon a verdict directed for the plaintiff in an action upon a foreign judgment. The same case was before this court upon an appeal from an order of the court striking a counterclaim. 166 F.2d 305.
The judgment upon which the complaint was based was rendered in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois (a court of general jurisdiction), May 21, 1943, upon a cognovit note due on demand, given by appellant to her father. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. At the time the note was made in 1930 the defendant, appellant here, and her father both resided in Illinois. Thereafter in 1935, appellant removed to the State of Missouri where she still lived at the time the judgment appealed from was rendered. After the note was made and delivered appellant's father died and appellee was appointed and qualified as executor of his will.
The case was first presented to Judge Duncan, who entered the order from which the first appeal to this court was taken. After remand it was tried before Judge Harper, who entered the judgment from which the present appeal was taken.
Upon the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence an authenticated copy of the judgment sued upon and rested. The defendant then offered in evidence an authenticated copy of a judgment entered by the same court on the same note on February 24, 1943, and rested. This judgment had been entered upon the appearance of an attorney attempting to act under the warrant of attorney given in the note. He attempted to enter defendant's appearance and to confess judgment, and a judgment was then entered upon such confession. The defendant having learned of the proceeding appeared by attorneys and upon motion the judgment of February 24, 1943, was set aside on May 20, 1943, for want of jurisdiction due to a defect in the affidavit of the attorney and the case "was continued for trial."
A new suit was filed on the same note the following day, and another attorney acting under the warrant of attorney given in the note appeared for the appellant, and the judgment by confession, upon which this action is based, was entered. No steps have since been taken in the Illinois court to vacate or to set aside the judgment so entered.
This suit was commenced in the federal court March 13, 1946. The trial commenced November 29, 1948, and the judgment from which this appeal was taken was entered on October 12, 1949.
In this court appellant contends:
1. That the judgment of the Illinois court sued upon shows upon the face of the record that the court did not have jurisdiction in that (a) the note shows on its face that it was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations, wherefore the warrant of attorney was no longer valid; (b) it did not appear on the record in what county of the state the note was executed as required by Hurd's Illinois Statutes, 1947, c. 110, § 174(5); (c) the warrant of attorney was exhausted by the appearance of the attorney who appeared and confessed judgment on February 24, 1943, wherefore the attorney who appeared and confessed judgment on May 21, 1943, had no power to do so; and
2. In rendering judgment without notice to the defendant she was denied due process of law guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, the judgment sued upon is not entitled to full faith and credit in the district court in Missouri.
The contention that the suit having been commenced more than ten years after the note matured the warrant of attorney had expired by limitation under Illinois law is without merit for various reasons. First, the warrant of attorney in the note in effect waives the statute of limitations. So far as material it reads: "If this note is not paid at maturity, we * * * do hereby * * * empower any attorney of any Court of Record to appear for us * * * at any time hereafter and confess a judgment without process against us * * * in favor of the legal holder thereof * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, the appellant relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Parsons v. Lurie, 400 Ill. 498, 81 N.E.2d 182, 185, in which the court, citing Matzenbaugh v. Doyle, 156 Ill. 331, 333, 336, 40 N.E. 935, said: The court said, also, in the same opinion: "The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction can be attacked in collateral proceedings only by the record itself." Citing Illinois authorities. (Emphasis supplied.) And "a transcript of the judgment, properly certified, is all that is necessary to make out a prima facie case." Toler v. Coover, 335 Mo. 113, 71 S.W.2d 1067, 1068; Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1057.
The record here shows clearly that the action on the note was not barred by the 10-year statute of limitations. Chapter 83, page 2144, § 19, of the Ill.Rev.Stat., 1947, provides that
Under the decisions of the Illinois courts it is clear that the cause of action accrued in this case when the note was executed and that the 10-year statute of limitations began to run at that time; and it is equally clear that the statute was tolled when appellant moved to Missouri in 1935 while the owner of the note, the creditor remained in Illinois. Mitchell v. Comstock, 305 Ill.App. 360, 27 N.E.2d 620, 625; Jones v. Foster, 175 Ill. 459, 51 N.E. 862; Richey v. Sinclair, 167 Ill. 184, 47 N.E. 364; Hibernian Banking Association v. Commercial National Bank of Chicago, 157 Ill. 524, 41 N.E. 919; Wooley v. Yarnell, 142 Ill. 442, 32 N.E. 891.
The contention that it did not appear on the record in what county of the State of Illinois the note was executed is based upon the requirement of § 174(5) of the Illinois statute, supra, which provides that
The note in this instance is dated "Alton, Ill., February 17, 1930." Alton is in Madison County, Illinois, where the court which entered the judgment sat. In Mitchell v. Comstock, supra, the court said 305 Ill.App. 360, 27 N.E.2d 625: , citing Bronte v. Leslie, 30 Ill.App. 288. Here the court was required to take judicial notice that Alton is situated in Madison County, Illinois. Linck v. City of Litchfield, 141 Ill. 469, 31 N.E. 123.
That the note in question and the non-residence of the defendant were shown on the face of the record in the suit in the Illinois court cannot be doubted. The complaint alleged that a photostatic copy of the note was attached to and made part thereof; and it alleged that defendant, maker of the note "* * * is now, and has been continuously for seven years last past a non-resident of the State of Illinois * * *" and "is now and has been continuously for seven years last past a resident of the State of Missouri"; and the affidavit attached to the complaint averred that defendant had continuously resided in Missouri for the past seven years. This was sufficient. Smith-Hurd Stats.Ill. c. 110, § 160.
It is next contended that the power of attorney was exhausted when the attorney appeared and confessed judgment on the note on February 24, 1943, and, therefore, the attorney who thereafter appeared and confessed judgment on May 21, 1943, had no power to do so. But the judgment on February 24, 1943, proved to be invalid and was thereafter set aside by the court that entered it. The courts of Illinois hold that a warrant of attorney confers authority to confess a valid judgment, and that when an attempted judgment has been vacated as invalid the warrant has not functioned but retained its original potency. Hoyt v. Morris, 216 Ill.App. 321; Vandersall v. Goldsmith, 231 Ill.App. 165.
It is true that the Hoyt and Vandersall cases are not binding upon the federal courts s...
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