Turner v. Calderon

• Decision Date: 27 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. CIV. F-91-153-REC-P.,CIV. F-91-153-REC-P.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Thaddaeus Louis TURNER, Petitioner, v. Arthur CALDERON, as Warden of San Quentin State Prison, Respondent.

Page 781

970 F.Supp. 781

Thaddaeus Louis TURNER, Petitioner, v. Arthur CALDERON, as Warden of San Quentin State Prison, Respondent.

No. CIV. F-91-153-REC-P.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

June 27, 1997.

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Katherine L. Hart, Law Offices of Katherine Hart, Charles T. Taylor, Lang, Richert & Patch, Fresno, CA, for Thaddaeus Turner.

Attorney General Daniel E. Lungren, W. Scott Thorpe, Sacramento, CA, for State.

DEATH PENALTY CASE

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CLAIMS 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 34, AND 36.

COYLE, District Judge.

This amended memorandum and order is filed to clarify the Court's discernment of the law governing death eligibility and sentencing in California. The original memorandum and order was filed on April 29, 1997. This amended document reflects minor grammatical and citation corrections as well as an update of the present procedural status.

I. Summary of the Relevant Facts

This case involves the stabbing murder of Roy Savage by Petitioner Thaddaeus Louis Turner on April 14, 1984. Mr. Savage was stabbed 44 to 46 times in his Merced home. Several household items and Mr. Savage's late model Cadillac were missing from the house when sheriff's deputies commenced their investigation. Turner admitted the act of stabbing Mr. Savage, taking a television from Mr. Savage's home, and driving away in Mr. Savage's car. He claimed to be a habitual PCP and marijuana user, including on the day of the offense. When Turner was apprehended by a CHP officer in Fresno two days later, he was driving Mr. Savage's car. The missing television set was in the trunk and Mr. Savage's wallet was on the console of the car. None of the other items said to be missing from Mr. Savage's house were recovered.

The evidence adduced at trial discloses that Mr. Savage was a highly respected African-American administrator and instructor at Merced Community College. In his position as the director of the Educational Opportunity Programs and Services at the college, he helped many young people pursue an education and obtain jobs. Since Mr. Savage owned several rental houses, it was not unusual for him to hire young people to help with landscaping and clean up tasks for these rental houses.

The defense attempted to bring out the fact that Mr. Savage engaged in homosexual activities and cultivated homosexual relations. This inference was alluded to by the testimony of Mr. Savage's second cousin, Gregory Mayo, as well as by his co-worker at the college, Augusti Albritton. Both testified that sometimes Mr. Savage went to San Francisco for week end stays and did not talk about what he did. The defense also called a former bartender, Jay Bradshaw, who worked at a known "gay" bar in Fresno. Mr. Bradshaw had informed police that Mr. Savage was a frequent customer at the bar. Turner testified that he met Mr. Savage at a bus stop just outside this bar in Fresno while Turner was on his way home from work as a construction worker. Mr. Savage offered Turner work performing landscaping tasks on his (Mr. Savage's) house. Turner accepted and Mr. Savage arranged to drive to Fresno to pick Turner up and return to Merced the following week end.

Turner worked for an unspecified time in Mr. Savage's yard, as he was hired to do, and then, with no protest from Mr. Savage, stopped mid-morning. For the remainder of the morning and afternoon, he and Mr. Savage talked and ran errands together. Mr. Savage also invited Turner to listen to his stereo. According to Turner, at the end of the day, while Turner was waiting for Mr. Savage to take him back to Fresno, Mr. Savage first requested, then pleaded for Turner to have sex with him. An argument followed about whether Turner would have sex with Mr. Savage or disclose the fact of Mr. Savage's proposition. Ultimately, Turner testified, the argument became physical and Mr. Savage assaulted him. Turner claims he drew his buck knife to ward off the unwanted sexual attack. Mr. Savage's perceived persistence was followed by Turner's harried and hysterical response, which resulted in Mr. Savage's death. Mr. Savage's homosexuality and his proposition to Turner were the linchpins for Turner's defense respecting motivation for the killing. During Turner's testimony at trial, he did not controvert that he killed Mr. Savage. Rather, the case focused on Turner's perceived need to defend himself and diminished mental state due to low intelligence and drug/alcohol intoxication.

The prosecutor painted a picture of Turner as an opportunistic, cold-blooded killer motivated by the desire to steal from his victim. The prosecutor argued Turner's story of Mr. Savage's unwanted homosexual overtures was simply unbelievable. To the extent Mr. Savage did express a sexual interest, Turner exploited Mr. Savage's feelings to gain access to Mr. Savage's home and cultivate Mr. Savage's trust. Under the prosecution theory, Turner formulated a premeditated plan to kill Mr. Savage so he could realize his goal to acquire Mr. Savage's property.

Two aspects of the crime were highly contested at trial. The first was whether Turner absconded with all the household items from Mr. Savage's house that were catalogued as missing, or just the items found in his possession at the time of his arrest. The second concerns whether Turner was responsible for cutting two of the three telephone cords in Mr. Savage's house. Since the cords had no blood on them, and the killing of Mr. Savage was a very bloody event,¹ the prosecutor argued Turner cut the cords in advance of the killing as part of his plan to steal. Turner denied cutting the cords or formulating the intent to steal in advance of Mr. Savage's death. He maintains that his decision to take any of Mr. Savage's possessions did not occur until Mr. Savage was dead. He offered an alternative theory that someone entered Mr. Savage's home after the killing, cut the cords and took the rest of the missing items from the house.

II. Procedural History

Turner's jury returned a verdict of guilty for first degree murder and found true the robbery murder special circumstance on November 21, 1984. On November 27, 1984, the penalty phase commenced and was completed the same day when the jury returned a verdict of the death penalty. Turner's motion for modification of the verdict was heard and denied on December 21, 1984. His direct appeal affirming the conviction and death sentence was filed April 26, 1990. He commenced this federal proceeding on April 1, 1991. On May 25, 1993, the Court ordered Turner to exhaust his state remedies. His state petition for habeas corpus was denied on March 25, 1996. Turner filed his amended Federal Petition on April 29, 1996.

Following the State's Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the grounds of procedural default, the Court issued an Order on October 30, 1996 resolving the State's motion. In the Order, Claims 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, 34, and 36 were determined to be procedurally defaulted based on the Dixon rule.² Under California law, the Dixon rule bars the presentation of claims to the California Supreme Court on state habeas which could have been, but were not, raised on a timely appeal. In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759, 264 P.2d 513 (1953). Where the denial of habeas relief by the California Supreme Court rests on independent and adequate state law grounds, federal review of the same claims also is barred. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-31, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2553-55, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). For the reasons stated in the October 30, 1996 Order, this Court has determined that the Dixon rule is an independent state law ground which precludes federal review.

The issue now before the Court is whether Turner can demonstrate that he should be excused from his procedural default under the cause and prejudice test or the fundamental miscarriage of justice standard. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506-07, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649-50, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). In the October 30, 1996 Order, Turner was instructed to limit his showing to the "prejudice" prong of the cause and prejudice test and actual innocence during the guilt phase of the trial under the miscarriage of justice standard.

In reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, the Court finds that Claims 10, 19, and 30 are not procedurally barred on federal habeas. It is now apparent these claims were not properly categorized by the California Supreme Court as defaulted under the Dixon rule in the order denying Turner's state habeas petition.³ The merits of Claims 10, 19, and 30 were presented to the state court and rejected on direct appeal. People v. Turner, 50 Cal.3d 668, 710-14, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 (1990). The Court withdraws its earlier determination in the October 30, 1996 Order to the contrary.

In addressing the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test, both parties have argued the merits of Claim 10, 19, and 30 complete with record references and citation to legal authority. The arguments on both sides are forceful and logically reasoned. There is no basis to believe the parties failed to advance their best arguments at this stage of the proceedings. Since both parties have thoroughly briefed Claims 10, 19, and 30, no reason appears for the Court not to address and resolve the merits. Claims 10, 19, and 30 are discussed in Part V, below.

The Court finds that all of the claims discussed below lack substantive merit. Accordingly, Turner has not established prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice for the procedurally defaulted claims. Claims 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 34, and 36 are dismissed. Claims 10, 19, and 30 are denied on the merits.

III. The Standard of Review to Excuse Procedural Default

To establish prejudice in the context of overcoming a...